The Politics of Europeanisation Patterns of Work and Family Life Reconciliation Policy: Germany and Turkey

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I confirm that the word count of this thesis is less than 100,000 words excluding the title page, contents, acknowledgements, abstract, abbreviations, footnotes, diagrams, maps, illustrations, tables, appendices, and references.
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Declaration:

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Abstract

With the dramatic changes in the extent to which women and men contribute to unpaid domestic work and paid employment, work and family life reconciliation (WFLR) has become more prominent than ever before within the European Union (EU) agenda. Particularly from the 2000s, the EU began to require a relatively stronger convergence from member and candidate states. However, this does not necessarily result in total policy change. Existing domestic political and cultural conditions may facilitate or prohibit the change at national levels. This comparative study thus endeavours to examine the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies of a longstanding candidate country, Turkey and a founding member country, Germany, over the last decade, with a particular emphasis on intervening domestic actors and factors.

To interrogate the subject, the study draws on a combination of Europeanisation literature and New Institutionalism (NI) theory. The term Europeanisation has been applied when explaining the domestic impact of the EU on Turkish and German WFLR policies, whereas the NI theory has been applied when explaining the domestic responses to the EU influence.

This study employs a qualitative research design and adopts a comparative approach. The comparison is conducted between the Europeanisation process in Germany and the Europeanisation process in Turkey around this specific policy area. The data have been collected through the combination of document analysis and 80 semi-structured in-depth interviews with EU representatives; German and Turkish political elites; representatives of civil society organisations (CSO); and academics. The collected data is then analysed through the combination of thematic analysis and process tracing.

The findings show that, at the time when the EU started to require a stronger convergence, the gaps between the German and Turkish WFLR policies and the EU WFLR policies were considerable. Therefore, each country received a high level of adaptational pressure in this specific policy area. In response to this adaptational pressure, both governments introduced a number of laws with respect to WFLR. However, a close examination of these laws indicates an incomplete and a contradictory Europeanisation process in each country. This study
further found the simultaneous existence of domestic actors supporting the Europeanisation process and of those supporting the status quo; their contributions to the process are key reasons for this contradiction and incompleteness, which adds to the view that Europeanisation is a two-fold process, which comprises both the push from the EU and the pull by the domestic actors.

Through its uniquely developed theoretical framework that compares Europeanisation patterns of a founding member and a candidate state from an actor-centred lens, this study contributes to three different literature strands: Europeanisation, gender studies, and comparative social policy studies. Additionally, due to the wide range of data collected throughout the fieldwork, this study also provides an empirical contribution by giving more insight into Europeanisation and social policy knowledge at national levels.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALDE</td>
<td>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central Eastern European Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAP</td>
<td>Deutsche Arbeiterpartei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Grünen</td>
<td>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Linke</td>
<td>German Left Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWL</td>
<td>European Women’s Lobby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMM Committee</td>
<td>European Parliament Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Halkların Demokratik Partisi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical Institutionalism</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFSP</td>
<td>Ministry of Family and Social Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGH</td>
<td>Milli Görüş Hareketi</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method of Coordination</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NI</td>
<td>New Institutionalism</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
<td>Rational Choice Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Refah Partisi</td>
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<td>SDAP</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Sociological Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBMM</td>
<td>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASG</td>
<td>Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative</td>
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<td>WFLR</td>
<td>Work and Family Life Reconciliation</td>
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<td>WW2</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the interplay of several factors contributed to the alteration of the prevalent family model and, concomitantly, existing gender roles. These included an increase in the number of women entering higher education, the structural transformation of the labour market, and the increased gap between prices and income, together with the increased economic necessity for two-earner families (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013; Lewis, 2009). It has been argued that the traditional male breadwinner family model (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hantrais, 2004; Lewis, 1992) has since lost some of its social prevalence over other family models, with the ‘adult earner family model,’ or at least the ‘one-and-a-half earner family model,’ gaining more prominence. This has resulted in a significant change in the life path of many women. Generally speaking, a typical post-war woman was expected to marry in her early twenties and have children right after marriage, and then dedicate the rest of her life to family altruism, acting as a ‘domestic servant’ (Esping-Andersen, 2009: 27). From the early 1980s onwards, women have increasingly chosen not to dedicate their lives to family altruism and have come to be associated with both home-making and lifelong employment (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2000).

These changes have been seen to improve women’s status within society. By pursuing a shift from primarily domestic ‘duties’ to lifelong employment, women could be freed from the dependency on either their fathers or male breadwinner partners (Lewis, 2009). However, it has also been argued that this change gave rise to new social inequalities and risks: some important aspects of this being the decrease in fertility rates; the double burden of family and job responsibilities on women’s shoulders; and the absence of mothers from their children’s lives (Hemerijck, 2013). Esping-Andersen (2009) associates this with the social policy structure of societies, stating that existing
welfare states are not fully ready to offset this new trajectory. To this end, and in line with the main aim of social policy-making, which is to provide human wellbeing and increase quality of life (Taylor-Gooby, 1996), these transformations have successfully harmonised with the formulation of laws and policies. Therefore, work and family life reconciliation (WFLR) has become one of the most pressing policy and political subjects across Europe but especially at the European Union (EU) level (Drew et al., 1998). From the 1980s onwards, the EU has prepared numerous strategies, formulated a range of goals and targets, drafted legislation and introduced various initiatives and roadmaps regarding the reconciliation of work and family life. However, with decision making around social policy, including WFLR policies, remaining under the domain of national competence of member and candidate states; the impact of all this attention at EU level on these issues has had varied impact on domestic policy. It was only as a result of the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in 2000\(^1\) that a stronger convergence from member and candidate states was required in this specific policy area. However, there remains considerable variation between countries in transferring and implementing EU standards, mostly stemming from the existence of national domestic actors with differing views on Europeanising the domestic WFLR model.

Since the 1980s, with many European welfare states are experiencing a rapid shift towards the ‘one- and-a-half earner’ or ‘adult earner’ family models and with the EU has been paying exceptional attention to the issue, it is not surprising that the scholarship on WFLR has exploded. To date, the literature on social policy, European studies and gender studies includes an array of accounts of the historical and contemporary development of WFLR policy at the EU and national levels. However,

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\(^1\) During the 2000s, the coordination method of governance became more common in the EU. Unlike the community and intergovernmental methods, it offers a mid-way solution and finds the best practices among member states, or at least decreases member states’ reluctance in terms of adopting the EU standards into their national legislative frameworks (Borras and Jacobson, 2004; Vural, 2011).
several elements of this topic have been less well researched. These include: analysis of the transmission process of corresponding EU policies into domestic levels, especially when it comes to candidate countries; internalisation of those policies by domestic governmental and nongovernmental actors; and their implementation at national levels. This study, therefore, seeks to address these gaps. More precisely, it aims to examine the Europeanisation processes of a longstanding EU candidate country, Turkey, and an EU founding member country, Germany, in this specific policy area.

1.1. Rationale:
This thesis is a comparative cross-case study that adopts a qualitative approach to examine the Europeanisation patterns of Turkish and German WFLR policies with a particular emphasis on intervening domestic actors. In the illustration of such an uneven and complex process of Europeanising the national WFLR legislative framework, an actor-centred perspective is taken. For this reason, the central emphasis is on investigating the roles and attitudes of domestic actors and tracing the causal mechanisms that account for the decisions of the domestic actors, while responding to the adaptational pressure coming from the EU.

In order to achieve this aim, this study has developed its own theoretical framework, which combines Europeanisation with New Institutionalism (NI). The term ‘Europeanisation’ is applied to explain the domestic impacts of the EU and the ways in which the EU influences nation states. As elaborated in Chapter 2, this study accepts the term as a tremendously intricate two-way process that has been filtered through various domestic factors and actors. It argues that firstly, member states strive to upload their domestic preferences to the EU level, depending on their political and administrative capacities. In this study, this dimension is expected to apply only to Germany: Turkey is a candidate country, rather than a member, thus its relationship with the EU is more
asymmetric than that of Germany and the EU. Secondly, and after the decision is made at the EU level on the basis of negotiations with the member states, the EU begins to require a convergence from its member and candidate states. This is where the top-down dimension comes into play. This study bears in mind that Europeanisation is not limited to legislative changes, but also includes how European values and norms and policy paradigms are internalised and how they shape discourses and identities (Héritier, 2001a; Ketola, 2013; Olsen, 2002), especially in policy areas where the divergence between the member states and the EU is high. In this way, this study uniquely explores the impact of EU WFLR policies on Turkish and German WFLR policies (the top-down dimension) at four levels (Diez et al., 2005): (1) policy Europeanisation, the legislative changes that have been made under EU influence; (2) discursive Europeanisation, the ways in which the domestic actors perceive the idea of Europeanising the national WFLR model; (3) political Europeanisation, the domestic actors’ contributions to the process; and lastly (4) societal Europeanisation, to what extent and why the EU way of reconciling work and family lives has been practised at the national level.

Furthermore, NI theory has been applied to explain domestic responses to the influence of the EU. In discursive Europeanisation, NI seeks to explain the mechanisms that account for the ways in which domestic actors perceive Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies; in political Europeanisation, NI theory is applied in order to understand the driving forces behind domestic actors’ actions throughout the process; and finally, for societal Europeanisation, this thesis appeals to NI theory to illustrate the reasons behind the existing WFLR trends. Ultimately, explaining Europeanisation through NI theory allows us to identify and better understand the reasons behind the legislative and practical decisions that have been made under the EU influence, as well as to locate the Europeanisation of WFLR policies within a broader national political picture.
The gap in the existing literature on domestic actors’ contributions to the process of Europeanisation centred the fieldwork to this study. Alongside the analysis of related literature and policy documents, 80 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with Turkish and German political elites, including the countries’ former labour and family ministers; nongovernmental organisation (NGO) representatives; academics sharing the similar research interest and EU representatives. The collected data have been analysed through a combination of process tracing and thematic analysis. This combination allows the researcher to illustrate the key features of a very complex, uneven, and under-researched process with a greater focus on the intervening causal mechanisms. Process tracing has contributed to the identification of the mechanisms that account for policy changes under the influence of the EU, whereas thematic analysis facilitated the understanding of corresponding domestic actors’ perceptions of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model, as well as the driving forces behind their contributions to the process. The rationale behind the decisions made with respect to the research design are further elaborated in Chapter 3. Now that the thesis rationale and research perspective have been briefly presented, the next section will discuss the gaps in the existing literature, and how this thesis aims to fill them.

1.2. Research gap and contribution:

The growing emphasis on WFLR issues specifically at the EU level has been reflected in an increasing research focus on the topic. Accordingly, there is now a vast literature on WFLR. Yet, there is also a salient research gap, especially within the Europeanisation literature.

In her PhD dissertation, Ayşe İdil Aybars states that over time, the EU has gradually moved away from being a ‘single market’ and a ‘common currency’ towards being ‘an external policy’, ‘a security framework’, ‘an immigration agenda’ and most
importantly ‘a European Social Model’ (Aybars, 2007b:1), which expects an increased level of social policy convergence from its member and candidate states. In line with this increased convergence expectation, a process of Europeanising the domestic social policy framework has begun in most member and candidate states. Therefore, the existing literature on Europeanisation has largely focused on the Europeanisation of various social policy spheres. These include the Europeanisation of immigration policies (Faist and Ette, 2007; Lavenex, 2001; Schain, 2009); civil society policy (Diez et al., 2005; Içduygu, 2013; Ketola, 2013; Zihnioğlu, 2013; Warleigh, 2001); social protection policy (Kvist and Saari, 2007); public policy (Radaelli, 2003); gender equality policy (Kantola, 2010; Liebert, 2003; Lombardo and Forest, 2012); employment policy (Aybars, 2007a; Graziano, 2011; Mosher and Trubek, 2003) and environmental policies (Jordan, 2002). However, the Europeanisation of WFLR policies has mostly been overlooked. Moreover, the main foci of these studies were on the policy changes pursued by the national states. The discursive, political and societal levels of the analysis were disregarded. Finally, Europeanisation scholars (Abrahamson, 1999; Aybars, 2007b; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Jacquot, 2008; Korpi, 2003) have also combined Europeanisation with welfare state typology and questioned how the transmission of EU standards to national levels has been filtered through the welfare regimes. However, although the welfare typology is a conscious preference of a certain socio-political ideology, the roles of the domestic actors remain unexamined.

A number of notable social policy scholars have paid significant attention to WFLR issues. They have focused on the internal and external factors influencing WFLR policy-making as well as the existing WFLR policies at the EU and national levels (Crompton et al., 2007; Drew, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 2002; 2009; Lewis, 2006, 2009). These researchers have questioned the policy paradigm behind WFLR policies and developed a number of alternative paradigms, with the aim of solving the work and
family life conflict. More recently, a growing emphasis has been placed on the implementation of WFLR policies at national levels. A voluminous body of research explores how families reconcile their work and family lives and aims to understand the shortcomings of the existing WFLR policies (Grebe, 2009; Hantrais, 2000; Knijn and Smit, 2009; Lewis, 2006). However, these works remain insufficient as they fail to combine their analysis with examination of the EU influence on changes to domestic WFLR legislation.

As WFLR is embedded in a highly tangled nexus of employment, family and gender equality policies (Grebe, 2009), the issue has also been assessed by researchers in the area of gender studies and social policy. Using a feminist lens, they question whether and to what extent WFLR policies could alleviate gender inequalities (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Hakim, 2000; Lewis, 2009; Saraceno and Keck, 2010; Stratigaki, 2004). They pay particular attention to exploring and explaining the role of WFLR policies in women’s economic liberation by encouraging their labour market participation through providing a balanced work and a family life. However, this body of work also excludes the EU influence from their analysis.

In sum, this thesis departs from the accumulated knowledge on WFLR, arguing that with the new social risks and inequalities stemming from the changing labour market and family structures, WFLR has turned into one of the key policy areas at the EU level. Especially within the last two decades, the EU has begun to require more convergence from its member and candidate states. In line with the EU’s requirements, each member and candidate state has taken some important steps towards Europeanising the domestic model. However, the outcome of Europeanisation has varied greatly from one country to another, and many of the member and candidate states do not demonstrate a fully-fledged Europeanisation (Hantrais, 2004). In the quest to understand the factors and actors that constrain member and candidate states from a fully-fledged
Europeanisation, the existing literature has found that the process of Europeanising the domestic model is highly filtered by the welfare model employed at the domestic-level. Although each legislative piece is an intentional outcome of a certain ideology, the domestic actors’ perceptions of and contributions to the process as well as their internalisation of the EU standards have been overlooked. Accordingly, through its uniquely developed theoretical framework that approaches Europeanisation from an actor-centred perspective, together with the data collected in two countries at very different levels of social policy development, and at different levels of relationship with the EU, this study aims to contribute to existing knowledge both at theoretical and empirical levels. Although the primary focus of this thesis is Europeanisation of WFLR policies, it is expected to advance the theoretical boundaries in three different literature strands: Europeanisation, comparative social policy studies and gender studies. Moreover, due to the first-hand data collected throughout the fieldwork, this study aims to provide an empirical contribution by giving more insight into Europeanisation at national levels. As one of the very few research studies comparing the Europeanisation process of a candidate country with the Europeanisation process of a member state in this specific policy area, it displays the significant interconnection between national debates and the Europeanisation patterns.

1.3. Case selection:

Yin (2009) highlights that multiple case studies are likely to be stronger than a single case study design. Gerring (2017) and Hakim (1987) confirm Yin’s argument but further argue that the cases to be analysed should be formulated in line with the researcher’s aims and research questions, regardless of their number. Relying on Yin, Gerring and Hakim, this study explores the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies from an
actor-centred perspective, selecting as its case studies the Europeanisation process of Turkey and the Europeanisation process of Germany.

The key rationale behind choosing Turkey and Germany as case studies is that both exhibit a high level of misfit with the EU in terms of their domestic WFLR models. Concomitantly, they both have been subject to some criticism and received adaptational pressure from the EU. It is argued that the German social policy framework and German political elites have played a significant role in the construction of the Turkish social policy model (Özbek, 2006; Şen, 2002). Accordingly, there are many similarities; the most important one for this study is that both of their family models strongly support traditional gender roles. In both countries, historically, women are expected to be the homemaker whereas men are expected to be the breadwinner, and this fed into the ways in which German and Turkish laws and policies were formulated. Accordingly, WFLR policies in both countries were highly similar in terms of their nature and paradigm.

Over the last seventeen years, in light of the pressure coming from the EU, both countries have witnessed shifts, away from their male breadwinner-female homemaker model. However, the reforms have followed different paths and reached different points. Since this thesis expects domestic factors and actors, to mediate the ultimate Europeanisation pattern, it stresses those domestic factors and actors that influenced the process by comparing two different countries with similar departure but different arrival points (see figure 1.1 below). The letters ‘X,Y,Z and W’ in Figure 1.1 visualise the initial similarities between German and Turkish family models, whereas the letters ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ and ‘q’, ‘w’ and ‘r’, refer to the differences between Germany and Turkey in terms of their relations with the EU, and in terms of their socio-political, socio-economic, political institutions and political history that are expected to shape the ultimate Europeanisation pattern. Moreover, Germany’s status as a founding member and
Turkey’s status as a candidate state demonstrate how the operation of Europeanisation differs from a member to candidate state.

**Figure 1.1:** Rationale behind the selected cases.

In addition to theory- and context-driven reasons, practical considerations also influenced the case selection. The researcher’s fluency in the language of each country allowed her to overcome any potential language boundaries during the fieldwork. As well, Turkey is the researcher’s home country, easing her access to interviewees.

**1.4. Time frame:**

This study examines the period between 2000 and 2017 for two reasons. First of all, as detailed in Chapter 4, in the course of the post-industrial era, formerly neglected work and family life conflicts have been well-acknowledged by the EU. Instead of being a supplementary policy field as it was in the past, work/life balance has come to be a highly significant and inseparable part of the EU social policy model (Kantola, 2010; Liebert, 2003). Thus, WFLR issues have increasingly begun to appear in EU policy documents (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Drew, 1998; Fahlen, 2012; Hantrais, 2004; Lewis, 2006, 2009, Stratigaki, 2004). The introduction of the OMC in 2000 gave a new dimension to WFLR policies in that the EU began to require its member states to converge themselves with the corresponding EU standards (Esping-Andersen, 2009). From 2000 onwards, EU member states have been expected to transpose both the hard and the soft EU WFLR policies into their domestic legislative frameworks. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that a process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR
models has gradually appeared in each member state, including Germany, which is interesting to trace.

Furthermore, although Turkey had applied for full membership only two years after the European Economic Community (EEC) – the predecessor to the EU – was established, their long-awaited date only arrived in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, when the EU declared Turkey as an official candidate state (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). Afterwards, a mutual but hierarchical exchange period began between the EU and Turkey. The EU started sending ‘to do lists’ for Turkey, under the name of ‘Accession Partnership Documents’, wherein the EU outlines the administrative and legislative amendments Turkey had to make to attain official membership (ibid). As a response to these official documents, the Turkish government has introduced a number of laws and bylaws with respect to leave schemes, childcare provision and working time arrangements in a like manner to the EU (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Dedeoğlu, 2012; İlíkkaracan, 2010). In other words, it can be argued that a Europeanisation process has also started in Turkey. This thesis, which aims to explore how the operation of Europeanisation differs from a member to a candidate country, takes advantage of this and examines the period between 2000 and 2017.

1.5. Research Questions:

This research has been conducted to explore the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies in Turkey and Germany from an actor-centred perspective. The main research question, therefore, is ‘how, why and to what extent have Germany and Turkey Europeanised their domestic WFLR model?’ By exploring the literature on the concept of Europeanisation, the researcher has found that Europeanisation is an interactive and context-dependent process. Five puzzling notions stem from such an interpretation of
Europeanisation: each of which stands as a research question for this study and each of
which is addressed in four empirical chapters.

The first research question accordingly asks ‘How, why and to what extent has
Germany influenced the EU WFLR policies?’ This question means to unfold traces of
German WFLR in EU WFLR policies.

The second research question targets the other side of the coin and asks ‘How
and to what extent has the EU influenced the domestic WFLR policies in Germany and
Turkey?’ This question seeks to reveal the administrative and legislative changes that
have been made in Germany and Turkey as a result of the adaptational pressure coming
from the EU.

The third research question next asks ‘How have German and Turkish domestic
actors responded to Europeanisation of German and Turkish WFLR policies?’ Being
the core analysis of this study, this question involves multiple dimensions: (a) who are
the main domestic actors that took part throughout the Europeanisation process? (b)
How they have responded to the relatively greater EU involvement? (c) What are the
main motivations behind their perceptions of Europeanising the domestic WFLR
policies while also engaging in the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR
model?

The fourth question takes its lead from the previous and asks ‘How have domestic
actors contributed to the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies?’ This
question aims to explore domestic actors’ input and influence upon the process.

The final question asks ‘Why and to what extent have the EU WFLR policies
been implemented in Germany and Turkey?’ It probes the extent of implementation of
the WFLR policies and the main background reasons that they have been introduced in
light of EU pressure.
These five research questions allow this study to contain two comparative dimensions: (1) the comparison of the operation of Europeanisation in a candidate and a member state; and (2) the comparison of the impact of the inner dynamics of two countries that differ from each other in terms of social policy development, political and cultural backgrounds and relationship to the EU on their Europeanisation outcomes.

1.6. Limitations of the research:

The key aim of this study is to investigate the Europeanisation puzzle with respect to WFLR policies in Turkey and Germany at four different levels. The researcher reached the target respondents and collected the data needed; however, there were some limitations which have been compensated for through various methods.

To begin with, the researcher commenced interviews in Brussels with EU officials, with the initial aim of getting more information on the EU’s thoughts towards German and Turkish reconciliation models than what is already provided in official EU documents. However, the level of information that could be obtained was highly disproportionate with regard to the two countries. EU officials, and the representatives of social partners and social institutions, were very keen to comment on the German model and its limitations. Yet, the same cannot be said for Turkey. As the researcher was from Turkey and Turkey-EU relations are in a period of regression (mostly because of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt\(^2\), current refugee crises and the Turkish President’s hostility to the EU), the EU officials were reluctant to speak about Turkey. The gaps caused by this reluctance have been addressed here through scrutiny of relevant EU documents, relevant data and papers published by the Organisation for Economic Co-

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\(^2\)On 15 July 2016, Turkey experienced its fourth military coup. A faction within the Turkish Armed Forces deemed to be connected with Turkey’s one of the strongest Islamist movements – the Gulen Movement – once again attempted to interfere in politics. Yet this time, unlike previous experiences, it was the coup attempters who failed. Neither the Turkish Grand National Assembly was closed nor the ruling party AKP. From that day on, Turkey has been under a state of emergency, which has fed into the elimination of democratic rule, erosion of secularism and trampling of human rights (Kandiyoti and Emanet, 2017).
operation and Development (OECD), and reports by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and International Labour Organisation (ILO), as well as through the interviews conducted in Turkey with representatives of the Ministry of the EU.

At the time the researcher commenced her fieldwork, Turkey was in a state of emergency due to the recent coup attempt. In the wake of the attempt, various NGOs were closed down with no reason given, and numerous academics, public sector employees and civil servants were suspended. Although these maladies have impacted on the interview process to a lesser degree than feared, there are still some apparent traces. Contrary to expectations, party deputies and NGO representatives were highly vocal and generous during the interviews. The civil servants, however, remained relatively more reluctant to express their views.

Three further limitations of the thesis generated from the formulation of the research questions rather than the conditions of the day. The first which is worth noting comes from the ways in which the EU approaches the reconciliation of work and family lives. There is an intense debate around whether the EU WFLR policies are aimed at achieving greater gender equality or at serving economic growth. However, this study excludes those discussions and accepts WFLR at the EU level as described by the EU because this study is aimed at unfolding Europeanisation patterns of Germany and Turkey in this specific area. Such an aim requires researcher to focus on how Europeanisation operates and on what are the domestic responses to Europeanisation, rather than focusing on the developments at the EU level.

The second limitation arising from the research formulation is in relation to societal Europeanisation. As explained in-depth in Chapter 2, societal Europeanisation refers to the implementation of EU standards by member and candidate state residents. In that sense, the aim of examining societal Europeanisation is to reveal whether and to
what extent Europeanisation could change Turkish and German citizens’ WFLR trends. The initial plan was to interview those people who have a family and a work life about how they reconcile those responsibilities, the most problematic aspects of the existing reconciliation policies and their main needs. However, this was found to be unfeasible in terms of time and cost. Therefore, the researcher reduced the study of societal Europeanisation to the analysis of existing data and publications collected through interviews with key academics and NGO representatives focused on research rather than advocacy, and from Turkish and German official statistic institutes (TUIK and DEstatis).

The last limitation of this research stems from the length of the thesis and relates to data triangulation. In order not to exceed the word limit set by the Ulster University, in most cases, the author supported her arguments with one direct quotation. However, as discussed in chapter 3 (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 at pages 55 and 56), she had interviewed a large number of domestic actors who are involved with or knowledgeable about WFLR policy-making, which helped with her efforts to triangulate the data. The author ensured that each claim that has been made throughout this thesis was expressed by more than one interview partner. In other words, the themes, which emerged are not specific to one particular respondent.

1.7. Structure of the thesis:

This thesis is structured in nine chapters. This introductory chapter proceeds to Chapter 2, which lays out the theoretical framework developed in this study and locates it to the phenomenon under investigation. More precisely, it reviews the literature on Europeanisation and NI. In doing so, it discusses how and why Europeanisation literature remains insufficient to fully explore the Europeanisation processes of German and Turkish WFLR policies. This is an important part of the discussion because it
explains why and how this thesis approaches Europeanisation using the additional framework of NI, and how the combination is applied to WFLR policy.

In continuation of the theoretical framework chapter, Chapter 3 presents the research design. It explains the research methods used in this thesis while collecting, coding and analysing the data, together with the rationale behind those methodological choices.

Chapter 4 presents the contextual framework. It visits the literature on WFLR policy both at the EU and national levels. This thesis is determined to trace the Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey in this specific policy area; therefore, establishing the nature of domestic WFLR policies before the processes began is of vital importance. Moreover, the chapter provides an overview of the factors that urge WFLR policy-making in EU, German and Turkish contexts. Finally, as the EU expects its member and candidate states to transfer not only the WFLR policies but also the policy paradigm, the chapter also discusses the EU logic behind WFLR policy-making.

Having explained the theoretical, methodological and contextual frameworks, the thesis proceeds to its empirical findings. Accordingly, Chapter 5 explores WFLR policy Europeanisation. This thesis accepts Europeanisation as a two-way process that consists of both the EU’s requirements from the nation states and the nation states’ responses. In line with the ways in which Europeanisation has been interpreted, Chapter 5 delves into the WFLR policy reforms experienced by Germany and Turkey under the EU influence. Therefore, it first discusses the EU’s requirements of these two countries together with the countries’ domestic legislative responses. Second, it discusses any mismatch between the EU requirements and the two sets of domestic policy responses.

The core analysis of this thesis is presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6 focuses on the stances of the domestic actors towards greater EU involvement in this specific policy area of WFLR. In other words, it illustrates the perceptions of domestic
actors towards Europeanising the domestic legislative framework, perceptions which are expected to shape the whole process. In that sense, it questions why some actors have decided to act as a catalyst and accelerated the process while others have favoured the status quo and decelerated the process. By exploring domestic actors’ perceptions of the Europeanisation of WFLR policies through NI, the chapter aims to reveal the importance of domestic actors’ rational calculations, as well as socio-political and historical backgrounds, to the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies.

Drawing on the perception of Europeanisation of WFLR at national levels, Chapter 7 analyses domestic actors’ contributions to the process. More specifically, this chapter seeks to explain the strategies and tactics that have been employed by both catalysts and antagonists while achieving their aims, together with the barriers that they have faced throughout the process. By showing the differences in strategy that have been employed and the barriers that have been faced by catalysts and antagonists, the chapter highlights how socio-political and socio-economic conditions of the day may influence the Europeanisation process. In-depth illustration of the strategies and barriers is very important for this thesis because it shows how Europeanisation is literally shaped by the domestic actors on the ground.

Since Europeanisation process involves not only policy adaptation but also the implementation of those policies, the last empirical chapter focuses on the societal level. Chapter 8 explores the implementation of WFLR policies made in Germany and Turkey under the EU influence. It questions why and to what extent the EU WFLR trend has been practised at national levels by German and Turkish citizens. By analysing the reasons behind societal actors’ daily WFLR practices, the chapter also speaks to the top-down nature of the EU. It discusses to what extent and why a supranational WFLR model is implementable at the domestic levels.
The final chapter reminds the reader about the main findings of this thesis and draws several conclusions from the analysis conducted. It aims to bring together the findings in order to discuss Turkey’s and Germany’s Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies. Moreover, by linking the findings with the key research questions, the chapter aims to provide alternative ideas for WFLR policy-making as well as outline areas for future research.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the study in order to explore the Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey. In doing so, it draws on two crucial aspects: (a) Europeanisation and (b) New Institutionalism. As illustrated later in this chapter, Europeanisation is taken here to refer to a bidirectional process, which both shapes and is shaped by the domestic policies and politics. To this end, the term Europeanisation has been applied when explaining the domestic impact of the EU and the ways in which the EU influences the national states, whereas New Institutionalism (NI) theory has been applied when explaining the domestic responses to the EU influence. To that end, the chapter is organised in seven sections. It begins by defining the concept of Europeanisation; secondly, it explains the different domains of Europeanisation; thirdly, it illustrates the ways in which Europeanisation operates; fourthly, it examines the roles of the domestic actors throughout the process, which is where the study appeals to NI. Therefore, the fifth section continues with a detailed explanation of NI; sixthly it discusses the potential Europeanisation patterns that are identified within the Europeanisation literature; and finally, it puts forward an interpretation of Europeanisation in the field of WFLR.

2.1. Definitions of Europeanisation:

Notable scholars have already observed that Europeanisation is not a theory itself but a puzzling and a vague concept in the broad field of European Studies (Graziano and Vink, 2008; Ketola, 2013; Ladrech, 2010 and Radaelli, 2004). Therefore, it has accrued different meanings in different contexts over time and various commentators have defined it differently due to their research interests and objectives.
As Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009) put forward, early studies on Europeanisation had largely focused on the evolution of European institutions as a set of new rules and practices. Ladrech, one of the initial advocates of this tendency, defines the term as:

An incremental process, reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics became part of the organizational logic of politics and policy-making (Ladrech, 1994:69).

As can be seen from the definition above, contributors have been concerned with the ways in which member state governments influence the EU-level administrative and legislative structures, exploring how, and to what extent, member states contribute to the establishment of EU level norms, values, rules and practices. This process, wherein member states try to transfer their own preferences to the European level, has been labelled as the ‘bottom-up’ dimension within the Europeanisation literature. This variant of Europeanisation has primarily been developed by Tanja A. Börzel (2002). She argues in her ground-breaking work ‘Member State Responses to Europeanisation’ that member states look for ways to ‘upload’ their national policy preferences to the EU in order to reduce the divergence between the EU and domestic legislative frameworks as much as possible so that they can subsequently minimise the costs of domestic legislation and implementation of EU rules, values and norms (Börzel, 2002; Börzel and Risse, 2003). It has further been argued that the process of uploading national preferences to the EU differs from one member state to another (Börzel and Risse, 2003).

Although various scholars have identified a wide range of factors that affect the success of uploading, there is a significant consensus that more powerful member states are more likely to succeed in transferring their own preferences to the EU. In other words, they are more successful in shaping EU standards. The literature on the bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation has identified two aspects which define what precisely is meant by being more powerful: (1) political capacity, or the political weight which the member
states carry in EU decision making bodies (such as the number of votes in the Council and financial contribution to the EU budget); and (2) administrative capacity, which can be defined as the function of particular resources such as staff-power, money or ability to offer expertise and information to the European Commission (EC) in the drafting of policy proposals (Diez et al., 2005; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Cowles and Risse, 2001; Radaelli, 2000).

More recently, Europeanisation scholars have increasingly become interested in what happens after the legislative framework has been developed at the EU level. This is the dimension known as ‘top-down’ within the Europeanisation literature. According to Börzel and Risse (2000), this dimension was *sine quo non* for a fully-fledged examination of any Europeanisation process. The authors associated with this dimension have argued that the EU developments have surely influenced the national legislative structures. Yet, each member and candidate state has been influenced in varied ways and to different extents (Kvist and Saari, 2007; Ladrech, 2010 and Radaelli, 2003) depending on the cost and benefit calculations done at national levels (rational choice institutionalism, RCI); past decisions of national governments (historical institutionalism, HI) and national governments’ logics of appropriateness (sociological institutionalism, SI). Accordingly, Europeanisation scholars have sought answers for the ways in which the EU and its rules, regulations, norms and values affect member and candidate states at their domestic levels. Two major factors appear to influence this issue. The first one is the adaptational pressure coming from the EU to member states due to the divergence between EU level and domestic level structures. The second one is the presence of domestic factors and actors that would respond to this pressure either by pro-acting or reacting (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). These factors and actors are called ‘mechanisms of Europeanisation’ and will be discussed in depth below.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these two dimensions of Europeanisation are not mutually exclusive. The reason they have been explained separately here is for theoretical purposes only. Europeanisation is an on-going process and these two dimensions in practice characterise two different phases of this on-going process. In that sense, one of the most comprehensive explanations of the term for this thesis has been provided by Claudio M. Radaelli, who defines Europeanisation as:

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2003:30).

This definition is crucial for this study because (1) it involves the role of member states in the process of decision-making at the EU level rather than treating Europeanisation as a one-way process in which EU institutions only impose their decisions on member states. It considers how, to what extent and why member states contribute to the EU legislative framework; (2) it emphasises the whole process through illustrating the roles of the domestic actors instead of looking and conceptualising the final domestic change. In other words, it examines the ways in which domestic actors perceive and contribute to the process of Europeanising the domestic legislative framework by bringing NI into the discussion; (3) it moves the scope of Europeanisation beyond the corresponding policies and involves the corresponding norms, values, rules and regulations; and (4) it stresses the importance of not only the adaptation of European norms, values, rules and regulations, but also their implementation and internalisation.

In sum, as has been discussed above, it is impossible to attribute one single meaning to the term Europeanisation. It takes different forms and explanations at different times in different research agenda. This study, examining the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies in Turkey and Germany, relies on Radaelli’s definition (cited
above) and accepts the term as a two-way process rather than restricting itself to either bottom-up or top-down dimensions. By approaching Europeanisation from such an angle, this study distinguishes Europeanisation from European integration, convergence or harmonisation. It argues that Europeanisation can only be a possible outcome of European integration and it has only the potential to bring about convergence or harmonisation, both of which in the end depend on various domestic aspects that are associated with the process, which are discussed later in this chapter. That is to say that the member and the candidate states might either accept or reject reformulating the national legislative framework in the light of EU requirements. Moreover, the level of reformulation featured at the national level may not be enough to close the gap with the EU, or on the contrary they may successfully conform their national structures to the EU’s (Featherstone, 2003; O’Connor, 2005).

Domestic structure, however, is a very wide description. For a careful and detailed analysis of the Europeanisation process, what is meant by domestic structure should be identified. Thus, the chapter proceeds with looking at ‘what is being Europeanised’; in other words, the domains wherein the effects of Europeanisation appear.

2.2 Domains of Europeanisation:
Börzel and Risse (2000) identify three major areas where EU matters and concomitantly the impacts of Europeanisation appear: politics, polities and policies. Their intention is fully practical – making the Europeanisation more suitable for empirical analysis. So, they argue that in order to make it more amenable, the domestic impacts of Europeanisation on polities, policies and politics of a country should be analysed separately.
In their categorisation, politics involves the processes of interest formation, aggregation and representation of the political actors, as well as their strategies and cooperation with other domestic actors, mainly with interest groups. To this end, the research concerned with the Europeanisation of politics aims to explore the changes in the actions of actors who are engaged with domestic governance under EU influence (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Ladrech, 2010; Wiener and Diez, 2004). Further, policy alludes to ‘political community and its institutions’ (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 18) including national executives, national parliaments, national courts or regional institutions (Ladrech, 2010). Hence, the Europeanisation of polities examines whether and how any of these institutions have witnessed a change with respect to the EU. Lastly, the Europeanisation of policies refers to any kind of transformation and adjustment to national policies, as well as the logic behind policy-making and problem solving due to EU influence (Börzel and Risse, 2003).

Relying on Börzel and Risse, this research devotes itself to policy Europeanisation and aims to examine the transmission of EU WFLR policies in German and Turkish contexts. However, in order to strengthen the analysis and reach a more holistic and accurate conclusion, this study also considers Ulrike Liebert’s (2002) argument that Europeanisation matters not only in terms of the changes that take place in the administrative and legislative structures of national governments, but also in the extent to which the national states feel ‘European’. That is to say that Europeanisation includes how EU values and norms as well as policy-paradigms are internalised and how they shape discourses and identities at national levels. Therefore, as can be seen from Figure 2.1 below, this study explores the impact of the EU WFLR model on Turkish and German models in four different levels: (1) Policy Europeanisation, which is probably the most common and widespread dimension, looks at the adjustments on national legislative frameworks (Diez et al., 2005). As Ketola (2013: 35) puts forward, it
examines ‘(a) what is required by the EU and (b) to what extent the country’s legislative framework meets those requirements or how it may need to change’. It concentrates on the level of fit and misfit between the member or candidate state policies and the EU level policies (Risse et al., 2001). It would not be controversial to say that this dimension is the first step of exploring the Europeanisation process of a country. It examines how and to what extent Turkish and German reconciliation measures differ from the EU reconciliation measures and what changes Turkish and German governments have made throughout the process. (2) Discursive Europeanisation aims to understand the attitudes of domestic actors towards Europeanising the national WFLR policies and the framing of WFLR Europeanisation in domestic actors’ language. It explores the ways in which EU WFLR is referred to within party campaigns, party programs or social movement campaigns (Cowles and Risse, 2001; Diez et al., 2005; Ketola, 2013). This dimension can be considered as a tool to identify both the domestic actors that support the EU way of reconciling work and family life and thus accelerate the adaptation of those policies, and the domestic actors that challenge EU-induced policies and prefer to preserve the national framework. (3) Political Europeanisation aims to back up discursive Europeanisation and looks at how domestic actors react to and operate within this process. Although the literature on political Europeanisation restricts itself solely to domestic political actors, in order to draw a more detailed picture on the domestic actors’ roles throughout the process, this study also includes NGOs because in both countries the civil society organisations (CSOs) in general, but women’s NGOs in particular, appear as a highly strong component of the process. Finally, since the EU requires a stronger convergence from its member and candidate states in the areas where the level of misfit is high, which is true for both of the selected countries, this study does not limit itself to the governance level alone, but uniquely considers how corresponding European values and norms are practised by German and Turkish citizens. Accordingly, the last
level is (4) Societal Europeanisation – whether, why, and to what extent, EU standards of reconciling work and family life affect the identity formation at the domestic level. Put simply, how ‘European’ do individuals feel while they are reconciling their work and family lives?

**Figure 2.1:** The domains of Europeanisation.

![Europeanisation Diagram]

As can be seen from Figure 2.1 above, this thesis approaches policy Europeanisation from four different levels, each of which stands as a single element of the whole process. Nevertheless, as Cowles and Risse (2001) have stated, no matter which level of Europeanisation has been studied, there are certain conditions in order for Europeanisation to operate and the chapter proceeds with discussion of these.

**2.3. Operationalising Europeanisation:**

Comparative research on Europeanisation pinpoints that the ways in which Europeanisation operates differ between a member state and a candidate state due to the nature of their relations with the EU. Therefore, the chapter analyses how Europeanisation operates in Turkey and Germany separately.

**2.3.1. Europeanisation of a member state:**

Cowles and Risse (2001) develop one of the most significant and elaborate frameworks for explaining how Europeanisation operates in a member state, citing the ‘mechanisms
of Europeanisation’. They perceive Europeanisation as a two-way process – an institution and policy building process at the EU level first, followed by the effects of these institutions and policies on EU member states. Accordingly, Europeanisation can operate only if there is a misfit (Duina, 1997) or mismatch (Héritier, 1996) between European policies and institutions on the one hand and national policies and institutions on the other. Put simply, they argue that there must be a gap between what is required by the EU and the extent to which the country’s legislation framework meets those requirements (Ketola, 2013). They call the degree of this gap between the EU requirements and country’s framework ‘the goodness of fit’ (Cowles and Risse, 2001). They further argued that this misfit between domestic and EU levels will eventually cause an adaptational pressure on member states: a larger gap would lead to stronger pressure coming from the EU and vice versa (Cowles and Risse, 2001; Ladrech, 2010). In the meantime, they note that the existence of this adaptational pressure does not necessarily narrow that gap between national and EU levels or bring change to domestic structures. Existing domestic political and cultural conditions, which they call ‘mediating factors’, may facilitate or prohibit the change at the national level (Cowles and Risse, 2001). In other words, they may accelerate or decelerate the process. (Domestic political and societal factors and actors have been identified as mediating factors and the ways in which they shape the operation of Europeanisation are discussed below in section 2.4.).

The ‘goodness of fit’ argument has been cited as a very useful framework to explain how Europeanisation proceeds. Nonetheless, it has also been criticised from various angles (Héritier, 2001a; Héritier, 2001b; Radaelli, 2003). One that is important for this study is offered by Claudio Radaelli, who highlights its insufficiency in comprising first the soft laws developed at the EU level and second the bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Radaelli, 2003). His critique
is very applicable to this study because: (1) the EU WFLR policy package consists of both soft and hard laws; and (2) one of the selected countries, Germany, is a powerful founding member of the union, so that its Europeanisation process in the broad sense is expected to be two-fold, including an uploading process on the one hand and a downloading process on the other (Dyson and Goetz, 2003).

Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) state that Europeanisation of soft laws differs significantly from Europeanisation of hard laws. While Europeanisation operates ‘horizontally’ with respect to soft laws, it operates ‘vertically’ when it comes to hard laws. Vertical Europeanisation makes a sharp distinction between the EU level and domestic level and leads to new policy-making or policy adjustment, whereas the horizontal makes a smoother distinction between the EU level and domestic level and leads to policy learning at the domestic political sphere. Moreover, Bulmer and Radaelli outline three modes of governance, namely ‘governance by negotiation’; ‘governance by hierarchy’ and ‘facilitated co-ordination’. The first governance mode, governance by negotiation, refers to the bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation and operates through vertical mechanisms. Member states try to upload their own preferences to the EU level in order to decrease the level of later adaptational pressure. The second mode of governance, governance by hierarchy, refers to the top-down dimension of Europeanisation. At this stage in their conceptualisation, the uploading is over and the model to be downloaded is ready for member states to adapt. This mode of governance is usually valid for EU hard laws and operates through a vertical Europeanisation mechanism. The last mode of governance is facilitated co-ordination; this applies to EU soft laws, and thus operates through horizontal mechanisms and refers to ‘a platform for learning about good practice’ rather than policy change (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 12). Because it works horizontally and functions in transferring soft laws, which are non-binding measures, it is expected to result in policy learning at the domestic level
(Jacquot, 2008; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). Learning here defines a process of internalising EU norms, values, rules and practices. It results in modifications and alterations in policy makers’ paradigms and thus in the policy-making process (Göksel, 2011; Jacquot, 2008; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). By formulating Europeanisation in this way, Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) involve formerly neglected aspects of Europeanisation. However, their formulation concerns member states rather than candidate states. As one of the cases this study considers is not yet a member, the chapter proceeds with a discussion of the ways in which Europeanisation operates in candidate states.

2.3.2. Europeanisation of a candidate state: Conditionality

The research on Europeanisation was originally concerned with EU member states. However, the context of enlargement, and mostly Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEEC) desire to join the EU, led the EU to influence the restructuring of their domestic legislation (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). This is reflected in the Europeanisation literature under the term ‘conditionality’. Scholars engaged with the term have sought to explain the Europeanisation processes of non-member but candidate countries (Grabbe, 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). Before describing how conditionality works, it is important to underline the distinction between democratic conditionality and the acquis conditionality. While the former concerns the adaptation of basic democratic and human right norms, the latter focuses on the transposition of certain EU laws into the domestic legislative frameworks (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2009). The former mostly appears in the early stages of the EU membership trajectory, whereas the latter, upon which this study focuses, appears at the later stages of the accession processes.
Conditionality is a process wherein a candidate country tries officially to convince the EU of its current capacity to enact EU laws, regulations, norms and values at the domestic level. This undoubtably leads to a move at the domestic levels from internal standards towards EU standards. Therefore, it could be argued that conditionality triggers a Europeanisation process in candidate countries. The process actually starts when the country decides to apply for membership. The country gains an official status when the European Council recognises this candidacy and declares it eligible (Keyman, 2013). Prior to doing so, the Council expects the applicant country to fulfil the so-called Copenhagen criteria – certain pre-determined rules and laws that the country needs to follow and implement in order to be eligible to join the EU. They can be summarised as (1) guaranteeing democracy and ensuring the protection of human rights and minority rights; (2) a functioning market economy and ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership and implement the EU acquis, which refers to all existing or potential rights and obligations of the EU including the binding and non-binding laws, rules and regulations, as well as the norms and values (Aldikaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Keyman, 2013).

These determine the country’s possible readiness for the full membership. Once the Council officially recognises and declares the candidacy status, the Europeanisation process officially begins. With this official recognition, the applicant country starts receiving the ‘Accession Partnership Documents’ – official documents prepared by the EC that identify the reforms needed to be done at the domestic level in order to align the domestic legislative structure to the

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3 Ideally, a candidate country gains an official candidacy status when it completely meets the Copenhagen criteria. Yet, in practice, most countries gain the official candidacy status before they completely met the Copenhagen criteria, and therefore, they cannot start the negotiations for the full membership immediately (Aldikaçtı-Marshall, 2013).
EU *acquis*, together with the financial and technical aid provided by the EU to the applicant country for the reforms. In response to these documents, the applicant country draws up a detailed action programme for the adoption of the EU *acquis*. Then the Commission reviews this ‘National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis’ and transmits its thoughts on the proposed reforms, in terms of compliance with the EU *acquis* to the applicant country, through annual ‘Progress Reports’ (Ministry for EU Affairs, n.d.; Dimitrova, 2002; Linden, 2002; Schimmelfenning et al., 2003). As can be seen, this is highly asymmetrical (Grabbe, 2003).

In such an asymmetrical relationship, the EU appears as an organism which is eligible to define certain prerequisites that the candidate country has to meet in order to achieve membership status (Vachudova, 1995). In contrast to member states’ Europeanisation processes, the Europeanisation process of candidate states is one-dimensional, meaning that candidate states are not involved in the EU policy-making and institution building processes. Thus, they cannot influence any policy outcome at the EU level. Theoretically speaking, Europeanisation in candidate states operates both vertically and horizontally as in the member states. However, unlike with member states, Europeanisation in candidate states does not have the bottom-up dimension; therefore, it lacks the governance by negotiation mode. It only starts after the decision has been made at the EU level and consists of the adaptation of those EU standards. On the other hand, the EU and its member states expect candidate countries to prove their ‘Europeanness’, to demonstrate that they share the same norms, values and legal structures as the EU and its members so that they would not remain as an outsider. This gives the EU extensive power of sanction over these countries (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005), meaning that the EU requires a broader and deeper integration from them. Accordingly, candidate countries are required to adapt not only EU hard laws, but also the EU soft laws. Furthermore, candidate countries are expected to exhibit a policy-
making paradigm change (Dimitrova, 2002; Linden, 2002; Schimmelfenning et al., 2003). In that sense, it can be argued that the Europeanisation process of the candidate countries holds the policy learning potential so it contains facilitated co-ordination as defined by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004).

To sum up, the concept of conditionality is regarded as the key instrument of the Europeanisation processes of the candidate countries. Although Grabbe (2003) states that there is no big difference between the way in which Europeanisation operates in member states and the way in which it operates in candidate states, the term conditionality highlights two important points, already mentioned above. The first is that because candidate countries are not members yet, they do not have a say in forming the policy package at the EU level, which ultimately creates an asymmetrical relationship. The second point is the uncertainty of their status, meaning that these countries gain an official membership status conditioned on how Europeanised they are (Grabbe, 2003).

Nevertheless, as the operation of Europeanisation is relevant for both the member and candidate states, this study does not make a distinction between the candidate and the member states while explaining their Europeanisation processes, but relies on the Europeanisation literature (Grabbe, 2003; Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2009; Tocci, 2005). Ideally, once the EU spells out the rules of acquis, candidate states – perhaps even more than member states – should adopt them. The EU clearly appears as an external push-factor and an oracle for policy-making in both member and candidate states. However, in practice neither a member nor a candidate state transposes those rules of acquis flawlessly (Tocci, 2005) and fully accommodates their policy framework to the EU. Europeanisation has a clear impact on member and candidate states in terms of changing their legislative status quo. Yet that is not to say that there will be a fully-fledged policy change in domestic structures. Member and candidate states will not necessarily be totally Europeanised. Their Europeanisation processes are filtered
through a number of factors leading to different Europeanisation outcomes. By and large, the literature on Europeanisation points to existing welfare models and the national social policies as the main sources of this filtration (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). As any kind of social policy is an intentional outcome – an intentional preference, more precisely – of certain groups of political actors, it could easily be argued that domestic political actors are the beating hearts of the Europeanisation processes. They are involved in policy-making by hampering the status quo, thus helping Europeanisation to bring change, or by defending the status-quo and favouring policy stability. Either way, they make their legislative decisions on the basis of different purposes (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Héritier, 2005; March and Olsen, 1998; Peters, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002). The chapter continues by illustrating the roles of those domestic actors and their ideologically motivated conscious actions throughout the Europeanisation process.

2.4. Roles of the domestic actors:

The literature on Europeanisation states that the second condition for Europeanisation, to be materialised alongside the misfit and the concomitant adaptational pressure, is the capacity of domestic actors ‘to exploit the opportunities and avoid the constraints coming from such a misfit’ (Börzel and Risse, 2003:64). Throughout the Europeanisation process, member and candidate states appear as entities who carry the possibility of policy change as an outcome of the EU adaptational pressure. Simply put, whether they (member and candidate states) end up with policy change or preservation of the status quo depends very much on the behaviours of domestic actors determining the political agenda in those states.

Taking its lead from the literature on Europeanisation (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Hix and Goetz, 2007; Korpi, 2006; Radaelli, 2003), this thesis has divided those intervening domestic actors into two major groups in order to theorise their actions. The
first group, the so-called ‘catalysts’, consists of those capable of exploiting the opportunities and avoiding the constraints coming from a misfit. They are the ones who are in favour of the policy change and thus work for the change. Concomitantly, their presence accelerates the process of Europeanisation. The second group, the ‘antagonists’\(^4\), consists of the decelerators whose presence would favour the status quo as they work to veto the policy change but to preserve the national legislation (Korpi, 2006). Categorising domestic actors as catalysts and antagonists is particularly important for this study because it constitutes a bedrock of the empirical analysis carried out in this thesis. Three of the four empirical chapters base their findings on this catalyst/antagonist categorisation.

Although the Europeanisation literature successfully elucidates conditions under which Europeanisation will operate and in what direction it can lead, the primary question of why actors (governmental or nongovernmental) perform in a particular way (accelerating or decelerating the process) has not been addressed. That is to say that Europeanisation, which is not a theory in itself but more of a guiding framework explaining how possible change can occur, remains quite insufficient in terms of illustrating the reasons for the behaviours of domestic actors throughout the process. For a complete exploration of the Europeanisation process, those reasons need to be examined and explained. After all, Europeanisation can bring transformation at the national levels only if domestic actors seize upon the relevant EU standards. This is where the second aspect of the theoretical framework of this study – the NI – comes to the scene (Börzel and Risse, 2000; March and Olsen, 1998). In seeking to answer

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\(^4\) Korpi (2006) in his inspiring work ‘Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism Protagonists, Conselects and Antagonists’ identified the actors, who were opposed to extension of social citizenship rights as antagonists. This thesis, however, applies the term to German and Turkish actors, who refuse to support the process of Europeanising the national WFLR policies.
questions of which domestic actor did what and why, this study appeals to the three forms of NI: RCI, HI and SI (Ketola, 2013; Ladrech, 2010; March and Olsen, 1998; Peters, 2005) that are explicated below.

2.5. New Institutionalism:
NI is the enhanced version of institutionalism – a political science theory with the aim of explaining the emergence of ‘institutions’ and individuals’ behaviours within them (March and Olsen, 1998; Peters, 2005). The concept of an institution can be viewed as the practices and rules that define an appropriate way of behaving for specific groups of actors in specific circumstances (Peters, 2005). Research on institutionalism endeavours to theorise the actions of individuals towards those rules and practices. NI adds to this framework seven new variants (Normative Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism, Empirical Institutionalism, Constructivist Institutionalism and International Institutionalism) to enrich the exploration of individual behaviours. This study refers to three of these to explain the roles of mediating factors throughout the Europeanisation process. In the application of this theoretical framework to the Europeanisation process, the misfit, and the concomitant adaptational pressure, appears as an institution which might offer new opportunities to, or exert new restraints on, member and candidate states. Member and candidate states are perceived as specific groups of actors with the potential to react to these new opportunities and restraints (Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Schimmelfenning, 2010; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). Accordingly, they appear as a group of actors whose behaviours need to be analysed.

A number of notable Europeanisation scholars have pointed to RCI as the first of three useful frameworks for conceptualising how member and candidate states respond to the adaptational pressure coming from the EU (Börzel and Risse, 2003;
Featherstone, 2003; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Ketola, 2013; Ladrech, 2010; March and Olsen, 1998). RCI relies on ‘a logic of consequentialism’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 162) and perceives individuals as rational and goal-oriented beings, who evaluate the costs and benefits of a certain process, as well as anticipating other’s behaviours, before making their own decisions (Ketola, 2013; Pollack, 1999). It postulates maximum utility to the actors’ behaviours. From this point of view, each individual actor at the domestic level – whether be it a political actor who is responsible for making the corresponding policies or a civil society actor who tries to shape those policies by various lobbying activities – is expected strategically to calculate the potential gains and potential losses of meeting EU requirements (Featherstone, 2003). Those Europeanisation scholars holding a more actor-centred approach (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Scharpf, 1999; Schimmelfenning, 1999; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005; Tocci, 2005) have argued that domestic actors will facilitate change through working to meet those EU requirements and Europeanise the national legislative structure only if they perceive the gains of Europeanising the domestic policy model to be greater than the compliance costs. It is also important to note that even if domestic actors choose to be catalysts rather than antagonists, it does not necessarily mean that they pursue a policy-making paradigm change. Actors pushing for policy change and adopting EU laws into their national legislative frameworks might be strategically adopting those rules of the EU, which does very little to change their mind-sets. Acting as a catalyst throughout the process on the grounds of utility maximisation does not necessarily result in social learning (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005).

HI emerges as another very fruitful approach for explaining the Europeanisation process of a member or a candidate state from an actor-centred perspective. Again with a particular focus on the domestic actors’ preferences, this strand of thinking suggests that domestic actors’ decisions on supporting either the Europeanisation or the status
quo are very much related to the past (Pierson, 2000). That is to say that, policy decisions made in the past and the patterns they created, or any kind of historical incident, are crucially important in determining whether an actor would prefer to accelerate the Europeanisation process or decelerate it (Hall, 1986; Peters, 2005 and Pollack, 2006). In that sense, the treaties that member states have signed, the laws they have passed or the agreements they have made in the past surely shape the domestic change. Ketola (2013) has already linked this to Europeanisation and argued that if the residuals of the past are contrary to the EU requirements, then the domestic actors are likely to act as an antagonist and vice-versa. Yet it is important to note here that this may lead to two different outcomes depending on the efficiency of the earlier policies and political trends. On the one hand, if the initial decisions or the political incidents experienced have been felt inadequate or negative, then the actors would be likely to avoid making any kind of new decision that might recall those formerly failed ones. Therefore, HI would impact the current decision in a reactionary fashion. On the other hand, effective past decisions are likely to lead domestic actors to keep the political and policy legacies alive (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Peters, 2005; Meyer and Pfau-Effinger, 2006). HI would thus operate in a path-dependent fashion.

One last possible theoretical lens that can help explain why member and candidate states have been or have not been Europeanised is SI, which suggests ‘social learning’ (Risse, 2004a). This variant of NI claims that instead of trying to calculate the opportunities that Europeanisation can offer and the constraints that Europeanisation can exert, or to link these opportunities and constraints with the past, actors within the member and candidate states ‘follow a logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 23). That is, they have already considered the rules, regulation, norms and values that have been developed at the EU level as ‘the right thing to do’ (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Risse, 2004b). In contrast to the two aforementioned variants of NI, SI expects
Europeanisation to bring a change to member states through social learning and a process of persuasion. This means that domestic actors facilitate the Europeanisation process not because they think it is gainful, but because they are convinced that meeting EU requirements is the most appropriate and right action to take (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). Of all the domestic actors, the ones who have come to share the same logic with the EU fall under the catalysts and redefine their interests accordingly. The actors who are not persuaded by the appropriateness of the EU requirements continue to veto the process. The literature on NI refers to catalysts as ‘change agents’, who have come to share the same views with the EU and prefer to accelerate the social learning and internalisation process. These change agents might be government officials who have already internalised the EU standards and passed laws in line with the EU requirements or they might be NGOs lobbying the government (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005).

**Figure 2.2:** The intersection of Europeanisation and NI.

As Figure 2.2 above shows, the adaptational pressure and reform requirements coming from the EU have been received and assessed by the political and civil society actors within the member and candidate states before they take action in terms of Europeanising their national legislative structures. On the basis of (a) cost-benefit calculations; (b) the impacts of the past decisions; and (c) shared norms and values,
domestic actors prefer either to act as catalysts or as antagonists during the whole Europeanisation process. Yet frequently, national political milieus lack harmony in terms of how to act, with groups holding quite antagonistic and mutually exclusive views. Their simultaneous existence then raises the primary question: what brings about policy change and Europeanises the national legislative framework? The anticipated answer to this question is that the more catalysts there are, the more likely the member or candidate state is Europeanised. It is not, however, that straightforward. Apart from the number of catalysts, their position within the society also influences the trajectory of the Europeanisation process. It might be assumed that catalysts in the political sphere holding policy-making competence rather than being part of civil society, trying to shape the process by lobbying the policy-makers, would increase the possibility of Europeanisation. But, their status within the political spectrum is another important aspect. For example, whether the catalysts are from the ruling party or from the opposition parties, as well as whether they are in a monolithic government or a coalition government, also has a considerable impact on the nature of the Europeanisation process. Ultimately, no matter whether they are government officials or NGOs, their national and international collaborations influence the legislative and administrative adjustment process of a member or a candidate state (Tsebelis, 2002). It is important to note that these are theoretical tools to identify the outcomes of the Europeanisation process of a member and a candidate state. In order to spell out the precise Europeanisation outcome, one has to illustrate how these power relations actualise in practice; that illustration is delivered throughout this study. The chapter proceeds with the possible outcomes of Europeanisation.
2.6. Europeanisation patterns:

This study accepts the term Europeanisation as a two-way process hence, it aims to understand (a) the impact of the EU on domestic structures and (b) the impact of domestic structures on the EU. Under the scope of the first aim, two key questions arise: (1) how much change has been brought about by Europeanisation? And (2) to what extent has policy learning occurred at the domestic political structures? With respect to the first question, the Europeanisation literature (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Cowles and Risse, 2001 and Radaelli, 2003) identifies four possible outcomes covering the extent and direction of the change that can be discerned. An additional outcome was added by Börzel (2005) and Börzel and Risse (2005), resulting in five typical potential outcomes of domestic change emerging from the Europeanisation process. These are: (1) *inertia*, which refers to lack of change. It occurs in the absence of a similarity of EU laws, rules, regulations, choices and models at the national level (Radaelli, 2003: 37); (2) *absorption*, which indicates change as adaptation (Hall, 1993). It occurs when member and candidate states incorporate European policies or ideas into their programs and domestic structures, respectively, but without substantially modifying existing policies and institutions, and the degree of change is low (Börzel and Risse, 2009:14); (3) *accommodation*, which occurs when, as with absorption, member and candidate states adapt their existing policies and institutions without changing their essential features and underlying policy paradigm, but where there is a modest degree of change; (4) *transformation*, which refers to the pragmatic change that occurs when the fundamental logic of political behaviour changes in order to meet the EU requirements; and (5) *retrenchment*, which refers to the situation when the national policy become less European than it was (Radaelli, 2000; 2003).
It is important to distinguish accommodation from absorption, even though they are quite similar and both refer to an incomplete change. Neither absorption nor accommodation exhibit a fully-fledged replacement of existing domestic structures with Europeanised ones. Member and candidate states which feature either absorption or accommodation adjust their existing policies and institutions or introduce new ones in line with the EU. Yet, they do not abolish the old ones and in the end, these remaining opposing measures cast a shadow over the change. The difference between them is that accommodation involves a ‘patching-up’ (Heritirer, 2001: 201), which means associating new policies and ideas with the existing ones, and thus leads to a higher degree of change than absorption. However – because it lacks a change in the attitudes of the policy-makers and therefore lacks policy learning – it cannot be argued that it would bring a total convergence, especially in the long run (Börzel and Risse, 2007).

As Europeanisation is beyond policy change at the domestic levels and is likely to create policy-making paradigm change, the domestic outcomes of Europeanisation are not limited to those five mentioned above. While seeking answers for the second question, the extent of the policy learning, scholars engaged with soft Europeanisation (Brooks, 2012; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Radaelli, 2008) distinguish thin learning from thick learning. The former refers to considerable and decisive changes both in policy outcomes and policy-making processes and leads to substantial policy convergence, whereas the latter is not as drastic as the former and denotes only a change in the policy outcome. That is to say that, thick learning influences political elites’ policy-making paradigms, and thus is expected to result in a relatively stronger convergence for the national states with the EU, whereas the same is not expected from thin learning because it remains insufficient in influencing the ways in which political elites approach to corresponding policies (Radaelli, 2008).
While examining the impact of domestic structures on the EU (the second aim of this thesis), bottom-up Europeanisation scholars have highlighted a considerable difference from one member state to another in terms of their capacity to contribute to the EU policy package, even though each member state tends to upload its own policy preferences to the EU level in order to decrease the ultimate adaptation cost. Börzel (2002) identifies three different outcomes depending on the member state’s policy uploading performance and preference. The first, pace-setting, refers to actively shaping European policies according to domestic preferences. Pace-setters not only manage to export their national policy preferences to the EU but also push their national preferences into the negotiation processes so that eventually other member and candidate states will transfer them into their own national levels. The second outcome, foot-dragging, is exactly the opposite of pace-setting. It aims at stopping or at least assuaging the attempts of other member states to upload their domestic policies to the European level. Foot-draggers are highly reluctant to receive more convergence requirements from the EU; they rarely provide policy proposals to the EU or allow other member states to do so. Finally, fence-sitting consistently aims neither at initiating and promoting specific policies at the European level nor at preventing the attempts of others to do so. Fence-sitters do not attempt to upload national policy-preferences to the EU either because they do not have the action capacity or because they do not wish to be involved in policy-making process. They only form coalitions with pace-setters or with foot-draggers depending on the policy area (Börzel, 2002: 197).

Various authors (Diez et al., 2005; Kaliber, 2014; Ketola, 2013; Radaelli, 2008; Tocci, 2005) have proved that Europeanisation has certainly been affected by and affected national structures and has brought about changes in domestic structures and influenced the mind-sets of key actors in charge of policy-making. However, as can clearly be seen from the discussion above, the effect of Europeanisation on member and
candidate states and the extent of the change it has brought about, as well as the impact of member states on the EU policy package, varies from one country to another as well as from one policy field to another. Since this study restricts itself to WFLR, the chapter proceeds with how the Europeanisation operates in this specific policy area.

2.7. The relevance and application of the theory:

While defining Europeanisation above, it is argued that Europeanisation is a broad and general phenomenon, which has been subject to various conceptualisations provided from different approaches in the field of European studies. It follows that not every aspect of the conceptualisation is applicable for this study. Therefore, relying on Diez et al. (2005), Bulmer and Radaelli (2004), Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), Jacquot (2008), Radaelli (2003) and Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005), this study has developed its own interpretation.

While exploring the Europeanisation patterns of Turkey and Germany in the specific policy area of WFLR, Europeanisation is taken to refer to an ongoing process of transmission of corresponding EU policies into selected countries’ domestic political and cultural structures. Europeanisation conceived in this way necessitates a three-fold analysis. The first is the analysis of what is Europeanised. Of three major dimensions within which Europeanisation can take place – policy, polity and politics (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Diez et al., 2005; Ketola, 2013) – this study restricts itself to Europeanisation of related policy, yet examines it at four different levels: policy, discursive, political and societal.

The second analysis focuses on the ways in which Europeanisation operates while transferring different forms of policies. As WFLR contains what could be defined as hard and soft governance aspects (a more detailed discussion of these can be found in Chapter 4), how Europeanisation operates for each of those two forms of law requires
different explanations. Additionally, the fact that Germany is a founding member and Turkey a candidate country also leads Europeanisation to operate quite differently in each. The Europeanisation process of Turkey is one-dimensional, meaning that Turkey is not capable of contributing to the policy-making process at the EU level, whereas Europeanisation operates more mutually in Germany. That is to say that Germany is involved both in the policy-making and policy-transferring processes. Accordingly, as can also be seen from Figure 2.3 below, this study argues that first Germany strives to upload its domestic preferences to the EU level on the basis of its political and administrative capacity, which can operate through both vertical and horizontal mechanisms. Here, this study examines how and to what extent Germany has been involved in the WFLR policy-making process at the EU level. It further analyses which possible outcome of bottom-up Europeanisation – pace-setting, foot-dragging or fence-sitting – Germany exhibits.

After the decision is made at the EU level on the basis of negotiations with the member states’ representatives, the EU begins requiring convergence from its member and candidate states. This is where the top-down dimension and Turkey come into consideration. As there are both soft and hard laws at the EU level to be transferred by the member and candidate states, the Europeanisation operates through vertical and horizontal mechanisms. Here, vertical Europeanisation refers to member and candidate states’ adaption and implementation of hard reconciliation laws (such as the Pregnant Workers Directive; the Parental Leave Directive, Part-time Work Directive and Fixed-term Work Directive). The transposition of the corresponding hard laws onto the national legislative systems of Germany and Turkey will be analysed alongside two aspects. These are speed and extent (Duina, 1997). Speed here signifies whether or not the law was adapted by the country before the deadline defined by the EU. The extent refers to the scope of the adaptation, such as whether all relevant criteria of the
legislation were adopted, whether any adjustments were made after the adaptation, and whether any opposing laws remained.

On the other hand, horizontal Europeanisation refers to member and candidate states’ adoption and implementation of soft reconciliation laws (for example, the Lisbon Strategy and Barcelona targets). As transferring the EU soft laws results in social learning, these cannot be analysed by looking at countries’ national legislative, administrative or constitutional frameworks. Therefore, the Europeanisation of EU soft WFLR policies will be analysed by tracing the changes in the manners, behaviours and ideas of the domestic actors. Whether Germany and Turkey demonstrate thick or thin learning will be revealed.

**Figure 2.3:** Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey.

The final analysis concentrates on the mediating factors of Europeanisation in Germany and Turkey. As this study approaches Europeanisation as a process that feeds and shapes the policy frameworks at national levels, but also a process that has been fed and shaped by the historical, cultural and political dynamics of national states, it gives a particular importance to the roles of those domestic actors. In other words, this study expects the impacts of Europeanisation on German and Turkish reconciliation models to be filtered through the domestic actors’ existence (Meyer and Pfau-Effinger, 2006;
Tsebelis, 2002). Therefore, while explaining the patterns of Europeanisation of WFLR policies in Turkey and Germany, this thesis pays particular attention to the actors’ roles during the whole process and explains it through NI theory.

2.8. Conclusion:

This chapter presented the theoretical framework of this study. While examining the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies in Germany and Turkey from an actor-centred perspective, this study relies on the combination of Europeanisation and NI literature. The literature on Europeanisation is applied in order to explain how and to what extent the EU WFLR policies influence Turkish and German WFLR policies. In doing so, this thesis acknowledges the two-way nature of Europeanisation, which emphasises member and candidate states’ capability of shaping the trajectory of their Europeanisation processes, rather than considering them as passive recipients of the adaptational pressure. Accordingly, considerable attention has been paid to domestic responses to the EU requirements and conditions whereby NI is incorporated to the theoretical framework. Europeanisation has also been accepted as a very uneven path, with a highly complex process of implementation. Therefore, alongside exploring the EU influence on domestic legislative frameworks, this thesis examines domestic state mechanisms, domestic attitudes and views towards the EU and the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model.

Having explained the theoretical framework developed to explore the Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey in this specific policy area, the thesis proceeds with a methodological discussion, presenting the rationales behind the methodological choices made.
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN and METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodological approach adopted to investigate the research questions identified in this study. It explains how this research has been conducted and the rationale behind the methodological choices. The chapter consists of five sections. The first section describes the comparative cross-case research design and discusses why it was chosen as the most suitable for this study. The second section justifies the qualitative approach, the third discusses the research ethic, whereas the fourth and fifth sections focus on data collection methods and ethical considerations respectively. Finally, the chapter concludes by describing and justifying the data analysis technique used in this study.

3.1. Comparative cross-case study:

At the simplest level, case study is an intensive research method that provides richly detailed information (either descriptive or causal) of a particular single case or small number of cases (Gerring, 2017; Hakim, 1987; Hammersley and Gomm, 2002). Like any other research method, case studies aim at describing, understanding, examining, comparing and explaining. What distinguishes case studies from other research methods, first and foremost, is their exceptional focus on particular cases. It is, therefore, highly important to explain what a case is. Depending on the research aims and questions, a case might be a certain process (e.g., democratisation, urbanisation, industrialisation or Europeanisation); state or state-like entity (e.g., nation-state, region, municipality, city or village); organisation (e.g., NGO, firm, school or political party); social group (e.g., certain race, ethnic group or a protest group); or even a specific role or relationship (e.g., working women’s relationship with their children) (Gerring, 2017; Hakim, 1987).

Case studies strive to provide an ample, complete and in-depth knowledge of the empirical case(s) under examination (Hamel et al., 1993). They may aim at different
things; they may devote themselves to describing a case in-depth, or comparing more than one case on the basis of a set of research questions. It is called *cross-case study* when it devotes itself only to two cases and *comparative cross-case study* when it is explores those two cases on the basis of commonalities and differences in events, activities and processes (Eckstein, 2002; Gerring, 2017; Ragin, 1997). Case studies, be they comparative cross-case studies or a study focusing on a single case, ultimately allow the researcher to either test a theory or construct a new one. In other words, the cases explored and analysed via case study generate the foundations of social theories (Gerring, 2017; Hamel et al., 1993).

Case studies, regardless of the number of the cases that they are investigating and their aim with respect to theory (testing or generating), may be descriptive or causal. That is to say that a case study may focus on describing a certain historical or social event or may focus on explaining the causal inferences of a process. Gerring (2017) calls the latter exploratory causal case study, and describes it as a case study which aims to answer a research question that asks what accounts for the occurrence of a particular phenomenon. ‘In these kind of case studies, the researcher works backward from a known outcome to its possible causes’ (p.66). Finally, case studies, exceptionally, are determined to analyse the case(s) in their naturally occurring settings, either unpacking the causal social relations and complex interactions or describing a historical event (Hammersley and Gomm, 2002).

Given all the aforementioned advantages of the method, this study compares two cases with a particular emphasis on the casual relations and interactions within each case. It is therefore a comparative causal cross-case study which can usefully be employed when seeking in-depth and fuller answers for ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. According to Schramm (1971), a key objective of a case study is to illustrate a decision or set of decisions (most likely political) from a holistic view. In other words, despite its
success in providing encompassing, analytical and highly meaningful knowledge on certain research inquiries, the real strength of the case study lies in its ability to illustrate why and how a political decision was taken, together with its implementation process and the results it brought about. Accordingly, this study considered case study as the most appropriate research method to explore the Europeanisation processes of two pre-selected countries from an actor-centred perspective. As has been mentioned in Chapter 2, the Europeanisation process of a country is strongly shaped by the domestic actors’ decisions on the trajectory of the reforms. This necessitates the researcher to reveal the driving forces behind the reforms taken or rejected, which the case study does comprehensively (Schramm, 1971).

3.2. Qualitative approach:

For a complete and careful exploration of the research aims and questions listed in section 1.5, this study adopts a qualitative approach, which has the advantage of explaining events in a more fluid and rich way. This section thus presents the basic characteristics of qualitative research design. It is difficult to provide a precise description of what qualitative research is, as a wide variety of techniques and philosophies fall under its umbrella (Bryman and Burgess, 1995; Hennink et al., 2015). In a broad sense it can be defined as a research approach that allows the researcher to explore and understand social behaviours, experiences, processes, circumstances, perspectives or histories in-depth on the basis of systematic research methods (Hennink et al., 2015; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). These methods include focus groups, interviews, and document analysis (Hennink et al., 2015).

The qualitative research was developed from an enthusiasm for exploring and understanding human behaviours in their own social contexts (Richards and Morse, 2013). It is worth noting that understanding here is used as a deeper concept. As well as
referring to the researcher’s endeavour of trying to understand the human behaviour from her or his own perspective, it also covers the researcher’s effort to understand human behaviour from the perspective of the population studied. The researcher emphasises ‘the subjective meaning that people attach their views’ (Hennink et al., 2015:18) or their personal intentions, motivations and rationales behind their actions. The latter explanation of understanding is called ‘Verstehen’ within the literature, a concept frequently applied by Max Weber (1975) and which constitutes the core element of qualitative research (Hennink et al., 2015).

In line with the main aims of qualitative research mentioned above, some of its key features can be summarised. First, it is holistic because the ways in which it has been formulated aim at explaining the whole context. Second, it is inductive because it seeks to create a new understanding on the basis of the data collected as the research proceeds, instead of starting with an understanding to be tested. Finally, it is interpretive because it acknowledges the fact that social reality is not an entity as such, but constructed on the basis of the people’s own interpretations, experiences and observations, and it seeks to illustrate those subjective meanings that individuals attach to it (Bryman, 2016; Bryman and Burgess, 1995).

A qualitative approach is considered as the most appropriate and applicable approach to this study for three reasons. First, qualitative approaches are generally better at understanding unanticipated, shifting and puzzling phenomena (Lewis, 2003), which is the case in this study. The Europeanisation processes of both Turkey and Germany are highly complex and, as elaborated further in Chapter 5, they contain various ebbs and flows. Second, qualitative research is considered to be the most appropriate strategy

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5 Qualitative researchers aim at understanding the social world through analysing how individuals interpret it, in contrast to natural scientific models. Interpretivism is an epistemological position which emphasizes the view of the individual towards the social world (Bryman, 2016; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
when identifying the various effects or consequences that arise from a policy or policy-making process (Lewis, 2003). In both Germany and Turkey, there are various meanings attached to WFLR. Therefore, WFLR policy-making has been subject to highly tense debates in both countries. Finally, it is also suggested to employ a qualitative inquiry when the explanation of the issue will be derived from the data as the research proceeds (Richards and Morse, 2013), as it emphasises ‘getting the insiders’ perspective’ (Punch, 2005:238). This is very important for this study for two reasons. First, it investigates an issue that very little is known about. There have been many accounts of the historical and contemporary development of WFLR policy, both at the EU and national levels. However, the actor-centred analysis of the transmission process of corresponding EU standards into domestic levels, and the internalisation of those standards by domestic political and non-political actors, have been less researched. Therefore, it is necessary to gather this information from qualitative data collected by the author. Second, the issue under investigation is a process which has been shaped by the related actors’ personal decisions, information about which needed to be obtained from the actors themselves.

3.3. Data collection:
One of the main distinctive features of qualitative research, in terms of data collection, is that it draws mainly on ‘words’ about people’s lives, lived experiences, ideas, emotions and motivations, rather than on statistical, mathematical elements (Bryman, 2016; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Accordingly, within the scope of qualitative research techniques, the data used in this study have been collected through a combination of literature review, document analysis and semi-structured in-depth interviews.

3.3.1. Document analysis:
As can be seen from Table 3.1 below, the documents analysed within the scope of this study are diverse. They consist of:
- Legislative and policy documents (EU, Turkey and Germany);
- EU Country Reports;
- EU National Action Plans (NAPs);
- EU Assessment of Programme reports;
- EU Accession Partnership Documents;
- Council Recommendations on NAPs;
- Turkey’s Harmonisation Packages;
- Party programs of the main political parties (Turkey and Germany);
- Election campaigns of the main political parties;
- Public speeches of the political elites;
- Newspaper articles (Turkey and Germany).
Table 3.1: A table displaying documents analysed with the rationale behind analysing them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document:</th>
<th>Aim of analysing:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU hard and soft laws on WFLR, child-care provisions, leave provisions and working time provisions</td>
<td>To ascertain the EU’s stance towards WFLR and to identify the nature of EU work and family life policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic literature on WFLR policies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/policy documents of Turkey and Germany including their constitutional provisions, major national laws and measures on WFLR, child-care provisions, leave provisions and working time provisions</td>
<td>To identify Turkish and German reconciliation of work and family life policy structures and their differences from the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU country specific reports (Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Accession Partnership Documents (Turkey)</td>
<td>To outline the EU’s requirements of Turkey and Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPs (Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (Turkey)</td>
<td>To explore countries’ responses to the EU requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Recommendation on NAP (Germany)</td>
<td>To reveal the EU’s assessment of countries’ harmonisation trajectory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Progress Reports (Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party programs, party and election campaigns of the main political parties.</td>
<td>To explore whether and to what extent the EU has been reflected in the political debates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public speeches of the political elites and Newspaper articles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.2. Interviews:

The analysis of this wide range of documentary material has been accompanied by 80 semi-structured in-depth interviews that were conducted with various actors in Belgium, Germany and Turkey between November 2016 and April 2017. Semi-structured in-depth interviews have been chosen for two key reasons.

First, they offer the researcher the opportunity to understand people’s personal decisions together with the main motivations behind those decisions. Second, they help the researcher to understand, in a very detailed way, people’s personal interpretations of, and responses to, certain complex processes as well as the personal impacts of those processes (Bryman, 2016; Richards and Morse, 2013). These aspects of semi-structured in-depth interviews fully overlap with the main aim of this study, which is to unfold the domestic influences on, and domestic responses to, Europeanisation processes, together with the corresponding actors’ personal motivations that shaped those responses. The semi-structured nature of the interview is also very important for this study as it explores scarcely analysed and highly actor-centred issues. It gives space to the participants to express some personal thoughts and experiences which may not previously have been sought or recognised. This allows the researcher to bring up new concepts or create new questions during the interview in line with the flow of the conversation, while still keeping the participants focused around the pre-determined general themes, thus providing some level of consistency (Bernard, 1988; Flick, 2011; Hennink et al., 2015).

Prior to commencing the fieldwork, four different interview guides (one for EU representatives, one for political elites, one for advocacy CSO representatives and one for key academics and research CSO representatives) were developed on the basis of key research questions outlined in Chapter 1 (See Appendix 1). Although most of the interview questions stemmed from the analysis of literature focusing around certain
themes, considerable space was left for respondents to shape the conversation and bring about unanticipated themes.

In order to understand the EU’s requirements of Germany and Turkey, as well as to obtain EU representatives’ views on Turkey’s and Germany’s WFLR policy-making trajectory, and along with consulting the official documents, the researcher interviewed nine EU representatives. Another reason for conducting interviews with these EU representatives was to understand the EU approach towards WFLR policy-making; in other words, to reveal the EU policy paradigm. As can be seen from Table 3.2 below, three of these representatives were gender equality policy experts from different European organisations lobbying the EU commission and national governments for a better WFLR policy structure. Four were policy experts from EU social partners, who are engaged in consultation with the EU WFLR policies. Additionally, in order to gain more internal information about how the European Parliament (EP) assesses German and Turkish WFLR models and their reform processes, the researcher had one interview with a member of the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee (FEMM Committee) and one interview with a member of the Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Commission.
Table 3.2: Categorisation of interviewee type in Brussels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee:</th>
<th>Number:</th>
<th>Code:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European umbrella organisation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU social partner</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of FEMM Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of gender equality cabinet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After identifying the EU’s views on the ways in which Turkey and Germany had framed their WFLR models, in order to reveal the inner dynamics behind those models (which generates the core analysis of this study), the researcher focused on the selected countries. She first identified the corresponding domestic actors, who are in charge of WFLR policy-making. Once they had been identified, the researcher conducted her interviews with them. As can also be seen from Table 3.3 below, these actors in this study are:

- The former and current family ministers;
- The former and current ministers of the EU;
- The former and current ministers of labour;
- The former and current ministers of foreign affairs;
- Representatives of woman branches of mainstream political parties;
- NGOs working in the fields of gender equality; women’s rights and children’s rights; education and family;
- Trade unions;
- Employers’ organisations;
- Religious organisations.
Table 3.3: Categorisation of interviewee type in Germany and Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Members:</th>
<th>Germany:</th>
<th>Turkey:</th>
<th>Code for Germany:</th>
<th>Code for Turkey:</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/CSU:2</td>
<td>AKP: 3</td>
<td>GPOL</td>
<td>TPOL</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD: 5</td>
<td>MHP: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Die Linke: 3</td>
<td>CHP: 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Die Grünen: 3</td>
<td>HDP: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:13</td>
<td>Total: 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Officials:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>GGO</td>
<td>TGO</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs:</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>GNGO</td>
<td>TNGO</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>GTU</td>
<td>TTU</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>GA</td>
<td>TA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were three main rationale behind conducting interviews with German and Turkish Members of Parliament (MPs) and government officials. First, to ascertain how they have perceived the idea of Europeanising the domestic WFLR models; in other words, what the main driving forces were for them while acting either as catalyst or as antagonist. Second, to discover whether, why and to what extent they have internalised the EU way of WFLR policy paradigm – whether the Europeanisation process brought any policy learning in this policy area or not. The third reason for interviewing MPs and government officials was to reveal their contributions to the process as well as the
barriers they have faced throughout the process. While choosing the deputies to be interviewed, particular attention was paid to their affiliation to gender, family and social policy issues in both Turkey and Germany. Additionally, in the German case, an effort was made to choose respondents who are Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

In both countries, NGOs and trade unions have appeared to be important components of the process in terms of both shaping the policy outcome and providing WFLR services. In order to understand their influence on the whole Europeanisation process, they have also been interviewed. The majority of these organisations were located in Berlin, Dusseldorf, Munich and Dresden for Germany, and Ankara and Istanbul for Turkey. There was no particular reason for choosing these cities apart from the fact that the related NGOs happened to be located in them. In order to avoid any kind of bias, the women’s NGOs and trade unions were chosen on the basis of their affinity with the subject, regardless of their political and ideological backgrounds. Finally, Turkish and German key academics, whose research interests lie in the area of social policy (family policy, gender equality policy and employment policy in particular), gender studies and European studies were identified as participants, and interviewed regarding why and to what extent the EU way of reconciling work and family lives has been practised at the national societal levels.

As can be seen, the interviewees were selected on the basis of their professional knowledge, expertise and experience regarding the issue being studied, rather than on a random basis. This type of sampling is defined as ‘purposive sampling’ and is very useful to get a better explanation on the investigated issue as the researcher speaks directly to the relevant person (Richards and Morse, 2013). As politicians and EU representatives are often difficult to reach, the researcher was aided by several gatekeepers that either she herself or her supervisors already had contact with. These gatekeepers, who had close contacts with the target interviewees, provided the
researcher their contact details. They were then contacted via e-mail and telephone to schedule an interview. When the researcher contacted the first potential interviewee, she asked for suggestions of others, a ‘snowball sampling technique’ (Richards and Morse, 2013). As representatives of NGOs are more easily reached to collaborate, the researcher contacted them directly, but still asked for recommendations of more interviewees who might be relevant to the research. Each interview conducted within the scope of this study lasted between 40 and 100 minutes and 77 out of 80 were digitally recorded. In those three interviews which the researcher was not allowed to record digitally, she took extensive notes during the interview and completed the verbatim transcription as soon as possible after the interview.

3.4. Ethical considerations:

Ethical approval for the study was obtained from Ulster University. Prior to conducting the fieldwork, all respondents were provided with the participant information sheet (see Appendix 2), containing detailed information about the research and the structure of the prospective interview. Prior to commencing the interview, the participants were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix 3) and a signed copy was kept by both the researcher and participant.

Participants were reminded that they could terminate the interview at any time in case of any discomfort and that they had the right to refuse to answer any question without giving an explanation. Although the researched topic is not exceptionally sensitive, a particular sensitivity has been given to anonymity and confidentiality. The anonymity of participants was protected and any personal reference or information that might identify the respondents was excluded. Furthermore, interviews were recorded only if the respondent felt comfortable about it and gave permission. Following the interview, the researcher transcribed the recorded data herself and kept the data securely
in her password-protected device. No person other than the researcher and her supervisors had access to the collected data. Finally, all the interviews conducted within the scope of this study took place either in respondents’ offices or public spaces like cafés or restaurants, depending on where the respondent wanted the interview to be, as this was considered to minimise risk both for the researcher and the respondent.

3.5. Data analysis:

Having explained how the necessary data for this study were collected, this section outlines the analysis procedure. Analysis was carried out through a combination of process tracing and thematic analysis.

Thematic analysis was chosen as the appropriate data analysis technique for this study due to its ability to summarise and pinpoint the key features of a very complex data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006), as well as its flexibility in terms of leaving some room for emergence of unanticipated insights (Boyatzis, 1998). Additionally, process tracing was employed as it is argued to be the best data analysis technique for ‘identifying the intervening causal process – the causal chain and the causal mechanism – between an independent variable(s) and the outcome’ (George and Bennett, 2005:206). Simply put, process tracing is considered to be one of the most appropriate data analysis techniques for this study because its aims fully overlap with the aims of this study. Process tracing is particularly useful when exploring what has caused a particular outcome and why (Beach and Brun Pedersen, 2013; Bennet and Checkel, 2015; George and Bennett, 2005). Since this study is not only interested in explaining the Europeanisation patterns of German and Turkish WFLR policies, but also aims to trace how and why Germany and Turkey have come to feature those particular patterns,
process tracing was employed. Of the three different forms of process tracing,\textsuperscript{6} ‘explaining outcome process tracing’ has been applied. This aims to craft a sufficient explanation of a particular outcome through analysing the intervening variables’ interactions, rather than testing theory-driven prior hypotheses (Beach and Brun Pedersen, 2013).

This combination of thematic analysis and process tracing ultimately enabled the researcher to conduct a deeper exploration of the highly complex Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey by working backward from their Europeanisation outcomes towards the causes of the outcome with a particular emphasis on subjective experiences and interpretations of the intervening domestic actors – the causes of the outcome. Taking advantage of this methodological combination, the analysis of the data for this study proceeded in three inter-related stages.

The researcher began the research procedure by identifying the fit and the misfit between the selected countries and the EU. The documentation of fit and misfit relied on Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 2002) three welfare pillar conceptualisation and familialisation/de-familialisation distinctions; these are discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. These parameters are: (1) level of market and state support in relaxing familial responsibilities; (2) alleviating women’s work and family conflict and (3) strengthening women’s labour market attachment (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Lewis, 2009; Orloff, 2001; Stratigaki, 2004). Comparing policy structures from such an angle helped to clarify whether the policies ensure that women can be both breadwinners and home-carers, resulting in ‘gender sameness’ (Orloff, 2001:141), or whether they continue prioritising their motherhood roles. This documentation was then followed by the analysis of the EU’s requirements and views on each country with respect to their divergences in terms

\textsuperscript{6} Beach and Brun Pedersen (2013) argues that process tracing can be applied with three different research aims: (1) to test a priori hypotheses; (2) make generalizations and (3) explain the outcome.
of WFLR policies. This allowed the researcher to set the starting point by establishing the main EU criticisms with regard to Turkish and German WFLR legislative frameworks.

In the second stage of the data analysis procedure, having identified the EU’s requirements of each country, the researcher focused on each country’s responses to these requirements. In doing so, first the domestic WFLR laws introduced under the EU-influence were analysed on the basis of aforementioned parameters. Then, in order to understand the ways in which these laws were made and what is the main ideology behind those laws, the domestic actors who are related to WFLR policy-making were identified. They were first divided into two main categories: (a) catalysts (the ones who are acting in favour of adaptation of EU standards) and (b) antagonists (the ones who disagree with the potential change and hence act to prevent or at least decelerate the adaptation process). Each category was then divided into additional sub-categories according to the domestic actors’ rationale behind their decisions on whether to be a catalyst or an antagonist. Dividing each category into additional sub-categories followed the thematic analysis roadmap created by relying on Boyatzis (1998) and Braun and Clarke (2006) and displayed in Figure 3.1 below.

**Figure 3.1:** Outline of the phases used during thematic analysis.
After the completion of the verbatim transcription of the interviews as well as the transcription of the notes taken during the interviews, an intensive repeated reading of the entire data set took place. The researcher coded the most repeated reasons, which then comprised the main themes of the study. Given the density and amount of the data collected, the researcher used NVivo-11, a software program considered a valuable instrument for analysing dense qualitative data. After identifying the codes, she collected all the raw data associated with a particular code in one document in order to ease the generation and writing up the analysis of the themes.

In the final stage of the data analysis procedure, in order to explain how and why two countries which shared similar WFLR policy characteristics at the beginning of their Europeanisation processes exhibited different Europeanisation patterns, the researcher compared Germany and Turkey on the basis of the similarities and differences of the themes that emerged from the domestic actors’ responses. This eventually revealed the key points around where and why Turkey lagged behind Germany in terms of Europeanising her WFLR model.

3.6. Conclusion:
This chapter aimed to show the methodological decisions made while seeking answers for the research questions identified with regard to the Europeanisation puzzles of Germany and Turkey. The research design of this study is constructed on the basis of a comparative causal cross-case research technique holding a qualitative approach. Accordingly, this study utilised a consolidation of document analysis and semi-structured in-depth interviews while collecting the necessary data, and a combination of thematic analysis and outcome-explaining process tracing while analysing the data. Having discussed the research methods employed in this study, the next chapter turns to the contextual framework.
CHAPTER 4. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter introduces the contextual framework of the study. More precisely, it explains how WFLR has turned into a highly contested policy area across European welfare states, but particularly in Germany and Turkey. Here, the discussion focuses on how and why Germany experienced a similar path to the rest of the Europe, where WFLR policies have emerged as a concomitant result of women’s increasing labour market participation, while they have been introduced in the Turkish context as part of Turkey’s EU-accession process. Since, in one form or another, various risks and inequalities emerged in almost all EU member states, the EU has acknowledged the importance of WFLR policies and placed an increasing focus on reconciliation policy-making. This particular policy sphere, which formerly had been left to national level initiatives, therefore has gradually become an area of greater cohesion. EU documents have begun to require a relatively stronger convergence from member and candidate states, which eventually has prompted them to reconfigure their existing reconciliation models.

Section two of this chapter, accordingly, focuses on the EU and examines the EU rationale behind reconciliation policy-making, including an outline of EU legislation regarding WFLR. As the main aim of this study is to compare how German and Turkish WFLR models have changed under the EU influence, it is also important to look at their national models prior to their Europeanisation processes. Sections three and four concentrate on the WFLR models that the two selected countries pursued up until 2000. Section three presents the German reconciliation model prior to EU influence while the last section presents the Turkish model.
4.1. New social risks and inequalities:

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, an increase in the number of women entering higher education, women’s increased desire towards self-development, the structural transformation of the labour market from industrialism to de-industrialism creating relatively more flexible working conditions, and the increased gap between consumer prices and income, together with the increased dominance of service employment, combined to alter the prevalent family model and concomitantly the life-paths of family members (Crompton et al., 2007; Drew et al., 1998; Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013; Lewis, 2009).

The traditional male breadwinner family model, which consists of a heterosexual married couple with children, living under the same roof, where the husband is associated with an intense period of education followed by an uninterrupted full-time employment until retirement, while the wife dedicates her life to homemaking (Esping-Andersen, 2009), was the prevalent family model among European welfare states. From the late 1970s, however, the ‘adult worker model’ of the family or at least the ‘one-and-a-half earner family’ model, together with ‘lone parent families’, have rapidly proliferated across Europe (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Lewis, 2006). These changes were reflected in changing gender roles and particularly in the roles of women. Post-industrial women have come to be less associated with purely domestic tasks and more with lifelong employment (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2000). Their labour force participation has become more continuous, even among mothers of small children. They remain in the labour market and contribute to the family budget – although there are considerable cross-national variations (Crompton et al., 2007; Drew et al., 1998; Lewis, 2006, 2009). While this has been perceived as an improvement in terms of women’s status within society, as they could be freed from the dependency on either their fathers or male breadwinner partners, it has also been argued that this shift exacerbated existing
social risks and inequalities and even created new ones (Esping-Andersen, 1999, 2002, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013; Lewis, 2006, 2009). Gosta Esping-Andersen (2009) uses the term ‘Incomplete Revolution’ to delineate this paradox. He perceives these drastic changes in women’s life-courses as on a par with revolution because they led to a global welfare state transformation (Hemerijck, 2013); but also as incomplete, since the existing social policy structure of European welfare states were not fully ready to offset this new trajectory, and thus could not mitigate the emergence of new social risks and inequalities.

The unequal gendered division of paid and unpaid work that emerged with the increasing labour market participation of women, and a corresponding rise in the dual earner family model, which causes multiple chain effects, can be identified as the encompassing and key social inequality of the post-industrial society (Bennett and Dixon, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Hemerijck, 2012; Jenson, 2006; Lewis, 2009). First, the disproportionate amount of domestic work carried out by women and assumed to be their responsibility impedes women’s self-investment by limiting their opportunities for labour market training and progression (Hakim, 2000; Lewis, 2009). Second, in the absence of appropriate social provisions, women try to balance this disproportionate domestic work with their paid work by working part-time. This causes additional inequality as these part-time jobs are frequently insecure, low-paid and secondary and are associated with more restricted entitlement to pension benefits during retirement (Lowson and Arber, 2013). Since this shift towards dual earner families did not happen overnight, residuals of the traditional male breadwinner family model are inevitable and hold the potential to generate an income polarisation between ‘working rich’ and ‘working poor’ families. While two earner families may enjoy a relatively higher income and become the working rich, the conventional single earner families have access to relatively lower incomes – the so-called working poor (Hemerijck, 2013).
The consequences of this include increasing socio-economic heterogeneity in the society and greater vulnerability to family and child poverty for the latter group (Esping-Andersen, 2002, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013). The literature identifies additional social and demographic risks, such as that the ambition of a typical post-industrial woman to build a stable, secure and lifelong career forces them to postpone or forego marriage and childbirth, leading to population ageing (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013; Krapf, 2014; Lewis, 2009).

The aforementioned problems have appeared in almost all EU member states, yet at different times to differing degrees. These differences stem from the dynamic shape of labour markets, the domestic realities of family structure and gender relations (Hantrais, 2007). Therefore, the chapter proceeds with a detailed discussion of newly emerging social risks and inequalities as well as their causes in Germany and Turkey respectively.

4.1.1. New social risks and inequalities in Germany:

Along with other developed European welfare states, Germany has been required to respond to societal changes. Germany’s complex historical background and the corporatist conservative welfare state model, which asserts the family as the main welfare provider (Ostner, 2010), mean that the effects of this transformation have been felt more acutely in comparison to some other states.

Germany initially lagged behind other European states such as Britain, France or Belgium in terms of industrial production. However, due to a highly skilled labour force, a good educational system, a strong commitment to the Lutheran work ethic and a protectionist economic strategy, it did not take long for Germany to become a world leader in industrialisation, along with Britain and the United States (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010). With slight falls in gross domestic product (GDP) at different times,
Germany maintained a strong industrial economy based on heavy manufacturing. Although industrial economies generally grow in tandem with the traditional male breadwinner family model, things developed differently in Germany due to the bitter consequences of the Second World War (WW2). The post-war division of Germany saw differences emerge between the former East Germany (the German Democratic Republic – GDR) and the former West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany – FRG). Both parts experienced an economic recovery on the basis of industrial labour market rules and regulations, but there were strong differences in the gender composition of the labour markets (ibid).

Like many other industrialised countries, the FRG evolved with a strong adherence to the traditional male breadwinner family model, based on the gendered work and care dualism (Ostner, 2010; Trzcinski, 2000), while the GDR prioritised gender sameness in all walks of life including the labour market. Throughout this divided period, the FRG, under the extremely conservative Adenauer administration, aimed at reversing the increased female employment rate\(^7\) and sending woman back to their main duty: home-caring (Bird, 2004; Grebe, 2009 and Roberts, 2016). Therefore, the FRG exhibited a sharp gendered division of labour between men and women, which was reflected in the life path of a typical Western German woman. Bird (2004) and Gottschall and Bird (2003) examine longitudinal empirical data on German women’s WFLR habits from the 1960s to the end of 1990s. They agree with Myrdal and Klein (1956), who argue that, throughout its existence, women in FRG followed a particular lifecycle made up of three conducive phases. The first phase refers to the period when women are engaged with extended education and training followed by full-time employment. This

\(^7\) Due to WW2, many women in Germany willingly or unwillingly participated into the labour market. The female employment rate increased during the war from about 5.1 million in 1939 (26%) to just over 7.25 million in 1943 (Office for National Statistics, 2013).
phase continues until marriage and ends with the marriage. Then the second period begins when they give birth to their first child and withdraw from the labour market or at least sharply curtail their working hours. This period lasts until the middle years of the child. Finally, the third and last phase begins, when women return to employment but usually to flexible part-time jobs (Hantrais, 2004; Drew et al., 1998; Lewis, 2006, 2009; Ostner, 2010). Jane Lewis (2006), comparing the behaviours and attitudes of women from four different nationalities, found that West German women were happy to quit or at least withdraw their careers for family altruism.

Eastern German women, on the contrary, followed a different life-path. The Socialist Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED) endorsed a classical Marxist ethos and saw women’s employment and their salvation from the private sphere as the biggest part of women’s emancipation (Ferree, 1993; Wagener, 2002). Additionally, the GDR economy desperately needed the full integration of women in the labour market (Ferree, 1993). Under these circumstances, GDR women, unlike women from the FRG, were expected to be associated with lifelong employment (Künzler et al., 2001). They sustained a continuous employment trajectory with only a very short break right after giving birth. According to Pfau-Effinger and Smidt (2011), for GDR women to do otherwise would be unimaginable. Especially for the younger generations, who were both born and raised in the East, combining motherhood with full-time employment and sharing domestic responsibilities with their husbands was central to their identities. Official statistics show that one year before the unification of Germany the female employment rate was 78.1% in the East while it was only 55% in the West (Lewis, 2006).

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, both parts of Germany witnessed considerable transformation with respect to their labour market and family structures. In the course of unification, after a very short-lived economic boom fuelled by the
industrial expansion (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010), the German economy based on manufacturing goods for export begun to shrink. Difficulties in adapting the GDR’s statist economy to a market economy, the outdated shape of industry legated from the GDR and a global trend of de-industrialisation paved the way for a shift from a heavy manufacturing industrial economy to a de-industrial economy primarily based on high quality service sector such as finance, design, marketing and consultancy services in unified Germany (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010; Roberts, 2016). By 1990, the service sector accounted for 29.5% of German GDP, compared to around 10% in 1960, and this figure continued to increase until it reached 50% in 2000 (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010).

Professional areas of the service sector are associated with more flexible working conditions, but also are low-paid compared to the industrial sector (İlkkaracan, 2010). Therefore, this demise, or at least the reduction, of heavy manufacturing activity in Germany ultimately altered the gender composition of employment both voluntarily and involuntarily. More flexible working conditions became very tempting for women, even those with family responsibilities, and the representation of women in the labour market grew rapidly (Toksöz, 2015). In addition, the rising prices made it very difficult for families to survive, especially with a single earner, and encouraged women to be in the labour market and contribute to the family budget. This shift triggered an upward trajectory in German women’s employment. As can also be seen from Table 4.1 below, there was a small but decided increase in female employment rates in Germany between 1990 and 2000, with the exception of the first two years, which Lewis and Zitzlsperger (2010) explain through the general unemployment rise in Germany.
Table 4.1: Labour force participation rates by gender in Germany between 1990 and 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Germany Labour force participation Stats. (NationMaster, n.d.).

Evidence points to an assuaged traditional male breadwinner family model supremacy in Germany in the wake of unification. In other words, due to the buoyant ambition of German women to build a stable, secure and lifelong career, the prevalence of the traditional male breadwinner family model gradually came to an end. Germany started to witness an intense and painful transition toward new family models, which do not function on the basis of sharp work/care dualism (Ostner, 2010; Trzcinski, 2000).

The existing social policies, however, remained inadequate in temporising the new labour market, family and gender realities. Therefore, they failed to prevent women being subject to a number of social risks and inequalities. Although German women said farewell to their sole housewifery roles and welcomed paid employee roles (Ostner, 2010; Pfau-Effinger and Smidt, 2011), they continued to be responsible for the bulk of domestic tasks. Thus, they came to carry the double burden of paid employment and unpaid housework, which caused various risks and inequalities. To the fore of these, ‘the fertility rate fell below the replacement level in 1994’ (when female employment started
to rise) and has stagnated there (Sobotka, 2012). Germany has come to have one of the lowest fertility rates, with 1.5 children per woman in 2015 (Statista, n.d.), and the highest childlessness rate (23%) (Beaujouan and Sobotka, 2017) among the EU member states. Furthermore, in the absence of appropriate family-friendly social policies, which would assist women to balance their work and family lives, German women looked to part-time and midi-jobs (Lewis, 2009; Trzcinski, 2000). Although this served as a panacea in the short term, it substantially impacted on German women in the long run. Working part-time or in flexible working arrangements incarcerated women in the secondary labour market associated with low-paid, insecure jobs where progression opportunity is low. In addition, low-paid jobs reduce the ability to earn sufficient pensions for retirements, and therefore reproduce women’s economic dependency on their male partners. As a result, as in many other European welfare states, WFLR appeared as an urgent need in Germany.

German policy-makers have gradually acknowledged the importance of WFLR measures (Erler, 2011). In line with Esping-Andersen (1999:73). ‘Any typology of welfare regimes remains valid only as long as history stands still’, meaning that the current socio-economic and socio-politic developments may lead to small modifications of the welfare models. The strong conservative corporatist welfare model of Germany, which initially did not touch upon reconciliation, has gradually been subject to various amendments that are discussed in the later stages of this chapter.

4.1.2. New social risks and inequalities in Turkey:

As with many other late-industrialising countries, Turkey deviated from European welfare states with regard to women’s labour market participation trends, trends which had salient impacts on their life-paths. In the course of the 1970s, when women’s labour market participation was increasing in the European welfare states, Turkey experienced
an opposite trend because the Turkish labour market was still operating on the basis of import-substitution industrialisation (Hemerijck, 2013; Toksöz, 2015).

The main reason for this was to protect domestic capital from the international competition and provide a domestic demand-driven growth. This, in return, enabled relatively high wages and ample job opportunities, but only for male workers because these were capital-intensive sectors, which are generally associated with men as they require physical strength (İlkkaracan, 2010). This male-dominated working culture created a male-dominated trade unionisation, which closed another window of opportunity in terms of female employment. The lack of women’s representation within the trade unions left women’s unequal positions even in terms of labour market entry uncovered and women’s demands could never appear on any collective labour agreement (Toksöz, 2015). All in all, a consolidation of the high wages which allowed a family to survive with a single earner, and the lack of women’s representation within the trade unions, who formed a potential strong pressure group at the time, did nothing but strengthen the prevalence of the traditional male breadwinner family model (İlkkaracan, 2010).

Added to this, throughout the 1970s, Turkey was experiencing a massive migration from rural areas to big urban cities (Makal, 2015) which exacerbated the already low female employment rates. A typical Turkish woman living in a small rural region and working as an unpaid family labourer in the agricultural sector had difficulty adapting to the labour market conditions of the big urban city due to her relatively lower educational background, thus she frequently became a full-time housewife (İlkkaracan, 2010). In the light of these domestic developments in Turkey, it would be fair to argue that men and women have followed completely different and even unequal life-paths. The husband was associated with the paid work and the wife with the unpaid domestic work (Ecevit, 2010), as evidenced in official statistics. The female employment rate in
Turkey in the early 1970s was below 19%, while the EU average was above 30% (İlkkaracan, 2010).

In the 1980s, Turkey experienced the adverse impacts of increasing petrol prices and a worsening foreign currency bottleneck. Even though Turkey had been employing a closed economy model until the 1980s, the country found itself in an economic recession mainly caused by the 1973 Oil Crisis, which resulted in economic stagnation in the Western world. These economic maladies paved the way for Turkey to move towards export-oriented industrialisation (Toksöz, 2015). On the 24th of January 1980, Turkey introduced export-oriented industrialisation policies (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014), which appeared to offer a glimmer of hope with respect to female employment. Export-oriented industrialisation is expected to extend labour-intensive sectors in traditionally female areas such as the textile, garment and food industries (İlkkaracan, 2010; Toksöz, 2015). But contrary to expectations, Turkish women’s labour market participation continued to remain low apart from very small changes, and represented an atypical case, rising only from 19% to 20% (Toksöz, 2015). The sharp gendered division of labour between men and women remained throughout the 1980s too. Although the labour market conditions were in favour of increased female employment, the contemporary political conjuncture of Turkey continued to exclude men from unpaid domestic work and women from paid work.

The second coup in Turkish history, in 1980, had ruthless impacts on the labour market structures and concomitantly on the family form. The military regime successfully suppressed any kind of action associated with left-wing ideas and eventually opened a window of opportunity for the rise of political Islam as well as the emergence of Islamist organisations (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014), which first altered the labour market structure and subsequently the place of women within the labour market. In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), holding an
explicit Islamic approach toward all walks of life including the economy, came to power. In the first tenure of their governance, the RP ardently started privatising the economy through supporting small and medium-size enterprises from different pious, undereducated and underdeveloped provincial towns through various government programs and credit arrangements (ibid). This new emerging business elite, backed by the government, dominated the Turkish labour market. They started forming their own business associations, trade unions and professional chambers (ibid), which went in tandem with the reproduction of the traditional male breadwinner family model. The RP’s determination to make new business actors out of formerly neglected pious businessmen from various small regions was taken over and perhaps better performed by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) after the RP was closed down by the military authorities in 1997 (Atabay, 2014). So, during the period between 1980s and 2000s, unlike its European counterparts, Turkey continued to pursue the traditional male breadwinner family model due to the strong traces of Islam and the corresponding conservative social and cultural order (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014).

This interrelated consolidation of the labour market and the prevalent family model, combined with the family and kin solidarity welfare model of Turkey, led to a conservative gender regime. This conservative gender regime maximised women’s domestic responsibilities and encouraged them to stay at home and care for their family members, rather than supporting their labour market participation (Bozçağa, 2013; Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Dedeoğlu, 2012). As can also be seen from Table 4.2 below, there was a continuous decrease in female employment rates in Turkey, whereas it was the other way around across Europe.
Table 4. 2: Labour force participation rates by gender in Turkey between 1990 and 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkey Labour force participation rate Stats, (NationMaster, n.d.).

Under these circumstances, Turkish women experienced social risks and inequalities which needed to be mitigated through various social policies. Yet, the social risks and inequalities experienced by Turkish women were different than those risks and inequalities experienced by European women. Until the mid-2000s, Turkish women were highly dependent on their spouses for economic and social support. The majority lacked economic independence because only workers actively engaged in the labour market and regularly contributing to the social security schemes were able to benefit from state provisions (Dedeoğlu, 2012). Given that it was mostly men associated with paid labour, children and women could access services only through their husbands and fathers, increasing their dependence. Moreover, women’s myriad domestic duties paved the way for their exclusion from any kind of vocational provisions (such as trainings, promotion, etc.). Building on the already large educational gap between men and women, this exclusion did nothing but consolidate the supremacy of the family for the majority of women. On the other hand, the minority who needed to work were largely forced into secondary insecure jobs because they could not find a place for themselves.
in the primary labour market (Ecevit, 2010). The risks and inequalities that Turkish women have experienced for more than three decades are not derived from their double burden of work and family responsibilities. Instead, Turkish women have suffered from the lack of measures supporting their labour market participation. Besides, the dominant socio-political and socio-cultural ambiance in Turkey has regarded women as the representatives of their family honour (Aldığaçtı-Marshall, 2013). The better they serve their motherhood, the higher the honour held by their family.

It is important to note that, over the last two to three decades, German women have gradually become more engaged with paid employment. Thus, they have come to shoulder employment responsibilities along with their already existing familial responsibilities. Although German women have begun to gain their economic independence, it does not mean that they have become fully equalised with men. In order to be in the labour market, German women have had to make some sacrifices, such as postponing or even foregoing marriage and childbirth, facing the paid employment and unpaid domestic work conflict and trying to solve this conflict by working in secondary jobs. These issues that German women have been facing have gradually been acknowledged by the German politicians. While being still poor, a number of WFLR measures have organically begun to appear in official policy documents in Germany. Meanwhile, most Turkish women were still responsible for the maintenance of the household. Most of them still lacked a work life which would need to be balanced with their family lives. Therefore, what they needed for gender equality was not WFLR policies, but rather, policies encouraging their labour market participation. For this reason, WFLR policies did not appear organically in the Turkish context. As mentioned above, their development in the Turkish context occurred in tandem with Turkey’s EU-accession process. This thesis anticipates that the differences between Germany and Turkey – in terms of how and why WFLR has turned into an important policy area –
will play a significant role throughout their Europeanisation processes. Having explained the German and Turkish contexts with respect to WFLR policy development, the chapter now focuses on WFLR at the EU-level.

4.2. WFLR within the EU:

In the course of the post-industrial era, especially during the 1990s, the EU adopted a new policy paradigm with respect to employment, economic and social policy (Morel et al., 2012). The key aims of this policy paradigm shift included tackling the ageing population and low economic growth (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012), increasing global competitiveness (Morel et al., 2012), and alleviating bankruptcy risks among member states (Lundvall and Lorenz, 2012), as well as responding to changing family forms (Lewis, 2006). This new paradigm, known as the ‘social investment perspective’ within the comparative welfare state analysis literature (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012; Morel et al., 2012), was centred on the idea of economic growth through full employment among all citizens, including those with family responsibilities (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012; Goetschy, 1999). In the achievement of this aim, formerly neglected WFLR policies have come to be perceived as key means because they simultaneously contribute to two different goals (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 2012, 2013; Morel et al., 2012; Morgan, 2012). On the one hand, WFLR measures allow women to be more active in the labour market without giving up on their motherhood roles (Jenson, 2009; Lewis, 2006, 2009; Morgan, 2012), which would also prevent falling fertility rates and labour scarcity in the long-run. At the same time, by transferring women’s disproportionate domestic workload either to the state or at least to the market, they also are expected to alleviate the unequal division of labour within families. Therefore, particularly since the mid-1990s, WFLR have come to be an inseparable part of the EU social policy model, rather than being a supplementary policy field as was
historically the case (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Kantola, 2010; Lewis, 2009; Stratigaki, 2004). Ferree (2008:239) highlights the significance attributed to WFLR by arguing, ‘it is not a side issue, instead, a rudimentary European value’.

As can be seen from Table 4.3 below, over the last three decades, WFLR policies have increasingly begun to appear in EU policy documents (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Drew et al., 1998; Fahlen, 2012; Hantrais, 2004; James, 2012; Lewis, 2006, 2009, Stratigaki, 2004) both in forms of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ laws. That is to say that while some of them are legally binding initiatives such as treaties, directives and the European Court of Justice’s rules that must be transposed by the Member States into their national legislative frameworks, some others are quasi-legal instruments with no legal binding forces, such as guidelines, roadmaps and recommendations8 (Aybars, 2007; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Kantola, 2010; Liebert, 2003).

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8 The EU of today was launched in 1957 as the EEC with the main aim of economic growth and integration. Therefore, it does not have the full competence on family policy legislations but on employment and gender equality policies. And because WFLR intersects with family, employment and gender equality policy, the EU is not able to exert a full autonomy on member states in this area. Therefore, reconciliation generated from both the hard and soft measures (see Aybars, 2007; Beveridge and Velluti, 2008; Kleinmann, 2002; Thevenon and Neyer, 2014).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard laws</th>
<th>Soft laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave provisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92/85/EEC Pregnant Workers Directive</td>
<td>o Member and candidate states should provide 14-weeks maternity leave with a payment or an allowance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Job dismissal protection during the leave and the right to return the same job with the exact same working conditions, or to an equivalent position;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later than two years after the adoption thereof or ensure, at the latest two years after adoption of this (EEC, 1992).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/18/EU Parental Leave Directive</td>
<td>o Member and candidate states should provide working parents an individual non-transferable at least 18 weeks of leave in case of child birth and/or adoption until the eighth birthday of the child;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Job dismissal protection and the right to return the same job or to an equivalent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o The right to request for working hours and/or patterns change for a set period of time according to parents’ needs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care provisions</td>
<td>Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality (2016-2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU does not have any competence on childcare legislations.</td>
<td>Council Recommendation (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council Resolution (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barcelona Council (2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Commission Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Member and candidate states should introduce measures facilitating access to part time work for both men and women in order to ease their WFLR;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Eliminate any kind of discrimination against part time workers and improve their working quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later than 20 January 2000, or shall ensure that, by that date at the latest, the social partners have introduced the necessary measures by agreement (EC, 1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97/81/EC Part time work Directive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Member and candidate states should remove any kind of discrimination from the fixed-term contracts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/70/EC Fixed term work Directive</td>
<td>o Provide fixed-term workers the opportunity to access corresponding trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 10 July 1999, or shall ensure that, by that date at the latest, management and labour have introduced the necessary measures by agreement (EC, 1999).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Due to a significant number of social democratic or relatively more leftist MEPs in the EP, who are more likely to endorse the view that comprehensive WFLR policy is the key prerequisite of gender equality as well as economic growth, the EU has introduced four hard laws. They have the power to ask member and candidate states to amend the existing laws and/or to introduce new provisions that decrease the misfit with the EU. These are the Part-time Work Directive, the Pregnant Workers Directive, the Parental Leave Directive and the Fixed-term Work Directive (Hemerijck, 2013; Kantola, 2010; Lewis, 2009). These directives comprehensively set the rules regarding maternity and paternity leave durations and payment during the leave, working times, breastfeeding arrangements and pregnant women’s health and safety in the workplace. However, they fail to include childcare provisions – known to be the biggest obstacle to women’s employment and thus to economic growth – as these fall outside the scope of the EU’s full competences (Beveridge, 2008; Kantola, 2010). Accordingly, in order to compensate for this lack, the EU has introduced numerous soft laws, considered to be useful tools in expanding the competence towards the hitherto unregulated areas (Beveridge, 2008). The key rationale behind introducing these soft laws was to support the regarding hard laws and explore the domestic conjuncture in the member states for a prospective directive (ibid). As shown in Table 4.3 above, similar to hard laws, they serve the goals of strengthening women’s labour market attachment and easing their labour market entrance through alleviating their familial burdens as well.

WFLR measures have witnessed an almost fifteen-year ‘golden age’ from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s. Yet, it was through the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination (the so-called OMC) in 2000 that they gained a new dimension, as the OMC brought a new approach to social policy-making at the EU level (Esping-
Andersen, 2009). In March 2000, at the Lisbon Summit, while setting the new agenda\(^9\) for the following ten years, the European Council introduced the method to be utilised while reaching the goal. This new methodological foundation was the OMC (Hemerijck, 2009, 2013), which ultimately nourishes the Europeanisation of national WFLR policies.

The OMC is a two-fold process based on the exchange of information, ideas and experiences, which eventually sets common objectives. After the common objectives are identified at the EU level on the basis of this benchmarking among member states, the EU first expects its member and candidate states to converge their legislative frameworks with the corresponding EU standards. Then, in the case of convergence failure, rather than imposing hard laws or imposing strict sanctions, the EU provides detailed feedback, including country specific policy recommendations and solutions (Beveridge, 2008; Vural, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 2002). Due to the OMC, member and candidate states are expected to download the soft EU WFLR measures into their national legislation. So, it is possible to argue that particularly from the 2000s, the EU started to require a relatively stronger convergence from its member and candidate states in this specific policy area.

WFLR measures by nature may seem a bit dispersed as they have been constructed and implemented in the employment policy, family policy and gender policy nexus. With slight differences in the content of the laws, they might serve to change the redistribution of work between men and women, or to improve women’s employment opportunities by easing their familial responsibilities (Duncan, 2002; Lewis, 2009; Mazur, 2002; Stratigaki, 2004). Since the main focus of this thesis is to explore the

\(^9\) The European Council agreed on a strategic goal over the decade 2000-2010, for the EU to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. It specifically stated that the overall aim of employment and economic policies should be to raise the employment rate to as close to 70% as possible by 2010 and, as part of that goal, to increase the employment rate for women to more than 60% by the same year.
Europeanisation processes of the selected countries in this specific policy area, it concentrates on the EU approach towards WFLR policies. In doing so, it appeals to two interrelated aspects: (a) Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 2002) three welfare pillar conceptualisation and (b) familialisation and de-familialisation distinction. While developing his welfare regime typology, Esping-Andersen (1990) defined the welfare regimes on the basis of different welfare distribution arrangements between the family, the market and the state\(^\text{10}\). He argued that three complementary welfare pillars operate simultaneously in order to provide welfare (see Figure 4.1 below) and different countries lean on different entities for different welfare needs.

**Figure 4.1:** Distribution of welfare between market, family and the state.

For example, Mediterranean countries rely on the family for care provisions and the state comes into play only after the families’ capacity for care provision is exhausted, whereas Scandinavian countries pre-emptively hand the reins of care provision over either to the market or to the state. Theoretically, the former exemplifies a familialised arrangement, whereas the latter represents a de-familialised one. Since Esping-Andersen developed his welfare regime typology, the distinction between familialisation and de-familialisation has been used to define the level of state or market support in relaxing

\(^{10}\) In his book *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen excluded the distribution of care provisions from his typology and focused more on the relationship between market and the state and thus has been criticised from various perspectives, especially from feminist scholars. These criticisms have been acknowledged by Esping-Andersen and while revisiting the welfare typology he included the care arrangements into his study (see Esping-Andersen, 1999, 2002; Orloff, 1993 and O’Connor, 1993).
families’ care responsibilities. In that sense, familialisation is used to denote a welfare model, wherein the family is the main care provider. On the other hand, de-familialisation refers to seeking to curtail individuals’ welfare dependence on kinship.

It is important to note that both Esping-Andersen himself and notable feminist scholars (Lewis, 2009; Ostner, 2010; Pfau-Effinger, 2005) use the term in a broader comparison of welfare regimes. However, this thesis applies it solely to WFLR arrangements as the central aim is to trace the Europeanisation processes of German and Turkish WFLR policies. To this end, it could be argued that both familialised and de-familialised WFLR policies ultimately aim to aid women in reconciling their work and family lives, yet there is a salient difference between their methods. As revealed in Table 4.4 below, while familialised reconciliation policies help women by easing their work responsibilities and providing them a greater amount of time to spend with their families, de-familialised reconciliation policies do the opposite. Their cumulative aim is to encourage women to participate in the labour market by transferring care obligations from the private to the public sphere (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leira, 2002; Lohmann and Zagel, 2016).

A closer examination of the EU WFLR measures indicates de-familialisation. As studies of EU gender politics, especially from the second half of 1990s onwards, have shown, due to the social investment approach and also to Sweden’s entry into the Union, the EU’s approach towards WFLR gradually become more and more related to women’s labour market participation (Bacchi, 1999; Mazur, 2002; Stratigaki, 2004). The EU directives with respect to WFLR increasingly aimed at maximising women’s full-time employment in member states by reducing their disproportionate share of domestic tasks (Leitner, 2010). This would eventually bring economic growth, first at the national levels and then at the supranational level (Lewis et al., 2007). Through shorter leaves, expanded childcare provisions and more flexible working-time arrangements, the EU
aimed at liberating its female citizens from their familial tasks. The EU WFLR policies, therefore, encouraged women to enter into the labour market, return to the labour market shortly after delivering their children and remain lifelong members of the labour market (Hoskyns, 2000). This approach of the EU clearly chimes with Esping-Andersen’s notion of de-familialisation.

**Table 4.4: Overview of familialisation/de-familialisation indicators regarding WFLR.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative:</th>
<th>Aim:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Familialisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare benefits</td>
<td>The cumulative aim of these policies is to assign a maximum of care provisions to family. By allocating care provisions in the family sphere, familialistic WFLR policies reproduce the traditional family norms and values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homecare allowances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged parental leave arrangements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De-familialisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and high-quality child care services</td>
<td>De-familialised WFLR measures aim to integrate as many women as possible into labour market by transferring their family responsibilities to the state or at least to the market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free public care for elderly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short, well paid and non-transferable parental leave arrangements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection against job dismissal and position protection during the leave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick and care leaves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although WFLR policies have enjoyed a strong emphasis for a decade and a half, they came to be side-lined in the second half of the 2000s. The 2008 Euro crisis, followed by the severe European debt crisis in 2009, together with the European Parliament’s increased number of conservative rightist MEPs in favour of austerity, saw social policy provisions disrupted (Hemerijck, 2013). To this end, WFLR policies lost
the political enthusiasm and momentum that they had enjoyed in the previous decade. However, during 2010 and 2011, they reappeared on the policy-making agenda at the EU level. Moreover, the EU has acknowledged that it is almost impossible to reach the Europe 2020 targets in the absence of comprehensive reconciliation measures (Hemerijck, 2013; Natali, 2010). In order to avoid any potential backlash with respect to WFLR policies, social partners and European social institutions, specifically the COFACE and the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), announced 2014 the ‘Year of Reconciling Work and Family Life in Europe’ (COFACE, n.d.). They put an exceptional effort into expanding WFLR measures with a particular aim of composing the disperse measures under one comprehensive package. The package consisted of both legislative and non-legislative initiatives covering leave schemes, care services and flexible working arrangements. This long-awaited demand came into existence on April 26 2017, when the EC released the European Pillar of Social Rights, in the form of recommendations listing key principles for driving the future EU social policy agenda. One of these principles focused on the reconciliation of work and family life and subsumed various legislative and non-legislative measures (Perez, 2017).

In sum, due to the aforementioned new social risks and inequalities that appeared in almost all its member states, as well as the aim of making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, the EU has adopted the social investment perspective, which emphasises WFLR (Morgan, 2012). Although the EU competence was relatively limited for a very long time, with the introduction of the OMC, documents started to require a relatively stronger convergence from member and candidate states. In the end, this prompted states to reconfigure their existing reconciliation models. In other words, the EU encouraged its member and candidate states to Europeanise their WFLR legislation (Liebert, 2002). In that sense, it is possible to argue that this pressure coming from the EU ignited change in each state. However,
as Jane Lewis (2009:120) argues, they all followed different paths depending on their policy and political contexts: ‘Each welfare state welcomed the 21st century in different places in terms of patterns of female labour market participation… as well as in respect of existing policies.’

Therefore, in examining the Europeanisation processes of the nation states, it is also important to explore their departure points. The following section of this chapter thus focuses on the empirical cases and gives detailed information about their reconciliation policy frameworks in the early 2000s.

4.3. The domestic WFLR policies in selected cases:
Relying on Ulrike Liebert (2003), who highlights the importance of the domestic social policy model and the policy priorities on the Europeanisation outcome, this section looks at German and Turkish WFLR models before the launch of the OMC and before the Helsinki Summit. As already mentioned, since the OMC, Germany, and since the Helsinki Summit, Turkey, are expected to download both EU hard and soft WFLR laws into their national legislative frameworks. Therefore, this thesis accepts 2000 as an historical marker, representing the beginning of the German and Turkish Europeanisation processes. Although the German and the Turkish WFLR models before 2000 had an important number of similarities, the politics of the policies showed significant variations, which can be expected to play an important role in the course of their Europeanisation processes. Therefore, the initial domestic models are explained separately and the chapter proceeds with Germany.

4.3.1. WFLR policies in Germany before the launch of the OMC:
Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the FRG – and afterwards, unified Germany – has often been cited as the perfect exemplar of ‘conservative corporatist regime’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Two main characteristics of this regime are: (a) strong adherence to
the traditional male breadwinner family model, based on the gendered work and care dualism and (b) the principle of subsidiarity, which requires an individual to seek help first from the family and to consider the state as the last resort (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 2000; Ostner, 2010; Trzcsinski and Camp, 2014). This played an important role in Germany being laggard in developing de-familialised WFLR measures, thus showing considerable contrast with the EU itself and other EU member states (Ostner, 2010; Palier, 2006; Pfau-Effinger and Smidt, 2011; Trzcsinski, 2000; Von Wahl, 2008).

During the late 20th and very early 21st centuries, the one and only federal policy with respect to WFLR was the Maternity Protection Law (Mutterschutzgesetz), which is a basic form of maternity leave but far from being de-familialised (Grebe, 2009). The law required mothers to end their careers with childbirth and dedicate their lives to family altruism (ibid.). Alongside the socially accepted male breadwinner and female homemaker family model, minor deviant family forms have also existed such as working-class families, which need a dual income to survive, and single mothers, who need to work and care simultaneously. Although they were not welcomed by society and considered as rabenmutter11, their work and family life conflicts were acknowledged by the German government (Rüling, 2010). Yet a very limited solution was provided (Grebe, 2009; Rüling, 2010). Few, poorly designed, kindergarten services were the only time-present WFLR measures. Their main concern was the education of children, especially those coming from the lower socio-economic strata (Pfau-Effinger and Schmidt, 2011). Furthermore, there were neither federal nor länder childcare policies. Enrolment of children in these kindergartens was completely left to parents’ initiatives (Grebe, 2009; Rüling, 2010).

11 A Nazi concept, referring to, a loveless, heartless, cruel, unnatural, or uncaring mother; a bad mother who does not take good care of her children (Retrieved from: https://www.german-way.com/tag/rabenmutter/). It is used to indicate mothers who, contrary to socially accepted family norms and values, engaged in gainful employment and neglected her familial duties.
Slight extensions to childcare services had been made during the Nazi era. One of the most notorious figures of German history, Adolf Hitler and his party had put a tiny effort into improving WFLR – but this was limited to improving poor childcare facilities. It is very important to note that this had nothing to do with women’s employment or gender equality (Grebe, 2009; Roberts, 2016), which can be proved by an ample extension of maternal leave. In the light of ‘Blood and Soil’ (*Blut und Boden*)\(^\text{12}\) ideology, Hitler and his German Workers’ Party (*Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*-DAP), prioritised child wellbeing and pro-natalism. The main concern of the government was boosting the birth rate and improving child wellbeing so that they could raise the superior Aryan ‘master race’ (Roberts, 2016). With this goal, they extended the childcare services slightly and put them under state control. But on the other hand, they also extended the duration of the ban on puerperant women’s employment. In the course of the Nazi era, WFLR policies held the aim of reinforcing traditional gender roles, which restrict women to the domestic sphere to care for the children. In other words, they were highly familialised.

As explained earlier, following WW2 and for the period of 40 years until reunification, each part of Germany had very different labour market trajectories with opposing family and WFLR models (von Wahl, 2008). In the FRG, wherein the political agenda focused on upholding and reinforcing the traditional care/work dualism, increasing women’s employment rates was elusive. This resulted in a considerable lack of WFLR initiatives.

\(^{12}\) The main ideology of Hitler and his party. According to this ideology, German people have the right to live on German soil so it aims to expand German territory and German nation.
Table 4.5: Historical development of work and family life policy in West Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>Law:</th>
<th>Content:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>First report on the current situation of Families in Germany.</td>
<td>○ Germany needs to improve its family policies especially ones about mothers’ employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Child-raising Benefit (Erziehungsgeld)</td>
<td>○ Cash benefit to be paid to parents who stop working to care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Motherhood Leave Act (Mutterschaftsurlaubgesetz)</td>
<td>○ 6-month period of optional maternity vacation with a monthly payment of 750 DM only to working mothers (approximately €350).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Promotion of Employment Act (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz)</td>
<td>○ Minimal protection for part-time employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Child-raising Benefit Act (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz)</td>
<td>○ Replaced the Motherhood Leave Act and introduced Child-raising Benefit payable to all mothers not only birth mothers for the first 18 months; ○ Introduced parental leave (Erziehungurslauf)-a flat rate parental leave scheme for 10 months to either mothers or fathers with a permission of part-time working (up to 19 hours/week).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 4.5 above shows, FRG WFLR policies were constructed around a strong male breadwinner family model. Lack of institutionalised childcare provisions together with the long maternity and parental leaves clearly engaged women with domestic work and mothering, rather than labour force participation. Therefore, it could be argued that West German policies pursued high familialisation and very low de-familialisation. On the contrary, due to its considerable capital and labour force shortages, the GDR had no
choice but to provide comprehensive WFLR measures. Accordingly, during its existence, it has facilitated the combination of work and family life through so-called ‘Mommy Policies’ (Muttipolitics) (Ferree, 1993). These Mommy Policies were underpinned by §10 of the 1965 GDR Family Code, which openly highlights the importance of WFLR (Grebe, 2009).

Table 4. 6: Historical development of WFLR policy in East Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>Law:</th>
<th>Content:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1st Implementation Regulation for the Order to Establish Pre-school and After-school facilities (<em>1er Durchführungbestimmung zur Verordnung über die Einrichtung der vorshulischen Erziehung und Horte</em>)</td>
<td>o Extensive childcare facilities and material assistance for women to combine their work and gainful employment lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Household day (<em>Haushalttag</em>)</td>
<td>o A paid day off for domestic work for women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Family Code, Art. 10</td>
<td>o The relations of spouses to each other must be designed in such a way that women can reconcile their professional and social activities with motherhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Pregnancy Holiday (<em>Schwangerschaftsurlaub</em>)</td>
<td>o 6 weeks paid leave before and 20 weeks after the child birth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Baby Year (<em>Babyjahr</em>)</td>
<td>o A year-long maternity leave with a benefit equal to sickness benefit to women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from Table 4.6 above, the GDR WFLR policies have always been extensive. However, that is not to say that they were all de-familialised. The care policies indeed exhibited high de-familialisation by locating care work under the state
responsibility, thus encouraging women’s employment. But on the other hand, all leave policies were directed at women. They therefore reproduced the assumption that women are the ones naturally responsible for childcare and domestic work, which was already the dominant notion in the West.

It is often argued that, with unification, all West German legislative, social and moral aspects were imposed on the East (Erler, 2011; Ostner, 2010). However, it was not that straightforward. In addition to several demographic factors delineated earlier in this chapter, East German women’s fear of losing their worker identity encouraged them to lobby for the signing of the bilateral unification contract ‘Einigungvertrag’, which promised an increased attention to WFLR and an exceptional effort to preserve GDR’s childcare network (Erler, 2011). Therefore, as listed in Table 4.7 below, WFLR policy slowly but surely has begun to appear in German legislative framework.
Table 4.7: WFLR policies in united Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Child and Youth Assistance Act (Kinder und Jugendhilfegesetz)</td>
<td>○ A statutory right for every child between the ages three and six in a childcare place on a part-time basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Tax Deduction for Childcare (Kinderfreibetrag)</td>
<td>○ A basic tax allowance to parents (€1080 for single and €2160 for married parents); ○ A separate allowance of €1500 for childcare related expenses for employed parents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Childraising Allowance Law (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz)</td>
<td>○ Full-paid maternity leave starting six weeks before the expected due date and ending eight weeks after childbirth; ○ Job dismissal protection from dismissal either with or without notice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Parental Leave (Erziehungsurlaub)</td>
<td>○ A flat rate parental leave scheme for 36 months with a financial compensation for the first 24 months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the time the OMC was launched, there were four laws regarding WFLR in the German legislative framework. Closer examination of those laws indicates a lack of de-familialisation. Germany was at this time a prototype of the conservative corporatist
welfare model identified in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare typology; with conservative right political parties in power, this resulted in German policies that focused on allowing women to maintain their care-giver roles rather than emphasising their career ambitions. The scarce supply of public childcare facilities induces citizens to count on family and kinship (mainly the female members of the family) with respect to care, which is underpinned by the considerably long and transferrable leave schemes. All in all, it could be argued that the German WFLR model, prior to the introduction of the OMC, was a familialised one, allocating care to the family rather than transferring it either to the state or market. This reinforced traditional gendered family roles, and thus showed a high level of misfit with the EU. Simultaneously, the German model received a high level of adaptational pressure from the EU and EU institutions. Referring to the ‘goodness of fit’ argument, it can be argued that a consolidation of the high level of misfit and high level of adaptational pressure eventually paved the way for a Europeanisation process in Germany in this specific policy area.

4.3.2. WFLR policies in Turkey before the Helsinki Summit:

Before the Helsinki Summit, when Turkey was declared an official EU candidate, the Turkish state did not pay much attention to how women reconciled their work and family lives, because women’s active presence within the paid labour market was not socially accepted (Kandiyoti, 1988). In that sense, as can be seen from Table 4.8 below, the Turkish parental leave provisions, childcare facilities and working time arrangements remained highly primitive and showed a high level of misfit with the EU, appearing as a salient obstacle to Turkey’s membership.
Table 4.8: Historical development of WFLR policy in Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>Law:</th>
<th>Content:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Guaranteed job protection to public sector employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare Provisions:</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Labour Code 1475 (Art. 81)</td>
<td>o Companies with more than 150 female workers are forced to provide comprehensive nursery rooms;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Companies with more than 300 female workers are obliged to provide comprehensive childcare centres and pre-school facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working time Provisions:</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leave provisions in Turkey before the introduction of the new Labour Code in 2003 were very immature and far removed from the EU standards. It was only the 1971 Labour Code which for the first time granted female public sector employees twelve weeks of paid maternity leave (Labour Code, 1971 Article 70), with the right to ask for an additional six unpaid months. There was a clear distinction between the public and private sectors with respect to job protection. While women working in the public sector were guaranteed job protection until the end of their maternity leave, women employed in the private sector did not have any guarantee against dismissal. The employer had the right to dismiss the worker without notice. Under the Labour Law of 1971, only fathers employed in the public sector were entitled to a (three to ten day) legal parental leave. The Code did not include any reference to the paternity or parental leaves of fathers working in the private sector (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). Rules and regulations regarding their leaves were totally left to companies’ initiatives – a reflection of the
perception that it was not appropriate for fathers to be involved in domestic work in the Turkish social context.

After an almost ten-year stability in terms of WFLR measures, in 1987 the Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSS) introduced an official bylaw regarding the working conditions of pregnant or breastfeeding female employers as well as nursing room and care centre provision. The bylaw required companies employing more than 150 female workers to provide comprehensive nursery rooms, and companies employing more than 300 female workers to provide comprehensive childcare centres and pre-school facilities (İlkkaracan et al., 2015). Unlike most of the other European countries, Turkey did not provide any legal right to children in terms of childcare place enrolment. Another cornerstone of WFLR, working time arrangements, were also highly disappointing in Turkey before the OMC. Although the majority of women were working part-time in order to be able to reconcile their work and family lives, part-time or fixed-term employment policies were not covered by the 1475 Labour Act legislation. In the absence of legal policies with respect to working time arrangements, part-time workers were working with no job guarantees, predominantly low wages and limited opportunity for progression, in what were regarded as secondary and informal jobs (Dedeoğlu, 2012).

All in all, the Turkish WFLR model was also highly familialised prior to the Helsinki Summit. Rather than easing women’s labour market participation through lightening their domestic responsibilities, Turkish policies successfully reflected the patriarchal social order of Turkey and encouraged women’s motherhood roles, which was demonstrated by official statistics. At the time Turkey was declared an official EU candidate state, the female employment rate was 26.33%, one of the lowest rates among the OECD and EU countries (İlkkaracan et al., 2015). In the same year, the total number of childcare services across the country was only 7,660, which could cover 212,603
children. This means only 9.8 per cent of all Turkish children were enrolled with a formal childcare place, while the OECD average was 28.1 per cent (ibid). It is important to note that these numbers reflect only children between three and six years old. There is a lack of any official statistics regarding childcare enrolment of children below age three (Ecevit, 2015). This lack clearly reflects the Turkish government’s attitudes toward external childcare for younger children (ibid.) By and large, Turkish women tried to reconcile their working lives with their family lives by working part-time in those so-called secondary jobs. The combination of these low employment statistics and poor legislation saw a high level of misfit between Turkey and the EU, which eventually led Turkey to Europeanise her WFLR model.

4.4. Conclusion:
Social policy is not a frozen entity. As it is defined as a set of legislation and activity applied by governments with the aims of alleviating existing social risks and inequalities and improving people’s life quality (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Taylor-Gooby, 1996), social policies change with the fluctuant conditions of the day. Simply put, at certain points in time when some policies are needed, others may lose their urgency. In this respect, although the need for WFLR policies was not acknowledged until the 1990s, since then they have been given increasing attention. Women have come to have both a work life and a family life, which need to be reconciled through comprehensive policies; women’s labour market participation was argued to be depressed due to the absence of such policies. In that sense, over the last three decades, in line with its newly adopted social investment approach, the EU has prioritised WFLR policy-making and started to require a relatively stronger convergence from its member and candidate states. This has had a marked influence on the EU member and candidate states and started a Europeanisation process in each of them.
This chapter, accordingly, located Germany and Turkey within this broader picture and diagnosed their changing needs in order to show how WFLR has historically appeared in their legislative frameworks. It argued that while Germany followed a path in line with the general trend in Europe, wherein reconciliation policies appeared as corollary, Turkey appeared as a completely unique case. In other words, the trajectory of women’s employment in Germany begged for reconciliation policies, whereas they have been artificially integrated into the Turkish policy framework via external forces. An increased number of German women entering the labour market saw the emergence of new social risks and inequalities within Germany, which turned WFLR policies into a significant policy area. On the other hand, Turkey emphasised WFLR policies mostly due to the adaptational pressure coming from the EU, because Turkish women’s employment trends have not witnessed a considerable change like the general trend in Europe. Yet, regardless of how and why corresponding policies have come into existence, by 2000 they both pursued a highly familialised model. In other words, both Turkey and Germany showed a high level of misfit with the EU. The goodness of fit argument, would concomitantly expect them to experience a Europeanisation process in this specific policy area as this study aims to illustrate.

Having explained the Turkish and German WFLR models prior to the launch of the OMC and the Helsinki Summit, the following chapter turns to illustrate the Europeanisation processes in each country. The thesis proceeds with a discussion of policy Europeanisation and examines the EU requirements of Turkey and Germany, as well as the policy reforms pursued by the two countries.
CHAPTER 5. POLICY EUROPEANISATION

This chapter presents findings relating to policy Europeanisation, which has been argued to be the most common and widespread dimension of the Europeanisation process of a country (Diez et al., 2005). More precisely, it aims to shed light on the legislative changes pursued between 2000 and 2017 under EU influence.

To accomplish this, the chapter is organised in four sections. The first section explores the bottom-up Europeanisation of Germany because this thesis argues that the Europeanisation process of a member state begins when the member state starts trying to shape the EU policy package in line with its own policy preference. To this end, the first section of this chapter seeks to understand Germany’s role in shaping the EU WFLR package. The aim of bottom-up Europeanisation is to reduce the level of misfit between the domestic and the EU legislative framework and the concomitant adaptational pressure. Having explained the bottom-up Europeanisation outcome of Germany, in the second section the chapter turns to outline the EU’s requirements of Germany and also Turkey, this time with respect to their WFLR policies. In the third section, the discussion focuses on the legislative changes featured by the selected countries in response to EU requirements on the basis of Esping-Andersen’s (1999) concept of de-familialisation. A closer examination of WFLR policies made in both Turkey and Germany under EU influence indicates an incomplete and contradictory Europeanisation because both governments have continued to pass familialised laws, which would push women back to the familial sphere, while simultaneously passing de-familialised ones. This in the end has done nothing but produce an ambivalent Europeanisation process in both countries. Therefore, the fourth and final section of this chapter examines the puzzling notions of the legislative changes. The chapter introduces the departure point of this thesis as it outlines the domestic policy reforms – which are deemed to be conscious
preferences of a certain ideology – made under the EU influence. By identifying the selected countries’ legislative responses to the EU requirements, it lays the groundwork for further illustrations at discursive, political and societal levels.

5.1. Bottom-up Europeanisation:

Several stands of literature (both theoretical and empirical) demonstrate that Germany plays an exceptionally important role in shaping EU policies (Bulmer et al., 2000; Dyson, 2003; Roberts, 2009, 2016). German influence is at its maximum in certain policy spheres: the monetary sphere; agricultural policy; asylum and immigration policies; and the EU’s military and defence activities (Bulmer et al., 2000; Roberts, 2016), but not employment policies or family policies. In other words, in this specific policy area of WFLR, Germany cannot be shown as a pioneer actor in shaping the EU policy package.

Closer examination of EU WFLR indicates the lack of German input within those policies. As has been discussed in Chapter 4, the EU WFLR policies encourage women to enter into the labour market; return to the labour market shortly after delivering their children and remain within the labour market for life (Hoskyns, 2000). This approach of the EU, which chimes with Esping-Andersen’s term de-familialisation, could hardly be considered as German input because German WFLR policies imply a huge deficit in de-familialisation. Thus, it is unjustified to argue that Germany has succeeded in uploading its own policy preferences to the EU level in the specific policy area of WFLR.

The reasons behind Germany’s failure to shape the EU WFLR policy package by and large contradict the literature on bottom-up Europeanisation. The financial contribution of member states to the EU budget, together with the number of their MEPs, have been stated to be two key elements of the success of member states’ policy
uploading process alongside the duration of their membership and their relationships with other member states (Börzel, 2002).

To start with, each year between 2000 and 2017, the financial contribution that Germany made to the EU was (a) considerably higher than the money that Germany received from the EU and (b) higher than other member states’ contributions to the EU. The net contribution of Germany to the EU budget was 8.16 billion euros, 5.12 billion euros and 11.95 billion euros in 2000, 2005 and 2012 respectively (Roberts, 2016). Between 2000 and 2017, the least amount that Germany paid to the EU was 15.62 billion euros (in 2002); whereas 13.056 billion euros was the maximum amount that Germany received from the EU (in 2013). As can be seen, the financial contribution of Germany to the EU and its predecessor institutions remain considerably high, so that Geoffrey Roberts called the EU ‘paymaster’ to Germany (ibid: 200). On average, throughout her Europeanisation process, Germany made a net contribution of 8.5 billion euros while France’s contribution was 3.5 billion euros and the UK’s, 4.9 billion euros (Roberts, 2009). Therefore, the anticipated relationship between financial contribution and successful uploading of domestic policy preferences, in the case of WFLR, is not supported in the German case. Similarly, the number of the MEPs cannot be taken as a reason behind the failure to upload these policies: in all parliamentary terms between 2000 and 2017, Germany was the country with the highest number of MEPs. The number of German MEPs in EP was 99 in the fifth (1999-2004), sixth (2004-2009) and seventh (2009-2014) parliamentary terms and it is 96 in the current parliamentary term. So, although a member state with a high number of MEPs is expected to be successful in shaping the EU policy package, Germany remained unsuccessful in shaping the EU WFLR policy framework. Finally, Germany, being one of the founding member states, has put an exceptional effort into establishing warm relations with other member states, both the central and periphery ones, since the foundation of the Union (Bulmer, et al.,
2000; Lever, 2017; Roberts, 2009). Yet, this did not bring success to Germany in terms of uploading its domestic policy preferences in this specific policy area of WFLR. Throughout the whole Europeanisation process, all four pre-conditions associated with the success of influencing the EU policy package do not stand up when applied to Germany. While they ensured Germany a privileged position together with France among the other six founding member states, which Germany exploited in shaping the EU policies in several other policy areas (Bulmer et al., 2000), WFLR remains an exception.

Within these highly complex circumstances, the roles of the German MEPs offer some explanations. The principal aim of German MEPs in shaping EU policies is to anchor Germany more firmly within the EU and to obtain peace and prosperity from the whole European integration project (Bulmer, et al., 2000; Roberts, 2009). Towards this end, German MEPs have focused on shaping different policy areas such as monetary, agriculture, immigration and defence policies, but not WFLR. Second, the European Parliament Groups and the European Parliament Committees to which German MEPs belonged during the fifth and sixth, seventh and eighth EP terms had a huge influence on Germany’s capacity to influence the EU WFLR policy package. In all four terms, the majority of the German MEPs\textsuperscript{13} were members of the European People's Party (EPP) group and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group; these are centre-right political groups with a rather conservative approach to gender roles, and in favour of neo-liberal policies. For these two groups, the division of labour based on gender and the subsidiarity principle are still important. They hold with the idea of women being wives and wives being mothers. Accordingly, they believe that member

\textsuperscript{13} In the fifth term, 53 of those 99 MEPs were members of the EPP. Similarly, in the sixth term, while 49 MEP were member of EPP, 7 of them were part of the ALDE. In the sixth term numbers have not changed much. While 42 MEP were involved in the EPP, 12 in ALDE. Finally, in the current parliamentary term, 34 of 96 German MEPs are working with the EPP and 4 of them are with ALDE.
state governments should not provide pre-emptive WFLR measures; instead, they should wait until the private households fail to secure the welfare of family members (Phinnemore and McGowan, 2013). This situation has concerned the relatively more progressive MPs in Germany from other political parties. For instance, a senior deputy from the German Green Party (*die Grünen*), while discussing Germany’s bottom-up Europeanisation process lucidly argued:

> It depends, I mean of course Scandinavian countries are the ones, who literally make the EU reconciliation politics. It is for me because of the MEPs, where they stand in Brussels. For example, most of our MEPs are from EPP and some ALDE and of course, they keep female employment issue quiet because they still have the conservative ideas in their minds… But Scandinavian MEPs, they are engaged with United Left and Nordic Green Left, if I am not wrong we have five or six German members there (GPOL12).

Such an attitude among MEPs strongly resembles sociological institutionalism (SI) from an actor-centred perspective as they decided not to put effort into contributing to the EU WFLR model on the grounds of their conservative ideas. Furthermore, it is the FEMM committee and the Employment and Social Affairs committee that are in charge of WFLR policy drafting. The number of German MEPs working in either of these committees has remained considerably low compared to other member states. Even though the Chair of Employment and Social Affairs Committee in the current parliamentary term is from the German Left Party (*die Linke*), because the EU directives on WFLR were introduced before he became Chair, his progressiveness could not matter in this sense. Therefore, the policy package at the EU level is likely to be shaped on the basis of other member states’ policy preferences.

Another reason for the lack of German contribution to the EU WFLR policy package, established through the researcher’s interviews with German MEPs, is Germany’s historical adherence to the subsidiarity principle. As German MEPs have not fully supported the integration process in this policy field, they remain half-hearted in trying to shape the policy package at the EU level, too. While discussing the reasons for
the lack of German input to the EU WFLR model, the aforementioned die Grünen MEP also openly criticised the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union – CDU) and the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union – CSU) for not being pro-Europe and for being conservative. She cited their conservatism and anti-Europe stance with respect to family policies as one major reason of Germany’s lack of success in the uploading process:

The number of MEPs from CDU and CSU are equal to number of MEPs from both die Grünen and die Linke… And you know they are the ‘conservatives’… So do their MEPs…They really do not have much preferences in terms of WFLR that’s for me one reason for not leading the discussions in Brussels (GPOL12).

Agreeing with die Grünen MEP on CDU’s discontent with EU involvement in family policies, a senior MEP from the CDU stated that:

Family life I don’t think is a policy sphere that EU should put general standards because, yes its dynamics affect female employment and gender equality and some demographic statistics I agree but at the same time it’s very local. I mean even the very personal relations within the families differ let’s say from Norway to Germany and from Germany to Great Britain, so I think countries themselves can make better policy choices on that than the EU…This is not my personal opinion, this is the dominant thought in our party, and in line with what we think, because we don’t want EU to involve in our family politics, we don’t contribute to EU level policies on family politics (GPOL2).

Lastly but most importantly, a very fragmented approach among the MEPs appeared as one salient reason for diminished German influence on the EU WFLR package. A lack of harmony among the MEPs, in terms of their attitudes toward motherhood, mothers’ employment and the ideal way of reconciling work and family lives, has reverberated in their collaborations and eventually Germany has fallen behind other member states in shaping the EU level WFLR policies. A senior deputy from die Linke, who identifies herself as a very progressive feminist, described this situation:

MEPs from the conservatives, I don’t think that they are really vocal. I know some individual members from the Green Party or from die Linke of course that are really working within the European Parliament but I don’t see them working in one line. I think the biggest problem for Germany within the European Parliament is they all have different sayings, they don’t speak from one mouth (GPOL8).
Her perspective was shared by another deputy from die Grünen who argued:

We have some MEPs like Fransiska Bratner, she is the head of the family department. She is the most progressive person in our party, she also knows and deals with all European Union issues. Also, Katja Dorner, she is also really progressive and vocal… Also, the SPD and die Linke are fighting on the same side with us… But the MEPs from the conservatives and also now we have MEP from AFD, it’s impossible to be on the same page with them… So, we really can’t do much in council meetings… But as I said, us, die Grünen, the SPD and die Linke, we are together because we are criticising our government back at home about their behaviour in the council meetings (GPOL12).

Likewise, a deputy from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD) Bielefeld fraction, noted that the fragmented approach among the MEPs was an important factor behind Germany’s lack of bottom-up Europeanisation process. However, unlike other interviewees, she referred to the different priorities of political parties with respect to the EU and their different expectations from the EU, which resonates with theories put forward by Bulmer and his colleagues (2000):

The MEPs from the SPD I think are really good, I personally know that they are really trying to push the EU to more of a gender equal direction, which has been slowed down most recently. But there is again heterogeneity, devastating our efforts… But this time, with respect to EU relations, the heterogeneity is a little different than what we have discussed… It is not a matter of conservatism… We don’t really have conservative MEPs but it is more different MEPs prioritise different things. And while family policies are extremely important for some MEPs, some others think that Germany has bigger problems than family policies. So, it’s hard to find a compromise (GPOL5).

As a result, and in contrast to other policy areas, Germany has remained ineffective in influencing the EU WFLR policies. It lags behind other member states in uploading its own policy preferences to the EU level (Bulmer et al., 2000; Dyson, 2003; Roberts, 2016). This situation intrinsic to Germany is called ‘fence-sitting’ in the bottom-up Europeanisation literature, delineating neither actively shaping nor stopping the policy-making process at the EU level (Börzel, 2002). Börzel (2001) further puts forward four key reasons why a member state would act as a fence-sitter: (a) in order to avoid to be isolated among the other member states; (b) in order to achieve the policy results while being constrained in terms of action capacity; (c) if they consider the
adaptation cost reasonable and (d) if they do not consider the policy issue as a priority. Yet, as shown above, these four reasons identified by Börzel remain insufficient to explain the German example. Germany remained weak in uploading her own policy paradigm to the EU and exhibited a high level of misfit with the EU. In line with the ‘goodness of fit argument’, Germany received a relatively high level of adaptation pressure from the EU.

5.2 EU’s requirements for Germany and Turkey:

In the course of the launch of the OMC, there were four hard laws (see Table 4.3 at page 79) with respect to WFLR at the EU level that needed to be transferred into German and Turkish legislative frameworks. Due to their binding characteristics, downloading them into domestic legislative frameworks was not open to any kind of negotiation (Kantola, 2010). In that sense, Germany was expected to download these hard laws no later than two years after their introduction and inform the EC thereof (CEC, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1999). On the other hand, due to her candidacy status, Turkey did not have any strict deadline for the adaptation of these laws. Turkey’s Europeanisation process proceeds subject by subject (Kantola, 2010). Simply put, as already discussed in Chapter 2, Turkey is expected to download some particular policies, which the EC required from her through accession partnership documents and annual evaluations into her domestic legislation. This indeed is very straightforward: if Turkey wants to become an official member, she needs to meet those requirements. The sooner Turkey meets those requirements and incorporates them in her legislative framework, the better for Turkey’s membership trajectory (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Tocci, 2005). To these hard EU laws on WFLR, a number of soft laws (see Table 4.3 at page 79) should be added. In that vein, one of the most important soft laws that needed to be adopted by Germany was the set of Barcelona targets (EC, 2008). Moreover, a number of other soft laws repeatedly
recommended to the member states, including Germany, are exhibited in Chapter 4 through Table 4.3. On the other hand, again because Turkey has not yet gained official membership, she was exempt from these soft laws.

In addition to the aforementioned hard and soft laws, the EU has also provided regular country specific reports to Germany and Turkey. While Turkey received regular Accession Partnership Documents (Aldıkaçı-Marshall, 2013; Kantola, 2010), Germany received annual Country Reports (Kantola, 2010). These reports represented the required legislative adjustments triggered by the misfit between the domestic WFLR models and the EU WFLR model. Since these reports were country specific recommendations, their content differed from one country to another on the basis of the level and the nature of the misfit between the national model and the EU model.

While assessing the German and the Turkish WFLR measures, the EU regularly asked both Germany and Turkey to de-familialise their measures, to make laws which would ease women’s labour market participation by transferring their household responsibilities to the state or at least to the market. Apart from expecting the transmission of the aforementioned hard and soft laws, the documents have openly asked Germany to improve childcare and parental leave provisions as well as to increase full-time female employment through WFLR measures. Turkey also received various requirements from the EU. Low female employment rates and poor childcare infrastructure have regularly been underlined by the official documents assessing Turkey’s membership. Although the official documents excluded the highly familialised parental leave scheme of Turkey, the EU officials interviewed under the scope of this thesis have pointed to the issue. Regardless of Germany being a founding member (thus receiving Commission recommendations) and Turkey being a candidate (thus receiving the accession partnership documents), the EU has focused on three interrelated aspects in terms of German and Turkish WFLR models.
**Adaptational pressure on female employment rates:**

A review of the related EU documents and the interviews conducted with the EU representatives indicates that the low female employment rates in Turkey and women’s overwhelming preference for part-time work in Germany have been major points of concern for the EU. The German and Turkish low female employment rates therefore are mentioned as an issue in most of the EU documents. For example, the 2003 Council Recommendation on Germany covered the issue under ‘preliminary notes’ and asked Germany to ‘increase the employment rate of women up to 60% by 2010’ (COM, 2003:4). In a similar vein, the first progress report, published in 2001, required Turkey to provide measures which would increase female employment rates. It stated that:

> The Turkish Constitution guarantees equality between men and women and sets the principle of non-discrimination. However, there is a need for effort to ensure that the equal treatment principle is implemented and enforced. In particular, actions should be designed to increase women's literacy through education and training and to improve urban employment for women (COM, 2001:38).

Alongside the official documents, low female employment rates were repeatedly criticised by different official EU representatives while discussing the WFLR measures of Germany and Turkey. A policy expert from one of the social partners argued that:

> The Commission for instance, and we also agree with that, put a lot of stress on the introduction of all kind of papers on the facts that female labour market participation is very low not only for Germany, Germany too but also for all member states. This is absolutely true – very big problem and very true (EU4).

Kantola (2010), Lewis (2007), Stratigaki (2004) and Aybars et al. (2018) argue that, particularly from the mid-1990s, an exceptional priority was placed on economic growth at the EU level. WFLR, therefore, has turned into a fruitful tool for allowing women to participate in the labour market. For this reason, both Germany and Turkey have been subject to a certain degree of adaptational pressure for an increased female employment rate through de-familialised WFLR measures, which would serve to liberate women from their domestic tasks.
Adaptational pressure on childcare infrastructure:

An adequate number of accessible, affordable childcare places have been argued to be the lynchpin of de-familialised WFLR policies, for the fact that they significantly ease women’s labour market participation (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Morgan, 2012). Neither Germany nor Turkey have developed sufficient de-familialised childcare services, an issue extensively covered in most of the documents that Germany and Turkey received from the EU. Both countries’ strong adherence to the traditional male breadwinner family model, based on the gendered work and care dualism and the principle of subsidiarity (Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Dedeoğlu, 2012; Ostner, 2010; Trzcinski and Camp, 2014), played an important role in this insufficiency. For this reason, the EU documents and the personal interviews conducted with official EU representatives stress the urgent need to expand childcare provision in terms of both quality and quantity. While the official reports’ foci were more on the statistics and numbers, a number of interview partners expressed their concerns about the affordability, quality and opening hours of childcare facilities. For example, the 2005 Progress Report indicated that:

In the last four years, Turkey made a 68% increase in the number of children in pre-school education, yet is still low…There is still much to be done in this area (COM, 2005: 137).

Similarly, a senior member of the Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Commission stated that:

Opening hours are very important so the care services should be running between times that parents can bring their child before work and pick up after work. So, it’s about facilitating… But in Germany, which is quite conservative I’d say kindergartens ends at 1 o’clock…How can this increase female employment? (EU7).
Even if childcare does not fall under the full EU competence, the EU officials are highly concerned about childcare infrastructure and ask both Germany and Turkey to improve it.

**Adaptational pressure on leave schemes:**

A consistently criticised aspect of German and Turkish WFLR model has been the parental leave schemes. It is argued that shorter maternal leave would provide for women’s quicker return to the labour market. This lesser amount of time spent out of the labour market would keep women updated in terms of their careers, which would benefit both the employee and the employer (Leitner, 2003; Lewis, 2002). Moreover, shorter parental leave, especially if it is shared equally among the parents, would also increase gender equality by distributing care work equally (Kantola, 2010; Stratigaki, 2004). To this end, relatively long durations of unpaid parental leaves supported by cash benefits, their transferrable nature in Germany and the lack of paternal leave for fathers working in the private sector in Turkey have been repeatedly noted by EU representatives. Yet they were merged into the requirements with respect to general WFLR measures, rather than being covered under a separate heading. For example, a senior member of the Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Commission stated that:

> Germany’s biggest problem beside the childcare is their long, long leaves, which is very much related to their understanding of mothers care, fathers earn… But, we here are screaming every day for an increased number of women in the labour market. But frankly how can it be possible with long leaves? That would actually move mostly women away from the labour market. This would create disincentives to stay in the labour market or to return to the labour market for instance after pregnancy and giving birth. And this contradicts with the objective of female labour market participation (EU7).

Alongside the duration of the leaves, transferability was another point of concern of the EU representatives. While appreciating the German parental leave scheme, which obliges fathers to take at least two months of leave (discussed below), they required even
more equal sharing of parental leave. A senior policy expert from a social institution lobbying the EU Commission for better WFLR policies stated, while discussing the current situation in Germany:

Germany improved its parental leave scheme… It still doesn’t have paternity leave but it’d be too much to expect a paternity leave from a member state when we don’t have it here. But yes, with this two additional months, which is usually taken by fathers, German parental leave is becoming better. Because what we say is parental leave should be individual; it should be non-transferrable individual (EU1).

In a similar vein, the 2005 Progress Report for Turkey explicitly pointed to Turkey’s backwardness in reconciliation measures and indicated that:

Turkey has not accepted the Article 8 of the European Social Charter on maternity leave of working women yet (COM, 2005: 38).

As can be seen from the examples above, the EU has consistently criticised both Turkey’s and Germany’s WFLR measures on the grounds of their familialised nature, and thus their divergence with the EU. In line with the ‘goodness of fit argument’, both Germany and Turkey received a considerable number of WFLR requirements from the EU, due to the high level of misfit. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on Europeanisation has already pointed to adaptational pressure as the pre-requisite for a Europeanisation process (Cowles and Risse, 2001). Therefore, a process of Europeanisation in terms of WFLR is expected both in Germany and Turkey. However, as Nathalie Tocci (2005) argues, it is the domestic aims, interests, the prevalent socio-political ideology and the domestic history that determine how the process will proceed. On the basis of these aspects, the process might bring real change, a modest change or might preserve the status quo. The chapter thus continues with a discussion of the legislative reforms that both Germany and Turkey pursued between 2000 and 2017, in order to reveal the change that came about with the Europeanisation process.
5.3. Legislative changes in Germany and Turkey under the EU influence:

The period from 2000 onwards shows an uneven WFLR policy-making process with various ebbs and flows for both Germany and Turkey. It is plausible to argue that both countries welcomed those aforementioned EU requirements and agreed to adopt a number of reforms with respect to parental leaves, childcare provisions and working-time arrangements (Büchs and Hinrichs, 2007; Yılmaz, 2016).

As can also be seen from Table 5.1 below, in January 2001, only a year after the OMC was launched, the Red-Green coalition government in Germany, and in 2003 the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) government in Turkey, made their first moves towards Europeanising domestic WFLR models, which controversially continued with ups and downs until 2017 (Bozçağa, 2013; Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Dedeoğlu, 2012; Erler, 2011; Grebe, 2009)
Table 5.1: WFLR policy reforms in Germany and Turkey between 2000 and 2017.

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<tr>
<th>Leave Provisions</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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<th>Turkey</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law:</td>
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<td>Parental Leave Act (2001):</td>
<td></td>
<td>Three-year leave to parents before the child turns to 12;</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Flat rate payment of €300;</td>
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<td>Protection from dismissal.</td>
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<td>Obligation on each parent to take at least 2 months of leave.</td>
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<td>Gender Equality Bonus (2008):</td>
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<td>Tax credits to parents, who share the parental leave equally.</td>
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<td>Reform on Civil Servant Code (2011):</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan (2015):</td>
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<td>Full-paid part-time maternal leave for employed mothers for the first six months following the end of the maternal leave;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flexible working arrangement rights to parents until their children turn to 5.5 years.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>○ 14 weeks of maternity leave to employed mothers with a full earning substitution.</td>
<td>○ Five-day paternal leave to fathers working in private sector.</td>
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<td>○ €1080 and €2160 tax allowance to single and married parents respectively; ○ Separate €1500 cash allowance to employed parents.</td>
<td>○ Companies employing 100 to 150 female workers to provide comprehensive nursery rooms; ○ Companies employing more than 150 female workers to provide comprehensive childcare centres and pre-school facilities.</td>
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<td>○ Part-time childcare right to every child between age 3 and 6; ○ National aim of increasing childcare enrolment rate to 35% by 2013 through opening 750.000 childcare place.</td>
<td>○ Metropolitan municipalities and municipalities with population over 50,000 can open children centres.15</td>
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<td>○ €2.15 billion increase in the government spending on initial childcare place investment; ○ Additional €770 million for the potential costs might exist while running the place.</td>
<td>○ National target of raising the childcare enrolment rate for the 3-5 age group to above 70%.</td>
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14 The statement has been dropped from the Code in 2007 through the delegated legislation 24/1/2007 (Municipal Law no: 5393 bylaw 2).  
15 The statement has been dropped from the Code in 2007 through the delegated legislation 24/1/2007 (Municipal Law no: 5393 bylaw 2).
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<th>Act</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Child Promotion Act (2008):</strong></td>
<td>o €4 billion government spending for 750,000 additional childcare place;</td>
<td>10th Development Plan (2014-2018):</td>
<td>o National target of increasing the preschool enrolment rate for the 4–5 age group to 70% before 2018.</td>
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<td><strong>Homecare Allowance Law (2012):</strong></td>
<td>o €150 monthly payment to parents, who look after their children until the child turns into age 3.</td>
<td>Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan (2015):</td>
<td>o Five-year tax reduction for newly established child-care centres ran by the MFSP.</td>
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<td><strong>Day-Care Law (2013):</strong></td>
<td>o Childcare place right to every child above age 1.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Part-time Work Act (2001):</strong></td>
<td>o Statutory right of an equal treatment of that full-time employees to part-time employees.</td>
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16 In Turkey, ECEC services fall under the competence of MoE or MFSP. While the MoE is responsible for providing a comprehensive care places for children aged 0-2; the MFSP is responsible for children aged 3-6 (İlkkaracan et al., 2015).
In addition to the reforms presented in Table 5.1, a number of government-funded projects were run in both countries. In 2004, the then family minister Renate Schmidt, who was the first family minister in Germany since the Nazi period to be vocal about extremely low German fertility rates (Rüling, 2010), launched the information campaign ‘More Care for Kids – Germany gets Family Friendly (Mehr Kinderbetreuung – Deutschland wird familienfreundlich)’ (Ripperger, 2005). The biggest aim of this campaign was to focus political attention on care and work dualism and initiate new policies to alleviate it through expanding public childcare provision. More recently in 2010, the German Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth agreed to fund the establishment of ‘Federal Forum Men (Das Bundesforum Männer)’, an umbrella organisation committed to involving more men in domestic work with the slogan of ‘sustainable reconciliation policy for fathers (nachhaltige Balance von Arbeits – und Privatleben ein für Vaters.)’. While these German initiatives aimed at de-familialising the existing WFLR legislation, closer examination of the content of the Turkish initiatives suggests the opposite.

In 2005, the Turkish government started a project called ‘Back to Family (Aileye Dönüş Projesi)’, which encouraged parents (mostly mothers) to care for their children themselves at home by paying them monthly 300TL (Bozçağa, 2013). Additionally, in 2015 the Turkish government initiated a project called ‘Grandmother Project (Babaanneye ve Anneanneye Çocuk Bakım Parası)’. In a like manner to the Back to Family project, the Grandmother Project provided grandmothers with a 450TL monthly allowance for taking care of their grandchildren (Daily Sabah, 2017). Then, in 2017, with EU funding, the MoLSS started the ‘Home-based Childcare Project (Evde Çocuk Bakımı Projesi)’ in three pilot cities. The ministry agreed to pay €300 to mothers of small children, who are already employed or planning to return to the labour market, in order to be able to employ childminders (SGKemeklilik, 2017).
The overall picture regarding these legislative amendments depicts a social policy transformation that has led to an upgrading and widening of WFLR policies. Steps taken suggest both Germany and Turkey have been putting effort into de-familialising their WFLR policies as they clearly attempt to transfer the domestic work from largely being a woman’s responsibility to being a government responsibility. Shorter leaves endowed both mothers and fathers with greater public childcare provisions and universal childcare enrolment rights in Germany; maternal leaves in common with the EU standard, together with targets to expand childcare provisions in Turkey indicate qualms about the strong adherence to traditional male breadwinner family model. In other words, conservative gender roles maximising women’s domestic responsibilities and supporting them to stay at home and care for their family members had begun to be evaporated. Both Germany and Turkey have come a long way in terms of Europeanising their WFLR policies. Through unburdening women’s familial obligations, both governments eased women’s entry into the labour market, and also provided some policy tools that would help them to remain in the labour market. Yet that is not to say that the selected countries have pursued a fully-fledged Europeanisation in this specific policy area.

From a critical perspective, most of the aforementioned legislative reforms made under the EU influence are vague and highly contradictory. That is because both governments, while passing de-familialised reconciliation laws, also continued passing familialised reconciliation laws and kept several familialising policies in place instead of abolishing them, which contradicts the EU approach toward WFLR. Therefore, both the German and the Turkish WFLR frameworks continued to show both fits and misfits with the EU and made their Europeanisation processes rather uneven. The chapter thus proceeds with illustration of these puzzling notions within the Europeanising moves.
5.4. Puzzling notions within the legislative reforms:

Chapter 2 has already distinguished Europeanisation from convergence. It argued that convergence is only one possible outcome of Europeanisation. In other words, a member or a candidate state holds the potential for convergence or divergence at the end of its Europeanisation process due to the speed and extent of downloading the EU standards (Duina, 1997). They might: (a) Europeanise their domestic legislative framework; (b) preserve the domestic legislative framework; or (c) partially Europeanise the domestic legislative framework. In this regard, both Turkey and Germany have partially Europeanised their domestic WFLR legislation in terms of both the speed and the extent.

While some of the corresponding policies have changed under EU influence, some others have remained intact or been downloaded into the domestic legislative framework with a considerable delay. This has eventually resulted in an incomplete and contradictory Europeanisation process in each country, wherein the de-familialisation impact has been eclipsed by the familialised policies. These contradictions within the reforms constitute a puzzle that requires solving because they are conscious preference of a certain ideology.

5.4.1. Speed of the reforms:

With respect to the speed of required reforms, it would be safe to argue that the laws, regulations and administrative provisions that the German government passed under the influence of the EU clearly indicate a belated transmission, especially regarding maternity leave, parental leave and childcare provisions. It took 17 years for Germany to align its maternity leave with the EU. While the EU expected its member states to provide a paid maternity leave as of 1994, Germany provided only partially paid maternity leave until 2011 (Krapf, 2014). Female employees in Germany were able to receive just 67% of their salaries during their maternal leaves. Lack of sufficient income
because of giving birth is arguably open gender discrimination and likely to increase women’s financial dependency on their partners (İlkkaracan, 2010). In other words, it is against the logic of de-familialisation and an anti-Europeanising move.

Furthermore, the EU parental leave directive (96/34/EC) obliged all member states to provide at least three months of non-transferrable leave both to men and women for childcare purposes, together with a job protection as of 1998 (EurWORK, 1998). Although the first reform of German parental leave policies in 2001 covered the latter clause, it was already three years later than the deadline given by the EU and omitted the non-transferrable notion. As can be seen from Table 5.1 above, the second parental leave reform in 2007 covered both clauses. Since the 2007 Parental Leave Act, Germany has been providing a non-transferrable parental leave to both mothers and fathers. However, the passing of the law in 2007 constitutes a nine-year delay for Germany in meeting the EU requirements with respect to parental leaves. Here, it is very important to note that, despite the delay, Germany is one of the few member states who downloaded this law into its own legislative framework, apart from the Scandinavian countries which represent the vanguard of de-familialised WFLR policy-making (Lewis, 2009). More precisely, it is only Germany among the six founding member states (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) that has aligned its parental leave legislation with the EU (ibid).

Finally, Germany appeared as a problematic case in meeting the Barcelona targets as well. In 2002, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the EU asked its member states to provide childcare to at least 90% of their children between three years old and the mandatory school age, and to at least 33% of their children below three years of age, attaining these Barcelona targets by 2010 (Plantenga et al., 2013). Although Germany agreed to meet these targets, the official statistics, especially with regard to the childcare
enrolment rate of children below three years old, show that Germany could not meet the Barcelona targets in time (Kalicki et al., 2017).

On the other hand, although Turkey did not have particular deadlines by which to download the EU standards into her own legislative framework, doing so quickly would be more favourable to membership. However, in a like manner to Germany, there has also been a considerable deficit in the pace of the reform in Turkey. While Turkey was sailing in the same direction as the EU within the first six years of her Europeanisation process, the seas were not smooth. With the AKP’s second victory in the Turkish general elections in 2007 and another disappointment in the sixth EU enlargement in the same year17, reforms almost in all spheres including WFLR policy area slowed down (Kubicek, 2013; Yılmaz, 2016). It would be safe to argue that Turkey took no more steps with respect to Europeanising its WFLR measures except the unmet childcare expansion target set by the Ministry of Education (MoE) in 2009. This stagnant period, which lasted until the introduction of the 10th Development Plan in 2014, has often been criticised by the EU. The 2012 progress report touched upon the absence of the progress in alignment with the acquis in the field of labour law and clearly highlighted the need for WFLR policy-making:

There has been no progress in Measures on improving the work-life balance are not fully in place, and the existing ones mainly focus on women rather than a gender mainstreaming approach… Provision of childcare facilities for working women remained an issue; work on a regulation on parental leave did not proceed (COM, 2012: 26&65).

Gözde Yılmaz (2016), while describing how Turkey’s relation with the EU switched from Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation, applied the term ‘selective Europeanisation’ ‘to this period, wherein the pace of the reforms was reduced. She argues

17 The 2007 enlargement of the EU welcomed Bulgaria and Romania joining the EU but not Turkey even though Turkey was featuring the accession negotiation process (see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.1.html).
that Turkey continued passing reforms, but only in particular policy areas and to a limited extent. The lack of measures regarding childcare provisions, leave schemes and working time arrangements show that reforms have not been continued within the WFLR policy field. Building on Yılmaz, it is plausible to claim that this prosaic period, in which Turkey lost her initial enthusiasm, overshadowed the Europeanisation process.

5.4.2. Content of the reforms:

With respect to the content of the reforms, puzzling aspects of German and Turkish WFLR policies have been summarised under three main themes, all of which eventually decelerated the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies. These themes are: (a) disincentives for female employment; (b) incentives for the reproduction of women’s motherhood roles; and (c) lack of state responsibility.

Disincentives for female employment:

The EU stubbornly presses for WFLR policy-making in order to increase female employment rates (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010), whereas a number of laws already existing in German and Turkish legislative frameworks, and some passed throughout their Europeanisation processes, tended to be less compatible with female employment objectives.

Homecare allowances, the monthly payment to parents (mostly to mothers) who do not put their children into crèches and care for them at home until the child turns three (Fleckenstein and Lee, 2014; Krapf, 2014), are the first example of female employment disincentive in the German case. The EU asked Germany to provide WFLR measures in a de-familialised manner in order to increase female employment but this law seems to contradict de-familialisation logic. Although the government defended this law as ‘an essential part of our policy of freedom of choice’ (Rüling, 2010), and allocated £319 million (Malm, 2012) to the programme, it can be perceived as conservative
welfare model heritage, which eventually impaired the Europeanising of the German WFLR model. While discussing the trajectory of Germany’s Europeanisation process within this specific policy area, a senior policy expert from one of the social partners openly criticised Germany for passing this allowance law:

> So, there is a change, the change is taking place. But it’s going not that quickly as we might want or as we expect…So, it’s early to speak because Germany is acting unpredictably on this… One year they pass a law for childcare registration for infants…the next, cash benefit for stay-home-mothers (EU5).

Similarly, the two clauses of the Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan of Turkey also hold a highly familialised policy paradigm. As shown in Table 5.1 above, the plan guaranteed the right to work part-time, with a salary paid on full-time work rate, for employed mothers for the first six months following the end of the maternal leave and the right to flexible working arrangements for parents until their children reach the mandatory school age (Cumhuriyet, 2015). Although paying a full-time salary for part-time work due to care responsibilities implies acknowledgement of the importance of the formerly invisible care-work, it also removes women from the labour market. While receiving a full-time salary but working part-time seems highly logical to women in the short run (TA2), it can significantly impair their chance of returning to the labour market. As Bianchi and her colleagues (2000) argue, the more time they spend at home, the less attractive they become to employers. This clearly reflects the familialised policy logic of Turkey, and concerns the EU. A recent document, the 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy Report, stated:

> Legislation on part-time work for working parents has been adopted. The lack of institutions and services to care for children, the elderly and sick people, including for long-term care, continue to hinder women’s employment due to the gender bias for caring responsibilities (COM, 2016: 60).

In order for the Europeanisation process to bring convergence, existing policies based on an opposing logic should also be eliminated. However, even though the
German government passed a number of de-familialised WFLR policies, it remained reluctant to alleviate the existing familialised ones. The joint taxation system (Ehegattensplitting) peculiar to Germany, which aggregates the incomes of spouses then divides the aggregated amount into two and takes this latter number into account while calculating the tax rate (Künzler et al., 2001), and the health-insurance system of Germany, which provides coverage for non-working spouses (usually wives) with no extra charge (Künzler et al., 2001; Ostner, 2010), clearly assuage women’s employment. Although they are of relevance to the policy area of WFLR, they implicitly discourage transferring the care responsibility to the state or market and reinforce the view of women as the main carers. They negate the EU approach towards WFLR policy-making and hamper Germany’s Europeanisation process in this policy area. As both pieces have been part of German legislative framework for a very long time, they appeared in many EU documents. The Council Recommendation on Germany's 2014 NAP bluntly criticised Germany for both the joint taxation and the health insurance systems:

Together with the still insufficient availability of full-time childcare facilities and all-day schools (see Section 3.3), the joint taxation of income for married couples (Ehegattensplitting) and free health-insurance coverage for non-working spouses discourage women in particular from increasing the number of hours they work. This is reflected in a low proportion of women working full-time and one of the lowest numbers of hours worked on average by women in the EU, despite a relatively high female employment rate (COM, 2014:14).

**Incentives for the reproduction of women’s motherhood roles:**

Another puzzling notion of German and Turkish WFLR policies made under the EU influence is the fact that they implicitly and explicitly support the role of women as mothers and providers of unpaid domestic work within the family. While more explicit in Turkey, the task of caring for children is assigned to mothers in both countries. In the German case, although the 2007 Parental Leave reform encouraged fathers to be involved in the care work, by obligating each parent to take at least two months of the
leave, the minimum duration given to each spouse is less generous than what the EU asked for. In a similar vein but even worse, fathers have completely been excluded from the picture in the Turkish case. The only law concerning fathers’ roles in care is the second bylaw of the Labour Code, which was added in 2015 with the Omnibus Bill. Although the law covers paternal leave, the content is highly under-developed. It provides only ten days of leave to fathers working in the public sector and five days of leave to fathers working in the private sector (Labour Law, 2003, article 74:2). While most EU countries have begun to divide the parental leave more or less equally between the parents, the same cannot be said of either Germany or Turkey. They clearly reproduce the traditional work/care dualism, where women are associated with domestic work and men with earning a living, therefore, reaffirming women’s roles as mothers. Moreover, Article 88 of the Turkish Labour Code, by basing the existence of childcare facilities on the number of female workers rather than the number of total workers, reproduces the traditional gendered division of labour patterns and naturalises women’s carer roles.

To these highly familialised laws and bylaws, two aforementioned projects with the same logic, operated by the Turkish MoLSS and Ministry of Family and Social Policy (MFSP), should be added, as both perpetuate women’s association with care work. While the 2005 Back to Family project does so by transferring child and elderly care back into the family sphere through providing cash benefits in return, the Grandmother Allowance project does so by rewarding only grandmothers for caring for their grandchildren, rather than grandparents, even if they both are retired. Relying on these examples, it can be argued that despite the high level of adaptational pressure for de-familialised WFLR measures coming from the EU, both Turkey and Germany reproduce the traditional male breadwinner family model. The existence of laws, bylaws and projects clearly contradicts the EU paradigm behind WFLR as they neither distribute
the care work equally among parents nor transfer it from women’s shoulders to the state or market. Hence, it can be argued that they impair the Europeanisation process in each country by stressing women’s motherhood roles.

**Lack of state responsibility:**

In addition to the aforementioned familialised laws, which paved the way for a continued misfit with the EU, there are also a number of policies where the German and Turkish governments abstained from taking the responsibility and left the implementation of the law vague. The ways in which the TAG and its revised versions were formulated in the German case, the 2005 Municipal Law reform and the 88th article of the Labour Code in Turkey can be given as clear examples for these vague rules and regulations.

According to the Germany’s federal state structure and the TAG, the federal government leaves the financial and regulative responsibility regarding childcare provisions to länder governments. The federal government covers only one third of the local authorities’ spending on childcare and leaves the rules and regulations to länder governments’ initiatives (Andronescu and Carnes, 2015; GPOL8). This multi-actored arrangement results in de-centralised opening hours and fees, which implicitly confounds the WFLR Europeanisation process in Germany.

First, each local government has been responsible for defining the opening hours of the childcare facilities and in most cases, these did not run full-time. According to Lohmann and Zagel (2016), childcare places operating half the day, rather than operating on the same schedule as workplaces, implicitly restrict women from full-time employment and fail to transfer care responsibility from family to the state. In other words, they contradict de-familialisation logic, and impair the Europeanisation process

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18 The other two third comes from the länder government, the municipalities and other various nongovernmental institutions, be it the church or the local NGOs (see Andronescu and Carnes, 2015; Schöber and Spiess, 2015).
of Germany. Second, there has also been a lack of centralised childcare fees. The cost of a regular childcare place has differed according to the family income, the länder and the age of the child (Krapf, 2014; GPOL10). In crowded länder like Berlin or Nordrhein-Westfallen, where the demand has been much higher than the supply, the fees of childcare places remain very high (Schöber and Spiess, 2015). As a result, these cross-country variations in terms of both fees and opening hours function as an obstacle to Europeanisation of German WFLR model.

Similarly, the Turkish government openly lays the responsibility of childcare place promotion either on the private companies through the 88th article of the Labour Code or on the municipalities through the 14th article of the Municipal Code. In both cases, there is no sanction regarding non-fulfilment of the requirement. In addition to this, there is very little monitoring of companies by the state (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; İlkkaracan, 2015). Under these circumstances, most companies prefer not to follow the regulation, which ultimately results in low childcare enrolment and female employment rates in Turkey (İlkkaracan, 2015). In a similar vein, through the aforementioned Grandmother Project, the Turkish government again is leaving responsibility for childcare with the familial sphere rather than transferring it to the market or to the state. Since the core aspect of de-familialisation is transferring the care responsibility from families either to state or to market, these legislations imply a very low level of de-familialisation, and a very low level of Europeanisation.

All in all, in response to the high level of pressure coming from the EU, both governments have made significant reforms during their Europeanisation processes. Yet, they also kept alive the laws which would push women back into the familial sphere. Their existence ultimately influenced the overall reform picture and diluted the Europeanisation processes of German and Turkish WFLR policies.
5.5. Conclusion:

This chapter has sought to document the policy Europeanisation processes of selected countries. This has been demonstrated through the legislative reforms featured by Germany and Turkey under the EU influence. Building on the ‘goodness of fit’ argument, due to their high levels of misfit with the EU, both countries received high levels of adaptational pressure in these areas. In return, both governments have adopted a series of reforms touching upon all three components of WFLR. However, in both cases reforms remained contradictory, incomplete and half-hearted. While introducing de-familialised reconciliation laws, they have not abolished existing familialised ones and continued passing new familialised ones as well. As such, both Germany and Turkey have featured an incomplete Europeanisation process rather than a fully-fledged one. Referring to five possible outcomes of Europeanisation identified by Börzel and Risse (2003) and Radaelli (2003), it would not be unjustified to argue that Germany has exhibited an ‘absorption’ whereas Turkey has exhibited an ‘accommodation’.

As demonstrated above, throughout her Europeanisation process Germany successfully downloaded EU standards into her national legislative framework. Numerous laws and bylaws passed by the German government between 2000 and 2017 exhibited a considerable level of de-familialisation. However, the German government did not show the same enthusiasm in abolishing the familialised laws, which could be identified as a legacy of the conservative corporatist past of German welfare state. This unique situation of Germany resonates with what Börzel and Risse (2009:14) calls absorption. Similarly, Turkey has undergone an uneven Europeanisation process. The Turkish government, like the German government, has downloaded EU standards into her own national legislative framework without abolishing the former opposing laws. Yet, because the level of change in Turkish context is lower than the level of change
pursued in the German context, it is more accurate to refer to Turkey’s Europeanisation patterns within this specific policy area as ‘accommodation’.

Relying on the combination of an extensive policy analysis and interviews with official EU representatives, this chapter contends that in order to feature a fully-fledged Europeanisation, both Germany and Turkey need to improve their childcare provisions, leave schemes and female employment rates. There is still a salient gap between the EU and Turkish and German legislation in terms of childcare provisions and leave schemes resulting in contradictory reforms. In order to understand why the reforms that have so far taken place remain contradictory, despite the high level of pressure coming from the EU, it is necessary to interrogate domestic actors’ views on and expectations from the EU membership, female employment, gender equality and WFLR. That is because any kind of legislative decision is an intentional outcome – preference – of a certain ideology (Tsebelis, 2002). The following chapter, therefore, will turn to the position of domestic actors with regards to their views on Europeanising the German and Turkish WFLR legislation.
CHAPTER 6. DISCURSIVE EUROPEANISATION:

Building on the premise that domestic actors (be they governmental or nongovernmental) fine-tune the process of Europeanising WFLR policies, this chapter investigates the German and Turkish actors involved in their countries’ Europeanisation processes. More precisely, the discussion within this chapter focuses on the views of domestic actors towards Europeanising the WFLR model, as well as the framing of WFLR Europeanisation in domestic actors’ language, which resonates with the aims of discursive Europeanisation. As mentioned in Chapter 2, discursive Europeanisation focuses on the reasons behind domestic actors’ decisions to act as catalysts or antagonists throughout the process (Diez et al., 2005; Ketola, 2013). It tries to understand the ways in which domestic actors perceive the idea of Europeanising their domestic WFLR legislation. This chapter begins by identifying the domestic actors relevant to WFLR policy-making in each country. Here, relevant actors are categorised as catalysts and antagonists on the basis of their positions throughout the process. After classifying the catalysts and the antagonists, the chapter proceeds to explore how they have perceived the Europeanisation of WFLR policies and to what extent they have reflected it in their discourses. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the level of internalisation of EU norms and values regarding WFLR by the domestic actors.

6.1. Actors of the process:

Throughout the processes of Europeanising both German and Turkish WFLR models, the competences of policy-making have been shared by a range of domestic actors. As can be seen from Figure 6.1 below, they all were highly tangled in the contemporary German and Turkish conjunctures, to the extent that it was almost impossible to make a sharp distinction between catalysts and antagonists.
**Figure 6.1:** Distribution of the actors of the policy-making process.

At the civil society level, a key group advocating policy reform in both countries (be it for more de-familialised policies or be it for more familialised policies) has been women’s organisations. As WFLR policies are embedded in a nexus of employment, family and gender equality policies, they also matter to trade unions, employers’ organisations and family organisations in both Germany and Turkey. Finally, because of the subsidiarity legacy in Germany, German religious organisations also feature in discussions about WFLR policy-making. At the political level, mainstream political parties and several commissions within the German Parliament (*Bundestag*) and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* – *TBMM*) are key players in policy reform. Additionally, due to the Municipal Law Article 14 (which exerts competence on local governments in providing childcare services), local municipalities in Turkey; and due to Germany’s federal nature, the local länder in Germany, also have a stake in WFLR policy-making.

In both countries (see Figure 6.1 above), the major political parties located to the left of the centre, whose members identified as more progressive and liberal than their counterparts, appeared as catalysts. Strikingly, some senior members of the main centre
right party of the Bundestag – the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union* – CDU) – also joined the catalyst camp in Germany. All these domestic actors had their own idiosyncratic reasons for catalysing the process. Accordingly, their perceptions of greater EU involvement in the WFLR sphere differed. However, in spite of the differences in their reasons and perceptions, these actors all welcomed the process and supported the policy change. To this end, there are some examples of cooperation across the groups. On the other hand, right, centre right and extreme right parties – namely the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – MHP) and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – AKP) in Turkey; the CDU and the Christian Socialist Union (*Christlich-Soziale Union* – CSU) in Germany, together with some relatively more traditional women’s organisations in both countries, constituted the core of the antagonist camp. In Germany, antagonists also include employers and family and religious organisations. As with the catalysts, antagonists’ reasons and the ways in which they perceive EU involvement in the WFLR sphere showed overt variations. Nonetheless, antagonists also found ways to build alliances while considerably decelerating the processes of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR.

**6.2. Actors’ perceptions of Europeanisation of WFLR policies:**

This thesis was built on the argument that the process of Europeanising domestic WFLR policies has been shaped by the contributions of domestic actors. However, it really is the ways in which they perceive the idea of Europeanising the WFLR policies, stemming from their ideological background, cost and benefit calculations as well as their socio-political past, that determine their inputs to the process. Relying on the Europeanisation literature, which argues catalysts and antagonists are two opposing but not mutually
exclusive groups, this chapter explores their views on Europeanisation WFLR separately and proceeds with an analysis of catalysts.

6.2.1. Catalysts:

Catalysts from each country, highly unsatisfied with the current state of their own WFLR measures, saw the EU’s greater emphasis in this specific policy area as a window of opportunity. To this end, they welcomed increased EU involvement in this particular policy sphere and tried to take maximum advantage of the whole process. There are three reasons for their position and the chapter proceeds with the first one.

Constructive pressure coming from the EU:

Some of the Turkish and German women’s organisations, who identify themselves as progressive and liberal, almost all the trade unions in Germany, most of the leftist and adversary ones in Turkey, together with the mainstream political parties from the left corners of both the Bundestag and the TBMM, have benefitted from the increased adaptational pressure coming from the EU in this specific policy field. They have seen it as a useful tool to trigger a reform process at the national level. The reasons for this include: (a) appreciation of the EU WFLR model; (b) the EU model’s usefulness in solidifying their own arguments; and (c) the model’s attractiveness to young women voters.

a) Appreciation of the EU WFLR model:

All the aforementioned catalysts were highly displeased with the underdeveloped and familialised WFLR policies of their own countries. For them, the lack of comprehensive WFLR policies, especially the insufficient number of childcare places together with their unaffordable costs and incompatible opening hours, required urgent remediation, as key factors in women’s continued inequality in domestic and paid employment settings. In that sense, they considered EU norms and values regarding WFLR policy as modern,
gender equal and global. Take for example one very vocal and active deputy from the People’s Democracy Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi- HDP), who argued:

EU is a civilisation project, it has rules and regulations contributing to improvement of societies. Of course, if you want to be part of a project, you need to follow those rules and regulations. And I do not see anything wrong to follow those rules. I mean they are universal, they are global, they are modern and applicable to every single aspect of our lives… be it women’s rights, be it ethnic-minority rights, be it economic policies or freedom of speech whatever comes to mind… And I think we surely need them. Especially today when everything is rapidly going back…When our women have been treated as holy mothers, when thousands of our citizens including a political party leader is imprisoned (TPOL10).

A senior deputy from the SPD, for example, who identifies herself as feminist, similarly stated that:

We are very much welcoming the change coming with the EU because we need to… In order to keep up with the EU and also the EU states, we need to revise our gender politics and family politics regularly, which is something that we really would not do if it was not for the EU because you know our political agenda is occupied by other issues and also the number of those conservative MPs are quite high in our Bundestag… so I would say we are a very pro-EU party (GPOL5).

Besides agreeing on the usefulness of Europeanisation of WFLR policies in solidifying gender equality at national levels, both in the employment and familial spheres, the leftist parties in Germany also noted their usefulness in alleviating the falling fertility rates in Germany. Some deputies from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD), the German Left Party (die Linke) and the German Green Party (die Grünen) suggested that the lack of sufficient WFLR measures were an important reason for low German fertility rates, a point also evidenced by a range of population studies (Brodmann et al., 2007; Hemerijck, 2013; McDonald, 2002).

The sympathetic stance of catalysts to the EU’s de-familialised WFLR policies has been reflected in their official documents. The majority of the documents belonging to the leftist parties of the two countries completely echo the EU policy-making
paradigm with respect to WFLR. They overtly embrace the Europeanisation of WFLR. The Republican People’s Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) and HDP’s 2015 election manifestos openly promised to introduce de-familialised reconciliation measures, which occupied an unprecedented space in Turkey’s Accession Partnership Documents. While the CHP covered the issue under the ‘powerful women powerful society (Güçlü Kadın Güçlü Toplum)’ heading (CHP, 2015: 79), the HDP published a separate document focusing only on women and women’s issues, under the name ‘we are labourer women, we are the raisers of humanity (Biz’ler Emekçi Kadılarız, Büyük İnsanlığı Büyütenleriz)’ (HDP, 2015). Both documents touched on a very problematic aspect of the Turkish WFLR measures: they highlight the urgent need to amend Article 88 of the Turkish Labour Code, which makes childcare place provision conditional on the number of female employees. As mentioned in Chapter 5, basing childcare place provision on the number of female employees is open discrimination, which infringes on Turkey’s Europeanisation process. Since both the CHP and HDP were in favour of Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model, their election manifestos promised to base the childcare place provision on the number of total employees (CHP 2015: 101; HDP, 2015). The HDP, known as Turkey’s women-friendly party, went even further and pledged to establish ‘Women’s Employment Support Centres’ in order to realise these aims and develop more policies aimed at easing women’s employment (HDP, 2015). Additionally, the CHP, cited in a number of studies as the pioneer and historical defender of the Westernisation of Turkey (Celep, 2013; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), openly highlighted the importance of EU influence in almost every policy sphere, but particularly in the social policy sphere (CHP, 2015: 93).

Echoing the EU paradigm, the three major leftist parties of the Bundestag promised a WFLR model which would support the goal of an equal share of domestic responsibilities between men and women, alleviating barriers to women’s employment.
For example, the Green Party covered the issue in its party program under a separate section called ‘The Green Women Politics (die Grüne Frauenpolitik)’, stating that:

We assist women and men, to be economically independent… For women, it must become easier to protect themselves through gainful employment for the age… We want women and men to help to share the concern for their children and work in partnership (Die Grünen, 2017).

b) Solidifying their own arguments:

Representatives of women’s organisations also welcomed the greater EU involvement and EU requirements in this policy area, as the official EU documents have come to be their biggest anchorage. An interviewee from a Turkish women’s organisation focused on women’s employment argued that:

Of course, when it was only our ideas and our demands, it was a bit too much marginal and feminist to the Government, their concrete appearance on official accession documents of course eased our fight a bit, but a bit (TNGO6).

A German grassroots feminist, also working as a senior policy expert in an umbrella women’s organisation, expressed similar feelings:

The EU did a lot of course, especially in extending the childcare places, which was not a German idea. So, all the progress that we made came from in fact forced through the EU. Maybe not a direct force but it brought the opportunity of looking to other countries, how do they manage it and what kind of childcare do they offer just made us to realise that in every other country children are going to day-care centres at the age of 1 or 2, which is also kind of forcing. So, it’s very important… I know we have a way to go but we wouldn’t have achieved even what we have achieved until today without the push factor coming from the EU (GNGO7).

c) Attracting young women’s votes:

The most striking actor of the catalyst camp is the group of relatively more progressive members of the CDU. Although their reasons for welcoming the process of Europeanisation diverged from those of other catalysts, they also agreed with aforementioned catalysts in finding the adaptational pressure constructive and positive for the country. A number of interview partners and a number of studies on German family policies suggest that some change in the position of the CDU is evident with the
coming to power of Angela Merkel (Fleckenstein, 2011). As general secretary of the CDU in 2002, when the party lost the election, Merkel claimed that the main reason behind the election defeat was the lack of votes from younger urban women (Fleckenstein, 2011; Ostner, 2010). She argued that ‘women-friendly’ and more ‘gender equal’ policymaking would attract those young women voters (Wiliarty, 2010). To that end, the CDU has supported Europeanising German WFLR policies. Discussing the tension between the different political parties regarding de-familialisation, a die Linke employee working for gender issues disputed that:

Well, now the CDU also seems highly in favour of improving WFLR politics but I am sceptical here… I cannot believe in their efforts as the way I believe in our efforts or die Grünen’s efforts… I am sure, they are more thinking about getting votes either from us or from die Grünen… at the end of the day, this is the election year (GPOL8).

A closer examination of CDU documents supports die Linke’s scepticism, as the CDU, who have aimed at catalysing the process for different reasons than the leftist parties, used more deliberate language in their official documents when compared to the leftist parties. Although the CDU documents cited Germany as the anchor of stability in the EU, they bypassed the EU when it came to WFLR. Firstly, emphasis has been on the ‘family’ rather than female employment. Second, contrary to other catalysts’ documents, CDU’s documents covered women-related issues under the heading of ‘Family, Women, Youth and Seniors’. Moreover, the CDU’s election manifesto for the 2017 general elections promised modest tax cuts and extra money for young families (Knight, 2017). Arguably, despite some progressive voices within the party and some progressive moves made by the party, the CDU as a whole did not internalise the EU’s norms and values regarding WFLR. Therefore, CDU’s language highlighting the importance of the family for German society lends credence to a senior deputy from their former coalition partner SPD, who argued:
Any kind of initiative regarding childcare provision expansion proposed by the SPD have been cut by the CDU in the process of negotiation within the coalition...so, I think the enemy is within the government (GPOL7).

Overall, different members of the catalyst camp welcomed the increased EU involvement in this policy sphere and held highly positive views on the process of Europeanising their own WFLR model, on the grounds that the process would remedy the maladies of their domestic policies. These positive views are also reflected in the language of their official documents. Yet, their reasons for appreciating and accelerating the process show some variation. Their dissatisfaction with their own national model appears to be the only reason common to all the catalysts, apart from the CDU. Both the Turkish and German WFLR were highly familialised prior to their Europeanisation processes. They both contributed to the reproduction of the gendered work/care dualism based on inequality between the sexes (Orloff, 1993). This lack of gender equality contradicts with the gender equality goals of feminist women’s organisations as well as those of the political left, who have always been close to the feminist movement. Therefore, an increased adaptational pressure from the EU for more de-familialised WFLR models became meaningful to them. In terms of New Institutionalism (NI), this resonates with sociological institutionalism (SI), as catalysts already saw the de-familialised WFLR model as ‘the right thing’ and supported it because it solidified their arguments. The EU standards concerning WFLR policy have been socialised by both the Turkish and German political left, together with relatively more vocal NGOs. A crucial part of the decisions made by the domestic actors to catalyse the process might be based on their social values.

A very important actor, however – Germany’s ruling party – has made its decisions on the basis of a rational calculation. Although the German Christian Democrats have also modernised their thinking and have recognised the importance of women’s employment, they still have their strict limitations. They have historically
regarded the family as the best educator, and have strongly believed that children should be looked after by their mothers. Yet that is not to say that they are against women’s employment. For them, women should work if they want unless they procrastinate their domestic responsibilities in general, and childcare in particular (Saxonberg, 2014; Wiliarty, 2010). A closer comparison of this with the EU requirements shows that there is a lack of common ground between what the EU asks from Germany and what the Christian Democrats believe. This, together with CDU’s strategic move towards defamilialising the German WFLR model before the 2005 general elections, exhibits a clear utility-maximising calculus. From an actor-centred perspective, it can be argued that accelerating the process for vote-concerns chimes with rational choice institutionalism (RCI); the CDU considered the executive office a bigger gain than assuaging their strong commitment to traditional conservative WFLR policies for the sake of a Europeanised model.

**EU funding as reform facilitator:**

Alongside favouring the constructive effects of the increased adaptational pressure for Europeanisation, catalysts also embraced the potential of EU funding to aid the domestic reform processes. As mentioned in the previous section, both German and Turkish catalysts viewed the EU’s requirements as a safe, global and neutral baseline, which would premediate them while legitimising their ideas to any opposing groups – such as the conservative voices in government in both cases. Similarly, catalysts in general but especially women’s organisations, who identified themselves as progressive and secular in Turkey and progressive and liberal in Germany, saw EU funding as transparent, safe and neutral, which would allow them to be more independent and flexible while setting the agenda for their projects.
Women’s organisations in Turkey and in Germany explain their *raison d’etre* as projects, research, advocacy, campaign and services providing for women’s prosperity and equality. In the achievement of these goals, and even for their own survival, these organisations need financial support. While one way of finding the needed financial support is to establish collaborations with and obtain grants from government institutions such as MFSP, MoLSS or MoE, the other way is searching for foreign funding\(^\text{19}\). A number of women’s organisation representatives from both countries point to the second option as the more appealing one, and the EU emerges as a promising donor. Although reasons for refusing to accept grants from national sources differed between Turkish and German catalysts (due to the differences between Germany and Turkey in terms of the current state of the relation between the NGOs and the government as well as the level of NGOs’ freedom of action), there were five main reasons for preferring EU funding. These included: (a) fear of potential government interference; (b) lack of trust in internal donors; (c) concerns about self-survival; (d) overlapping themes of EU and women’s NGOs; and (e) the meaning of being a rights-based NGO.

a) Fear of potential government interference:

The representatives of the women’s organisations interviewed in Turkey were well aware of the discrepancy between their own views and the views of the current Turkish government regarding female employment issues. Therefore, they were highly concerned about potential government interference in their projects and attempts to remould them in line with the ruling ideology, which eventually would distant the project from achieving its original goals and aims. In order to avoid these difficulties and be autonomous in terms of the aims, goals and targets of their projects, Turkish

\(^{19}\) Both in Turkey and in Germany private companies also started funding civil society organisations under the scope of civil responsibility initiative, yet that is a very recent trend for both countries.
women’s organisations give priority to EU funding even if it takes more time and effort. A pedagogue working as a project coordinator in a very active NGO, located in a highly disadvantaged neighbourhood in Istanbul, and trying to provide childcare services to the neighbourhood’s children, shared their lived experiences and how they became sceptical and antagonistic toward internal funding:

Due to the topics we deal with, two very potential funders for us are the ministry of education and ministry of family. In the past we ‘somehow’ managed to find a common ground and run projects together. But the last application we did was a complete disaster. You know the residents of this neighbourhood are all from lower class, so they both need to work but at the same time there is no way they can afford kindergarten, even the public ones. So, we decided to provide childcare services for free only to locals. For that, we needed not a very high budget but a considerable budget. So, we, actually I, wrote a project to family ministry. After the second or the third meeting, they sent us a ‘revised’ version of the project, which was completely a brand new one. Nothing on the paper was ours. They were suggesting a place wherein children would come with their mothers to socialise. So, I understood that there is no way that we can agree and run a project together anymore. Since this, we turned our faces to international partners like the UN or EU or World Bank [which] seem possible targets (TNGO7).

This lived experience of a rights-based NGO exemplifies how the Europeanisation process of a country is highly filtered by the domestic political conjuncture. For this NGO, the EU presents an alternative in order to avoid government interference into NGO’s agenda, but at the same time, also a reason to support the process of Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model.

b) Lack of trust in internal donors:

The second reason for trying to get EU funding rather than seeking funding internally, is some women’s organisations’ lack of trust with regard to the neutrality and objectivity of those internal donors. This distrust is twofold. The first, which is very similar to the aforementioned concern, is topic-centred. There is a perception among several women’s organisations that the projects granted funding from internal government sources are known even before they tender their proposals. For them, a project aiming to facilitate women’s employment would always lose to a project stressing motherhood. This
attitude links to the second distrust reason, which is agent-centred. As discussed in Chapter 7, pioneered by a women’s organisation run by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s daughter, a number of NGOs working particularly in the gender equality field have been established in the last five to seven years with the support of the AKP as well as the wealthy religious businessmen. In addition to these AKP-supported women’s organisations, some women’s organisations that were established in the aftermath of the 28 February process, which brought in brutal restrictions on Islamist circles in society (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), and are working for freedom of the headscarf, also became more and more close to the AKP, especially after AKP abolished the ban on the headscarf. These government organised nongovernmental organisations (GONGOs) are expected by secular and progressive women’s organisations to get the internal funding as their projects would be in line with the government ideology. This expectation is also reflected in the literature on Turkish faith-based NGOs. A number of authors have pointed to the significant political and financial support provided to these GONGOs by the local and national government (Atalay, 2013; Doyle, 2018). In line with their concerns, catalyst organisations have found working on a proposal to be submitted to the EU funding mechanism more logical and promising than spending time on a proposal to be submitted to internal donors.

Ketola (2013), however, in his inspiring work Europeanisation and Civil Society, finds that even a very progressive NGO working for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual rights or a Kemalist women’s organisation actively and vocally opposed to abolishment of the headscarf ban would prefer internal funding on the grounds that it

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20 There is a rapidly emerging literature on Turkish faith-based NGOs over the last decade (Atalay, 2013; 2016; Çelik and İşeri, 2016; Petersen, 2012; Zihnioğlu, 2013). Authors have argued that, from 1960s onwards, Turkish religious brotherhoods had turned into legal foundations, reaching peak numbers as of 2000 (Atalay, 2013). Although they initially mostly engaged with humanitarian aid, as they have their roots from charity work, more recently these faith-based NGOs have come to be working in the women’s rights field.
indeed is the EU funding which has a predetermined agenda (Ketola, 2013). This difference in the findings perhaps stems from AKP’s sensitivity on WFLR and reveals how marginalised secular women’s organisations have become recently in Turkey. As detailed in later stages of this chapter, motherhood and family are two of AKP’s key values. For AKP cadres, women’s motherhood roles and responsibilities come before their labourer roles. To this end, the AKP overtly tried to persuade Turkish citizens to have more children and to be more engaged with their family (Korkut and Eslen-Ziya, 2011), and AKP supported any kind of project sharing these goals. Under these overwhelmingly restrictive conditions, women’s organisations engaged with female employment openly expressed their feelings of isolation and considered the EU funding as a way out, which eventually intensified their catalyst roles.

c) Concerns about self-survival:

Finally, the recent political climate in Turkey cultivated women’s organisations’ interest in EU funding rather than that from internal institutions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, on 15th of July in 2016, Turkey experienced its fourth military coup (see Footnote 2). Although the ruthless impacts of the attempt were deeply felt in any sphere of Turkish citizens’ lives and by NGOs in general, women’s organisations in particular appeared to be the most convulsed group, which led many feminist authors to interpret the coup attempt as ‘a war against women’ (Arat, 2017; Kandiyoti and Emanet, 2017). The state of emergency legally allowed the President and his cabinet to draft or even pass new laws without negotiating them within the parliament. In other words, the state of emergency permitted the ruling party to impose their vision on the whole country. The AKP government closed down 94 NGOs and suspended the service and funding of those 370 within the scope of the eleventh article of the State of Emergency Act. Ten of those 94 closed ones were organisations working for increased female employment and childcare facilities, such as VAKAD, Gundem Cocuk (Agendum Child), Kongreye
Jinen Azad (Aksam, 2016; YöneY 2016). The remaining organisations, extremely scared and concerned about the maintenance of their activities, hence have looked increasingly to external donors, including the EU. A senior policy expert from a women’s organisation located in Istanbul, accordingly, argued that:

> Turkey is going through hard times since the 15th of July. Things [that] happened to VAKAD, and to Gundem Cocuk are obvious. Leave partnership aside, it is even impossible to approach any government institutions. So, what is left for us to collaborate… municipalities… but the level of paranoia is maximum among them too, they do not want to cooperate with us either. So especially these days EU funding is a shot in our arms… because the worst-case scenario is getting a rejection, no closing down or no trial risk (TNGO8).

In a similar vein, one of the project coordinators of a deep-rooted organisation, focused on parent-child relations, elucidated:

> Frankly, we never had funding issues. I mean we are here since early 1990s, so I should say we are pretty much accepted. But, now looking around what is happening, looking at the trajectory of the country, the state of emergency, the referendum, you know I will not list everything happening since 2010, we made a big meeting last meeting to discuss our research agenda and the potential financers and honestly, we are no more searching grants within Turkey (TNGO14).

Under a political climate which made it extremely difficult for Turkish NGOs to rely on internal funding, the EU funding seemed an attractive option on the grounds that there was no hidden agenda, and the EU would never interfere in the content of the project, or would be less likely to terminate the protocol during the lifetime of the project. EU funding clearly contributed to catalysts’ embrace of the process of Europeanising domestic WFLR policies. Women’s organisations’ adopted strategy of taking the most advantage of the EU in order to sustain their projects strongly implies the RCI perspective, but also resembles the SI perspective. That is because appealing to EU funding was not a simple act of utility-maximisation, it also involved women’s organisations’ own norms and values. They used EU funding because they perceived EU funding as transparent, objective, just, equal and reliable. Therefore, the strategy correlates both to SI and RCI perspectives.
Similarly, any potential grant from the EU, but especially the European Social Fund (ESF), established for advancing member states’ national employment climate through co-funding national or even regional projects (Brine, 2002), appeared highly favourable to German women’s organisations and bolstered their catalysing attitude. Yet due to Germany’s relatively advanced democracy and a greater respect in Germany for NGOs, their reasons for preferring EU funding over internal funding differed from those expressed by Turkish women’s organisations, as this chapter will now explain.

d) Overlapping themes of EU and women’s NGOs:
Representatives from a range of German women’s organisations stated that their project topics usually do not fall under Government priorities, leading to numerous unsuccessful funding applications to German governmental institutions. Like their Turkish sisters, representatives of German women’s organisations also gave priority to EU funding applications:

Only money that we get from Germany in this field is through the special research projects, special training programs regarding childcare, or some cultural child education projects… the ESF and ICRC are very very very important for us. Otherwise, we would be sitting here in our offices because our government is not very keen on involving or financing research projects aiming to increase women’s full-time employment or some special training programs regarding childcare, which is basically why we established this place (GNGO7).

It is argued that the themes of the projects are linked to donors’ own objectives and priorities (Ketola, 2013). Relying on Ketola, it is plausible to relate this pro-Europeanisation stance of German catalyst organisations to SI as it stems from overlapping project ideas.

e) Meaning of being a rights-based NGO:
Another reason why German women’s organisations prioritise EU funding relates to their own understanding of being a rights-based NGO. For them, being an NGO means giving voice to marginalised sections of the society. Getting grant aid or establishing collaborations with governmental institutions would diminish their close relationship
with the public. In order to avoid tainting their reputation, they have preferred applying to and accepting funds from the EU, despite its competitiveness and difficulties. For them, the EU’s multi- and supra-national nature connotes objectivity in terms of agenda-setting for project funds, as well as the ways in which both the project itself and the grant application process proceeds. Accordingly, a representative of a women’s organisation mostly engaged with lobbying and activism states:

To get funds from the EU, you need people to deal with those applications so on and so forth and here we are only four people working and these people have immense responsibilities. But anyhow as an organisation opinion we decided not to get any grant from German government but try to get from the EU…because you know if we are funded by the government and if it’s heard, people who need us might lose their trust to us. Even if nobody loses anything, we need to be free for our self-peace (GNGO5).

The acceptance of EU funding on the grounds that it solidifies the rights-based feature of the organisation clearly chimes with the SI perspective as it drives from women’s organisations’ understanding of being an NGO.

**Europeanness:**

When seeking to understand the tone of the domestic actors’ language towards Europeanising their domestic WFLR model, ‘European identity’ appeared as an important, but not an overlapping, theme. The CHP as well as some NGOs who identify themselves as Kemalist in Turkey, and some progressive deputies who contributed to catalysing the process from the CDU in Germany, felt the need to Europeanise their WFLR model in order to prove their European identity. Yet both did so in considerably different ways, due to Germany being a very powerful founding member and Turkey being a long-lasting candidate state, whose membership is highly contested. While peer pressure was the driving force behind German catalysts, pursuing European values in terms of WFLR and proving the possibility of a secularised Muslim Turkey to Europe encouraged Turkish catalysts.
a) Peer pressure:

Peer pressure played a very important role for some CDU members in supporting the Europeanisation process in WFLR sphere. Despite the ideological differences between the party and the EU approach to WFLR, the fear of Germany falling behind other countries induced some CDU deputies to join the catalyst camp. The German political elite, especially the CDU/CSU group, for a very long time regarded the adherence to traditional male breadwinner family model as a sign of advancement in terms of economy and prosperity. They believed that the German labour market has been capable of paying enough so that German families do not need two earners (Rüling, 2010).

Furthermore, for the same group, a child raised in a kindergarten would not be able to become a successful citizen. Instead, they expected the child raised in the kindergarten to have social and psychological issues (GNGO7). As such, the German elite for a long time believed that their traditional male breadwinner family model is the better model. However, with increasing European integration, and the bitter PISA test results21, some of these elite (the ones from the CDU) have come to realise that in reality they have not been doing as well as they thought (GNGO7). The low PISA scores that German kids have received, especially, made some CDU MPs see that a child raised in a kindergarten might be more successful, as is the case in the Scandinavian countries, than a child raised at home like in Germany (GNGO7; GPOL1; GPOL2). This awakening, in line with Lever’s (2017:129) quiet sarcastic observation that ‘Germans like to be liked’, significantly softened the strict anti-EU stance of some CDU deputies with respect to WFLR. In order to catch up with the rest of the Europe and increase the low PISA results, some CDU members contributed to the Europeanisation process. A senior politician from the CDU recalled:

This PISA test had a big influence on us and showed us that we had to reform our education policies, especially the early childhood education. Because you know, in the past we were very good at education...As you know by the end of the 19th Century, which was just before the Nazis took over the power, we were the leading nation in science, especially in natural sciences but also in social science. After the Second World War, the situation has changed of course. But anyway, we still considered ourselves as the country of strong education. But, this PISA test was a big shock for us and many discussions went on for some years and led us to reform in regions and also at the federal level (GPOL2).

b) Pursuing European values in terms of WFLR:

Starting in the late Ottoman and accelerating in the early years of the Republican era, Turkey has gone through a very busy reform agenda\(^{22}\) aiming to transform Turkey into a modern, Western and secular state (Arat, 1999; Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), particularly under the leadership of Ataturk and his party CHP. This transformation, also known as the Kemalist ideology, largely centred around women’s rights issues (Ketola, 2013). The CHP, being in the first place Kemalist elite, introduced a number of laws in order to emancipate women and dismantle them from an Islamic way of life (Findley, 2010). However, all these reforms took place in the public sphere and left the family sphere untouched. Therefore, Turkey continued to employ the traditional male breadwinner family model. Kandiyoti (1987:324) delineates this paradox intrinsic to Turkey: ‘emancipated but not liberated’; his implications are still valid. Being the representative of Ataturk’s secular tradition, the CHP has still been trying to resume the modernisation, Westernisation and secularisation of Turkey. Although the party has recently acquired more sceptical language around EU membership (Celep, 2013; Findley, 2010; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), party members

\(^{22}\) The first Civil Code of the Turkish Republic came into force in 1926 and abolished polygamous marriages and the husband’s rights on one-sided divorce; it legislated for monogamous marriages and gave the rights of divorce, child custody and ownership of family properties both to men and women. Moreover, women gained the right of suffrage in 1934; the primitive maternal leave rights were introduced in 1945; the Law on Family Planning that legalized the sale and free dissemination of contraception in 1965 and the same law legalized the abortion until the 10th week of pregnancy. The concept of ‘head of family’ given to fathers has been abolished with the introduction of the Civil Law in 2001 (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Kılıç, 2010; Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, 2010; Dedeoğlu, 2012).
remain supportive of Europeanisation in this particular policy field because their anti-EU stance is of relevance to WFLR policy. It stems from the fact that CHP is the main opposition in a political milieu wherein the ruling party is exceptionally in favour of EU membership. The CHP elite has never fully believed in the sincerity of the AKP’s pro-EU stance. For them, this pro-EU stance was taken in order to pave the way for Islamising Turkey by taking advantage of the accession process in terms of human rights requirements (Celep, 2013; Findley, 2010; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). Therefore, the CHP elite had gradually become less pro-EU. Yet, they still regard the de-familialised WFLR model as a Western value that needs to be a Turkish value too, and supported the process of Europeanising the Turkish model:

I think being in the labour market adds to your motherhood rather than impairing it. Because it’s an opportunity to invest in yourself and the more you invest in yourself the more you invest in your kid. Look at European mothers, I mean they let their kids go and those kids become stronger than our kids in future. It’s just us incarcerating ourselves and our kids to home for the sake of better child-raising. No, we should adapt the European way too if we want progress (TPOL6).

c) Proving the possibility of a secularised Muslim Turkey:

Alongside pursuing European values in terms of WFLR, CHP also wants to prove the possibility of a secularised Muslim country sharing EU norms and values in such a private policy field. As observed by many scholars of EU studies, Turkey’s accession process has been significantly impaired by Islam being the dominant religion in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2013; Yılmaz, 2009). Here, it is important to note that Islam is not referred to as a theological system but more of a lifestyle (Usul, 2008). In other words, what has been disliked and opposed in Islam has never been the ways in which Turks believe in or pray for God. Instead, the issue has always been the fact that Islam interfered in the culture and politics (Yılmaz, 2009), which links to the issues of women’s rights. Women’s dominance over men in the private sphere and their subordination in the public sphere (be it political participation or labour market participation) thus became a very
symbol of Islam and accordingly this opposition to Islam (ibid, 2009; Usul, 2008). In that sense, the CHP, historically aiming at a radical break with Turkey’s Islamic lifestyle, welcomed Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model in order to soften European respondents’ very strong Turko-scepticism on the grounds of Turkey’s Islamic identity.

Appreciating and supporting the process of Europeanisation in order to keep an old tradition can well be explained through Historical institutionalism (HI). Europeanising Turkey has in a way been handed down to CHP from its predecessors almost a hundred years ago. Today, the CHP is executing its predecessors’ bequest while Europeanising Turkey’s WFLR model. Put simply, CHP’s sympathetic stance toward Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model takes its roots from the very early years of CHP, which clearly echoes HI’s suggestion in a path-dependent fashion. Yet, on the other hand, supporting the process in order to recuperate the successful past of Germany and to spread the idea that Islamic Turks can be compatible with Christian Europeans in terms of WFLR, resonates well with RCI. In both cases, catalyst elites welcomed the process on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Their intention was to gain the maximum profit out of the process instead of internalising the EU way of a defamilialised WFLR model. While seeking ways to increase the low PISA results, German elites saw Europeanisation as a window of opportunity. They have regarded the gains of increasing the PISA results through reconfiguring the German WFLR framework as greater than maintaining the status quo. In a similar manner, while seeking to show how Muslim Turkish women can be equalised with European women in terms of reconciling their work and family lives, Europeanising the legislation appeared as a window of opportunity. Therefore, the CHP elites have embraced the process.

In sum, although different catalyst groups had different reasons for pursuing the process of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR policies, it has been a key goal for all. They have successfully taken advantage of the process and used it in tandem with
their original goals, norms, values and ideas. Their existence and ability to exploit the opportunities that came with the process were expected to extinguish the misfit between the domestic WFLR policy framework and the EU WFLR policy framework (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Cowles et al., 2001; Duina, 1997). However, even though both countries have pursued an ongoing Europeanisation between 2000 and 2017 through an intense process of de-familialising their WFLR policies, as illustrated in Chapter 5, neither Germany nor Turkey have developed a fully-fledged one in this policy area. Both governments continued passing familialised reconciliation laws while passing de-familialised ones. Turkish and German WFLR frameworks, therefore, continued to show both fits and misfits with the EU and made their Europeanisation processes ambiguous. It is possible to explain the puzzling aspects of both processes through the existence of domestic antagonists whose presence is equally important to that of catalysts’ in shaping the whole Europeanisation process. The chapter thus proceeds with the illustration of antagonists’ perceptions of and attitudes towards the Europeanisation of domestic WFLR policies.

6.2.2. Antagonists:
Antagonists have perceived the greater EU influence on the domestic WFLR policies as a challenge. In line with their opposing stance, they have supported the status quo and successfully decelerated the process. As with catalysts, the reasons why antagonists have perceived the process as a challenge and refused to support it differ among them according to their sociological, historical and political backgrounds, together with the result of their cost-benefit calculations.

Subsidiarity:
A number of groups in both countries have been highly uncomfortable about Europeanising their own WFLR model, on the grounds of subsidiarity. These include:
representatives of the Christian Democrats in Germany, the CDU/CSU; some German religious organisations; Turkey’s ruling party, AKP, which identifies itself as a ‘conservative democratic party’ rather than an Islamic party; Turkey’s extreme nationalist party, the MHP; and some Turkish Islamist women’s organisations. Although they object for a variety of different reasons, all have perceived EU involvement in such a private sphere as a threat to national identity and to the national political and cultural order. Therefore, they prefer the related issues to be dealt with at the domestic level, which chimes with the principle of subsidiarity (Kalyvas et al., 2010). Three key aspects stemming from antagonists’ strong adherence to the subsidiarity principle were: (a) fear of assimilation; (b) threat to political competence and (c) fear of adverse effect.

a) Fear of assimilation:

As observed by a number of notable scholars, subsidiarity is a key Christian Democratic value (Kalyvas et al., 2010; Hale, 2006). The CDU/CSU is described as ‘one of the three classic Christian democrat parties’ in the world (Hale, 2006:68), and the AKP, which has adopted a relatively more secular and pro-Western political image than its overtly Islamist predecessors, has claimed at every opportunity that the AKP is a Muslim Democrat party like those Christian Democrats of European countries23 (Çarkoğlu, 2006; Duran, 2006; Hale, 2006; Tepe, 2006). Accordingly, a number of deputies from CDU/CSU, accompanied by representatives of some German religious organisations and a number of deputies from the AKP, when interviewed stay loyal to the principle of subsidiarity. They see Europeanisation of WFLR policies as a potential source of

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23 The AKP elite, especially during the first AKP government, have exceptionally prioritized projecting their party as a conservative democratic party rather than an Islamic party (Akdoğan, 2006). According to Daği (2006), this was the narrative used by the AKP in order to prove that they are not the continuation of Turkey’s strongest religious movement ‘the National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüs Hareketi)’. However, after having won the general elections three times in a row and increasing the votes each time, the AKP has pursued a radical shift towards overt Islamism (Oniş, 2016) and stopped identifying itself as a conservative democratic party. Even the party has not been denying their Islamic nature since 2011, they still are highly loyal to the principle of subsidiarity.
assimilation and express their fears about it. There is a concern among both the Turkish and German antagonists that WFLR policies on child-raising are likely to distance children from national norms, values, customs and traditions. For them, EU-induced short maternal leaves, obligating mothers to send their children to childcare centres – again set up on the basis of EU standards – hold the possibility of a generation moulded by European norms and values.

This is a greater concern among Turkish antagonists than German as the difference between Turkish and EU norms and values is greater than the difference between German and EU norms and values. Some CDU/CSU members and religious organisations have accepted and respected some commonalities between German and EU culture, as they are proud to be European (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010), but they have also highlighted the differences in terms of family relations that they prefer to preserve. As illustrated in Chapter 4, Germans have preferred to keep the sharp gender roles alive. For them, it is appropriate that a woman’s life be centred around the ‘3Ks’ – Kirche, Küche, Kinder (church, kitchen, children) – inherited from the Nazi-era (Bridenthal, 1973), and a man’s centred on providing a living for the whole family. Although the world is gradually moving towards an adult worker family model, some deputies from the CDU/CSU, who themselves maintain a lifestyle close to this model, do not consider it as backwardness. Instead, they see this as a sign of prosperity. To this end, they view Europeanising their WFLR model as distancing from their values for the fact that EU-induced reconciliation would change their children’s mind-sets.

Some AKP members hold similar views, but express them with stronger language. They perceive the adult worker family model as a European value that would not fit into Turkey’s structure, as Turks are not necessarily European. For some members of the AKP, the institution of the family constitutes the cornerstone of Turkish society. Family ties and solidarity among family members are great values that Turkey should
not and can never give up. This view, which is well reflected in Turkish family policies, leads some comparative welfare state scholars to describe ‘family and kin solidarity’, which expects family members to rely on each other for their welfare before searching support from the state or labour market (Grütjen, 2008: 127). Deeply believing in the idea ‘sow the kindergarten and reap the nursing home’ (TPOL1), they prefer divergence over convergence in this specific policy area:

I mean, at the end of the day, EU membership was an imposition. Honestly, in many areas especially regarding family ties and family relations, I don’t belong to the EU, I belong to the Middle-East and no matter how hard you try, we never will harmonise (TPOL1).

Referring to three forms of NI, the attitudes of CDU/CSU in Germany and the AKP and the MHP in Turkey can be linked directly with SI but also with HI. The very obvious reasons for this fear that leads antagonists to reject Europeanisation is the ideological clash with the EU. In line with what SI suggests, the members of the CDU/CSU, the AKP and the MHP have not seen the EU way of reconciling work and family life as the ‘right thing to do’, nor have they come to internalise the process, perhaps due to the wideness of the gap between the approaches towards WFLR policy-making. Yet, the historical dimension of their attitude is also equally important. It was Nazi propaganda that introduced the 3K model to German society in the 1930s (Bridenthal, 1973); that remains and shapes the CDU/CSU members’ ideologies. As HI indicates, a decision made in the past – even though it was not one that Germans are proud of – has affected CDU/CSU members’ decision in a path-dependent fashion.

Similarly, the Kemalist state elites’ top-down manner while founding the Republic of Turkey in the early 1900s might have led the AKP members to perceive Europeanisation as an imposition and trigger greater opposition to the process. As mentioned earlier, during the 1920s Ataturk and his followers put an exceptional effort into secularising and Westernising Turkey. In the achievement of this aim, any
oppositional voice to Turkey’s secularisation and Westernisation project was quickly silenced. Since those silenced oppositional voices were the predecessors of today’s AKP (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), it is justified to relate AKP members’ attitudes to HI, yet in a reactionary fashion.

b) Threat to political competence:

Some CDU/CSU MPs have regarded the Europeanisation of WFLR policies as a constraint on their political competence and an interference into their party programme in terms of both budget and agenda-setting.

Political parties have a certain agenda for each electoral tenure; either they are in power or in opposition (Ware, 1996). Before each electoral tenure starts, political parties already know their activities and their costs. A directive introduced at the EU level, to be transferred by member states into their domestic legislative frameworks, is described by a number of interviewees from the CDU/CSU group as causing a great inconvenience to political parties’ internal affairs, particularly with respect to budgeting. Any new reconciliation measure, but especially a new target on childcare, is seen by this group to create financial problems. Opening even one more centre for children has a number of dimensions, each requiring resources. If the five-year party plan does not have spare budget for childcare place expansion, then it may bring some serious problems:

We have a problem in the acceptance of the EU when they regulate too much. They should keep an eye on the essentials but not on every detail. And I think Brussels should not tell me as a German politician how the family politics in Berlin has to be made, without taking into account other issues, without knowing what we had planned for our own country and in which order we will realise those plans… for example, Brussels should not tell me to increase the number of kindergartens without knowing is there any teacher shortage or not, or are we planning to solve our childcare problem through alternative ways or not (GPOL1).
Here the CDU/CSU’s strong adherence to the subsidiarity principle and concomitant refusal of Europeanisation goes beyond the ideological level and appears at the practical level. In order to prevent an unexpected work overload or monetary shortage emerging from the top-down Europeanisation, some members of CDU/CSU have preferred domestically-made WFLR policies. From the view of NI, this resonates with an RCI perspective, as antagonists’ preferences directly stem from their cost-benefit calculation. For some CDU/CSU deputies, the cost of Europeanising the German WFLR model outweighs its benefits.

c) Fear of adverse-effect:

By the same token, some Islamist women’s organisations in Turkey have preferred not to endorse the process of Europeanising Turkish WFLR policies due to the EU’s top-down and enforcing manner. While their relatively more secular catalyst counterparts readily welcome the process and benefit from the funding opportunities that came with it, Islamist feminists have accused the EU of overlooking the domestic dynamics, while expecting its standards to be adopted. For them, the adaptation of the EU standards may have adverse effects in Turkey due to political, economic or socio-cultural and historical aspects intrinsic to the country, such as the high level of patriarchy or low level of female literacy and so on. Therefore, in contrast to their catalyst fellows, who have trusted this overlook and found it to be objective, antagonist organisations worry about the same approach on the grounds that it might cause bigger problems and worsen the already suppressed position of women in Turkey:

I do not think that the EU process is useful for anything. For example, if you go to South East Anatolia where customs are still highly prevalent and say that women are no longer looking after their children, instead they are working, you would not bring any advent to Turkey. Instead, you fuel the violence against women...So, I think we should arrange our own reconciliation model on the basis of our own moral laws, values, geographic features and our own inner dynamics (TNGO4).
This protectionist position of NGOs from the antagonist camp, which cripples the Europeanisation process of Turkey, chimes with SI and also contains traces of HI. Both the EU and Turkish corresponding actors aim at circumventing women’s suppressed position in Turkey. However, the ways in which they do so overtly differ. On the one hand, being fond of de-familialised gender policies, the EU seeks to bring economic independence to women by easing their labour market participation through relaxing their domestic responsibility (Yılmaz, 2009). On the other hand, Islamist women’s organisations, also, endeavor to raise women’s unequal position within Turkey but in line with Islamist feminist ideology, built on Islam and its teachings (Badran, 2005).

The 1980 military coup brought a very apolitical climate to Turkey. Taking the advantage of this tranquility, a small number of Islamist women came together in order to challenge the status of women in Islam (Diner and Toktaş, 2010). During this time (the second half of the 1990s), the current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was the mayor of Istanbul. A member of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), he saw the lack of organised feminist women who would advocate for Islamist women’s rights, in contrast to Kemalist feminists. To this end, a number of pious women, who are connected with male deputies of the RP, were chosen by the RP leadership cadre to be educated on how to form a women’s commission or women’s organisation (Arat, 2005). It was Erdogan himself, who now does not hesitate to openly state that he does not believe in gender equality24, who delivered the first lecture on how to form women’s commisions and organisations. This nascent Islamist feminist movement, procurators trained by an anti-gender equality mentor and bred up with Islamic teachings, was aligned with the traditional gender-based division of labour (ibid). They consider

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24 Since 2010 onwards, the AKP leadership cadre in general, but President Erdogan in particular, has defined women in terms of ‘reproduction, homemaking, and nurturing functions.’ (Eslen-Ziya and Erhart 2015:474) and he has repeatedly stated that he does not believe in equality between men and women (T24, 2014).
women’s domestic responsibilities and men’s labour market responsibilities as equal and complementary tasks (Tekin, 2017), despite one being invisible and one being gainful. Therefore, their area of interest excludes the ‘equal share of both domestic work and paid work’. Instead, they focus on fighting domestic violence against women, deemed to stem from a misinterpretation of Islam that legitimises this violence on the grounds of male dominance over females (Diner and Toktaş, 2010). As a result, Islamist women’s organisations worry that the EU’s de-familialised policies would not fit into Turkish society and might trigger the domestic violence that they have been fighting against since their emergence. With regards to this concern, and in line with their historically acquired social norms and values, they favour the idea of subsidiarity in terms of WFLR.

**Disapproval of EU WFLR policies:**

An analysis of the EU accession processes of the CEEC (Schimmelfenning, 2005) finds that candidate countries adapt EU standards only if they approve of those standards. Although Schimmelfenning’s observation refers to areas such as democracy, economy and human rights, it also has relevance for the Europeanisation of this specific policy area. A number of domestic actors in Turkey and in Germany have refused to Europeanise their WFLR policies because they lack esteem for the EU WFLR model. The various actors disliked different aspects of the corresponding standards, due to their position within the society and their sociological, ideological and historical backgrounds, as well as their own lifestyles. Antagonists’ disapproval of EU WFLR policies could be classified under three main themes: (a) disapproval of the EU’s labour market-oriented approach; (b) perceiving the domestic model as better than the EU; and (c) conflict of interest.
a) Disapproval of EU’s labour market-oriented approach:

The EU’s labour market-oriented approach in terms of WFLR was disapproved of by almost every single member of the antagonist camp interviewed.

In the majority of the European welfare states during the transition from familialised WFLR policies to de-familialised WFLR policies, women’s organisations have been strong advocates (Guenther, 2010). However, in the German context, due to the divided nature of the women’s organisations and feminist movement, some women’s organisations have supported the status quo. For them, a key aspect of feminist demands was the right to be a mother regardless of marital status. This feminist idea takes its roots from the ‘protection of motherhood (Mutterschutz)’ (Anthony, 2017). Early German feminists formed a union in 1904 in order to demand for extended motherhood rights for women. Today, after a century, there are some women’s organisations following the Mutterschutz idea and supporting the status quo. To this end, the successors of the union; some family organisations and religious organisations, together with some members of CDU/CSU in Germany; and the right fringes of the TBMM, the AKP and the MHP, together with Islamist-women’s organisations in Turkey, have taken a critical stance to the EU’s WFLR policy-paradigm. Concomitantly, they have refused socialisation of that approach on the grounds of its unilateral character. For them, the EU is still an economic community, whose only aim is economic growth: the EU introduces WFLR measures only to increase the number of female employees within the labour market because the aimed economic growth cannot be reached without the women’s labour force. It is important to note that conservative parties in Germany have historically emphasised economic growth (Rüling, 2010). To this end, it would be expected that they would appreciate the labour market-oriented approach of the EU regarding WFLR. However, to the contrary, interviewees from the CDU/CSU group highlight the importance of
parenting, which resonates with Ruling’s (2008) findings, stating that the CDU/CSU has come to acknowledge the role of the family in terms of a child’s education.

A number of notable feminist scholars (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Stratigaki, 2004; Lewis, 2006; 2009) have questioned the logic of the EU WFLR policy-making paradigm and agree with the antagonists’ arguments on the grounds that the EU paradigm sometimes overlooks the mothering aspect of WFLR. However, recent EU initiatives, in particular the 2010 Parental Leave Directive which seeks to distribute domestic work equally between men and women, are likely to prove that the EU is considering women’s disproportionate share of domestic work, and to show that economic growth is not the one and only aim of the EU. Nevertheless, the German and Turkish antagonists have not come to be persuaded by those recent initiatives and have stubbornly refused to adopt the EU’s ex-parte paradigm.

Through decelerating the process and keeping the WFLR policy-making competence at the national level, rather than giving the credit to the EU, German family organisations, successors of the Mutterschutz idea and members of the CDU/CSU group aim to preserve women’s right to parenting. This has been reflected in CDU/CSU official documents under the ‘freedom of choice (Wahlfreiheit)’ argument, which became a very common slogan in the second half of the 2000s. Both the German family organisations and CDU/CSU group saw the EU’s short paid maternal leave as a threat to women’s mothering rights and have refused to Europeanise the German model, especially the leave schemes. This attitude of the German antagonists resembles SI and HI among the three forms of NI. A very senior politician from the CSU, who is responsible for family policy within the CDU/CSU group, stated:

We can/should decide whether we can go to work right after the birth or we can stay at home with the baby three years. We should do whatever we want. We don’t order, we don’t say you have to. We give women both of the opportunities to make them choose. This is the difference between German government’s
approach to family politics and the Brussels’ approach to family politics that never will/should become ours (GPOL1).

Many catalysts have had a sceptical position to this Wahlfreiheit approach and accused CDU/CSU of legitimising their conservative ideas by pretending to provide multiple options to women. Regardless, the group’s strong loyalty to the argument has led them to take an antagonist position throughout the process.

German religious organisations, the right camp of the TBMM and some Islamist women’s organisations, on the other hand, have adopted stronger language, calling the EU’s labour market-oriented approach a threat to the ‘sacredness’ of the family. The MHP, in line with its ethnocentric ideology (Avcı, 2013), has also brought the issue of nationalism into the discussion and highlighted the importance of not Europeanising Turkish WFLR model as it could damage the norms and values intrinsic to Turkish families. These actors, who a number of Turkish catalysts call ‘holy family-centric’ (TPOL7, TPOL6, TNGO6, TNGO8), see the family as the guard of prosperity and women as the guards of the family. Therefore, for them, women are already doing a very important job for the society, one which is as important as the job men are doing. So, in the Turkish holy family-centric view, women do not need to be dragged into the labour market: in fact, labour market participation is likely to place another burden on women’s shoulders, decreasing their efficiency in caring for their families, which eventually will devastate the society. A senior politician from the AKP group, in this vein, openly expressed the differences between EU’s and AKP’s expectations from women:

‘…Women and men are equal beings in meaning to creation, but they have different abilities. Please note that I’m underlying different abilities, not unequal. In fact, for me women are more valuable because they have fertility and motherhood features given by God, which is very special and sacred according to the Islam religion which I belong to… Therefore, we should let women to practise their given specialty rather than attributing a new role to them…’ (TPOL3).
b) Perceiving the domestic model as better than the EU:

In addition to disapprobation of EU WFLR policies for its labour market-oriented approach, some CDU/CSU members in Germany and some MHP members in Turkey see their own WFLR measures as superior to the EU’s and want to keep them in their current form. They are very concerned that Europeanising the national model would lower the current standards. For them, within a very multicultural union such as the EU, harmony could only be achieved at an average level. Asking countries with already better standards – such as Scandinavian countries or Germany (in their perception) – to adapt EU standards would be unfair. In this respect, the fear of retrenchment has led a number of domestic actors to abstain from contributing to the Europeanisation process. In other words, even if the EU encourages its member and candidate states to improve their measures to a level beyond the EU (EU8), deputies from the CDU/CSU and the MHP have felt more comfortable in the absence of any EU involvement in this particular policy sphere. An MHP deputy addressing the subject from a historical perspective, for example, argued that:

I mean there might be some fields that EU brought in Turkey but if we look at our own essence, if we remember our own successful past, we could have been in a way better position, I assume… I mean we had most of the rights regarding gender equality way before those EU members, who now seem to be better than us. Remember in the battlefield, Khan was accompanied by his wife. Even if the Khan dies, his wife used to continue to fight. OK, it might be a bit different than paid-employment but that was the condition of the day. Today’s paid employment which seems suitable to men was yesterday’s battle and there was no such a seeing that battle is suitable for men… So, I think we have already been better than those countries and we just should remember that rather than trying to adapt their rules (TPOL5).

The AKP members hold very similar opinions. Although they do not believe that Turkish WFLR is any better than the EU, they have not seen any difference between Turkey and the EU in this regard, either. For them, Turkish WFLR measures have

25 Here, the respondent is drawing a simile. She is comparing today’s employment to battle on the grounds that men are expected to engage with both.
already been converged with the EU and are good enough to alleviate obstacles to women’s employment. In other words, Turkish WFLR policies have already defamilialised, so that there is no need for more effort to be made to Europeanise them. Despite the national and international critiques of WFLR policies made under the AKP rule, deputies seem highly satisfied with those policies and have refused to accept any more EU involvement. A senior deputy from AKP, who used to work as a women’s employment policy expert in one of the most active trade unions in Turkey, stated:

Yes, maybe in the past there were some deficiencies but we had met that deficit in the last 15 years of AKP rule. Especially regarding parental leaves, there is no difference between us and the EU. Through our main policy documents, we wanted to deliver the message that it is not only mothers but both mothers and fathers responsible for child-raising…childcare might still be a bit problematic but we already included it in our policy goals and aims… So, I think we are getting there and we do not need the EU for work and family life reconciliation policy-making (TPOL2).

Highly satisfied with current Turkish and German models, MPs from CDU/CSU in Germany, and MPs from AKP and MHP in Turkey, have closed themselves to alternative models. This sense of national superiority lessens the potential for socialisation and leaves almost no room for policy learning. SI emphasises the domestic values and norms in an analysis of the ways in which the EU norms and values have been perceived. As the positive views on domestic standards have impaired potential internalisation, it is fair to relate this attitude of corresponding antagonists to SI. Additionally, considering German superiority as a historic belief among German citizens and politicians (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010), it would not be unjustified to link this also with HI in the German context.

c) Conflict of interest:

Finally, a conflict of interest appears as an important but non-overlapping factor that triggers displeasure with EU WFLR policies, which eventually contributes to vetoing the process. Some German employers’ organisations, together with some members of
the SPD, called ‘old and conservative’ by a number of younger SPD members (GPOL5), and some members of the CDU/CSU express their resistance to the process on the grounds that Europeanising German WFLR framework would pose a threat to their self-interest.

These particular members of the SPD and some members of the CDU/CSU group are themselves sustaining a conservative lifestyle (Heather and Barkin, n.d.) and benefitting from the laws that solidify this style, especially the tax-related ones. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Germany employs a very particular tax system that encourages either the traditional male breadwinner or at least the one-and-a-half earner family model, which has been criticised by the EU. Europeanising German WFLR model would mean abolishing this tax law. However, a number of parliamentarians who do not want to give up on the advantages of this tax system remain distant to the EU. In that vein, a member of the SPD from Bielefeld fraction, who identifies herself as a feminist, argued that:

An overwhelming majority of Christian Democrats are benefitting from these laws, why would they change it… And honestly, I think it would be worse to look inside the black box and see where my party is standing on this issue. I wouldn’t say they all are in favour of changing those laws either. I personally know men in our party between the age of 50 and 65, who are quite high in number, also enjoying these laws in their personal lives and never mentioning to change them or supporting us when we propose to change them (GPOL5).

Employers’ organisations, a very powerful actor of the antagonist camp, have also refused to welcome and support the process as their losses would be bigger than their gains if Germany Europeanised its WFLR policy model, especially parental leave schemes. Although they support de-familialised WFLR policies, especially expanded childcare provisions, as it serves their purpose in terms of increased female employment rates, they stood beside the antagonists on the grounds that giving EU-induced paid leaves to fathers as well as mothers would increase their costs. A policy expert from an
umbrella employers’ organisation, discussing the impact of the EU on national states, recalled:

We do not really want to see EU putting more and more regulations. Our member organisations always demanding for more freedom, which is understandable in a sense. For example, OK we understand that parenting is a universal right and fathers deserve it too as much as mothers but this has huge impacts on our member organisations. They lose a lot of money because of this extended paid paternal leave, for example. And of course, our member organisations do not really show any respect to that. And at the end of the day, we can only advocate for their demands (GNGO10).

This decision of employers’ organisations to support the status quo rather than Europeanisation clearly resonates with RCI as it was made on the basis of cost-benefit calculation, whereas SI also provides a useful perspective by which to regard the members of the CDU/CSU and SPD. These politicians have been sustaining a conservative lifestyle on the grounds of their ideology, but they also have rationally been benefitting from policies encouraging this way of living. Since Europeanisation means abolishment of some of those policies, particularly the tax system, the members of the CDU/CSU and SPD have refused to support the process as they are afraid to lose those advantages. Therefore, their attitudes resonate both with SI and RCI perspectives.

**Vote concerns:**

Alongside individuals’ personal ideological backgrounds, their positions within the society and the origins of those positions play an important role in shaping the ways in which they perceive Europeanisation. In that sense, some members of the two major political parties in Germany, the CDU/CSU and SPD, refused to favour the process because they saw being a catalyst as a potential challenge to their own political position for two reasons: inner part conflict and the threat of the rising extreme right.

a) Inner party conflict:

Wiliarty’s analysis (2010) of the changing paradigm in German gender policy-making under Merkel’s CDU, finds that the catch-all nature of the CDU overtook Merkel’s
personal efforts to modernise Germany’s conservative gender policies. This same catch-all nature also has had an impact on the stance of the CDU/CSU to the process of Europeanising the WFLR model. Catch-all parties are constructed in a decentralised fashion. They contain internal party groups that are represented in the party’s administrative and decision-making bodies. In such a decentralised formation, final policy-decision is made through negotiation with these internal groups, who have different, sometimes even opposing, ideas (Panebianco, 1988; Wiliarty, 2010). As a catch-all party, CDU/CSU consists of a number of internal groups, which makes the CDU/CSU far from homogeneous. The majority of the CSU and an intra-party group in CDU are still in favour of the traditional gendered division of labour. Thus, they hold a relatively stronger opposition to Europeanisation, being delineated as ‘right-wing fundamentalists’ by Leitner (2010: 464). While their historical support for conservative family models has been legitimised in their views on child wellbeing and in arguments about children’s education, their stronger support of nationally-made family policy has been legitimised in their arguments about the EU’s constraints on freedom of choice. For them, the best way of raising a child is to care for them at home until their third birthday and then send them to half-day kindergarten until they reach school age. In this regard, they saw the EU way of reconciling as forced-labour market participation of mothers, which poses a serious threat to mothers’ right to choose. For example, while discussing the German reconciliation model, a deputy from CSU recalled:

> Children are our future, Germany owns everything to the education of its children, that is how we succeed to stay alive after our difficult times in the past… Our mothers are so important too, because they are the cooks of the meal, yet you cannot imagine a dish without salt and kindergarten is the salt here, you cannot put much but you should not put less either… But EU wants a salty dinner… No, we cannot say yes to this (GPOL1).

Alongside these right-wing fundamentalists, there are also some deputies within the CDU who have been described as ‘true people in the wrong party’ by German
progressive women’s organisations. These people are perceived as highly modern in terms of WFLR provisions, and in this sense pro-EU. Angela Merkel and the former Family/current Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen are the most active ones of those ‘moderate Realos’, in Leitner’s (2010: 464) words.

It is important to note here that these two opposing groups are not just two groups within a party with antagonistic opinions; the tension between them is remarkably high. Although the tension among these two sister parties has come to be more obvious with the CSU’s drastic rejections of Merkel’s refugee policies, it has been there for more than a decade now, and emerged from a childcare allowance policy draft. In 2006, the then-CSU Chief proposed a draft law on childcare allowances, which, through cash benefits, encouraged women to stay at home and care for their children. The CDU was highly reluctant to pass this highly familialised law, but because the CSU was threatening to leave the union unless the law came into force, Merkel had to silence the critical voices in the CDU and could only delay the passage until 2012 (Havertz, 2012; Heineman, 2013). This six year period of dormancy did nothing but contribute to the tension within the CDU/CSU. Accordingly, MPs from the CDU have perceived Europeanising the German WFLR model as a potential challenge to party harmony and tranquility, and stand beside their sister party CSU within the antagonist camp.

b) Threat of the rising extreme right:
Due to some socio-political changes, particularly the rise of the extreme right Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AFD), in the last couple of years, some members of the CDU/CSU and also the SPD have gradually conservatised their ideologies, resulting in an anti-EU stance. Since the foundation of the National Democratic Party (National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands – NDPD) in 1964, the Bundestag has hosted several extreme right-wing parties. However, none of those could make any significant inroads until the emergence of the AFD in 2013, with its terrifying
anti-EU, anti-women and anti-globalisation discourse (Langenbacher, 2015). The AFD has adopted an extremely conservative position on social issues, especially issues regarding family and national identity. They called for Eurozone break-up through the ‘Euro is ruining Europe. Us too!’ slogan (Langenbacher, 2015; Patton, 2015, 2017). They also maintained contacts with far-right populist NGOs working to raise awareness of national identity and national sovereignty, such as Berlin Circle (die Berliner Gruppe). As a result, the AFD managed to hold seats in ten of Germany’s sixteen länder prior to the 2017 general elections, and entered the Parliament for the first time after the election (Rothwell et al., 2017).

This rapid rise of the AFD alarmed the mainstream political parties both from the left and right corners of the Bundestag. To this end, they all felt the need to revise their positions on gender issues but especially on those related to female employment and European integration, in order to avoid losing votes to the AFD. As the AFD was appealing to the conservative voter camp, both parties adopted a relatively more conservative stance. As expected, the CDU/CSU conservatised its position more than the SPD. While this conservatisation process of the CDU/CSU group encompassed familial issues as well, the SPD kept it at the economic level, which has been decried as neo-liberalisation by the catalyst women’s organisations, trade unions and SPD members, who are displeased about this new image of the SPD. Yet, it led both parties’ members to support the status quo and perceive the Europeanisation of German WFLR as a challenge. It is important to note that this lessened enthusiasm in terms of European integration applies only to this specific policy area. Members of both parties are still conscious of the importance of the EU for Germany, and the importance of Germany’s leading role within the EU. A senior deputy from the SPD explained the impact of the AFD on Germany’s Europeanisation process as:
We were more than welcoming the EU involvement on our family politics because you know, ours were very, very outdated. So, our family minister Renate Schmidt started all those reforms in accordance to the EU… But now, the situation is different, now we have the AFD to fight against, in almost all länder. That means our citizens prefer their way so we need to be flexible as well. We need to do little amendments in order to avoid bigger catastrophe (GPOL7).

This attitude of a number of CDU members, especially the party leader, and some members of the SPD, assuaging their attempts towards Europeanising the German WFLR model in order to secure their own positions, goes beyond the personal perceptions of domestic actors on Europeanisation itself and relates to the impacts of political climate on Europeanisation. Such an attitude strongly resembles RCI from an actor-centred perspective, as the decision of the actor to be an antagonist is made on the basis of their benefit-maximisation calculus with respect to securing votes. According to Sarah Elise Wiliarty (2010:37) ‘the goal of the CDU is certainly to win elections and gain the executive office’. In a similar vein, as Patton (2015) puts forward, the key aim of the SPD shifted away from being the oppositional coalition partner and towards becoming the majority government. In the achievement of these goals, the CDU needed to compromise with the CSU, and both the SPD and the CDU needed to prevent AFD from capturing their votes – which in a way meant less Europeanisation in the WFLR field. For both parties, refusal to Europeanise the German model has produced a positive outcome, which solidifies the RCI argument mentioned in Chapter 2.

**Loss of trust in the EU:**

Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) stress the importance of credibility in both the accession and Europeanisation processes. They argue that trusting the EU in a certain policy area and perceiving EU as a credible body will lead to increased integration. In line with Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, the right corner of the TBMM, as well as a salient number of Islamist women’s organisations in Turkey, lost their trust in the EU.
for two different reasons: (a) EU’s hypocrisy towards Turkey in terms of membership and (b) a lack of support from the EU when needed.

a) EU’s hypocrisy towards Turkey in terms of membership:

Although the MHP has never been a big supporter of the process and has always held a sceptical view on EU’s attitudes towards Turkey, the AKP, especially during its first and second tenures in power, was a pro-EU party. As expected from an extreme right-wing party, Turkey’s overt nationalist party – which is cited as Europe’s radical right’s duplicate (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) – the MHP has historically stood aloof from the EU, despite new MHP leader Devlet Bahceli’s efforts in changing MHP’s image from extreme-right wing to centrist (Avcı, 2013). On the grounds of nationalism and ethnocentrism, in order to (re)produce Turkish history and culture, the MHP has historically held a Eurosceptic view (Landau, 1982; Öniş, 2003). It is also argued that, from 1997 and onwards, MHP became much more moderate in terms of its views on the EU membership (Avcı, 2013). MHP’s contributions to Turkey’s path to the EU were noticeable even though the Cyprus issue and the Kurdish opening being the key two issues, there were few concerns that were immensely difficult for MHP to compromise with (Avcı, 2004). Yet, the interminable delay of membership has led the party to consider these reforms as waste and lose those tiny bits of trust, as reflected in party’s official documents:

Turkey shares… a story of disappointment filled with blackmail, ultimatums, preconditions, unfair demands and pressure (MHP, 2007).

Similar language is used when it comes to Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model. The party members accuse the EU of being hypocritical and applying double standards. They believe that Turkey’s efforts and reforms have not been recognised by the EU just because Turkey is a Muslim country. To this end, they perceive the EU as a Christian union that is ‘othering’ non-Christian countries (Cizre, 2008). All these negative views
of the EU eventually paved the way for the MHP to give up on the process and veto Europeanising any policy field, including the WFLR:

Well at first, I wondered if… I thought maybe it might be useful but after accepting the post-soviet countries or countries, who have lower standards than us, like Bulgaria or Greece, I am now certain that their aim is not collecting the European countries under the roof of a Union. Instead establishing a Christian Unity… This is what bothers us. So, now I do not want to Europeanise anything (TPOL4).

b) Lack of support from the EU when needed:

By the same token, the AKP and Islamist women’s organisations have gradually lost their trust (which was far greater than MHP’s trust) in the EU and begun to use a very similar language of disappointment.

At the time when the AKP formed, Turkey was suffering from the severe post-coup conditions, known as the 28 February process (Findley, 2010; Dağı, 2006). The Turkish Army, whose staff was taught that their first and sacred duty is to defend and maintain the Kemalist ideology and its principles at all costs, especially Turkey’s secular character (Jenkins, 2006), exerted unprecedented restrictions on any Islamic formation that exist in Turkey, including those pious social and economic networks (Sözen, 2006). Under these circumstances, the newly emergent AKP saw EU membership and membership requirements as a window of opportunity to elude these oppressions. The EU’s requirements on the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics, the ensured and strengthened freedom to NGOs regardless of their religious orientation, and the EU’s areas of interest fit especially well with the AKP’s alleged\(^{26}\) long-term goals and demands. Moreover, the AKP hoped to remove the bans on the headscarf and on Imam Hatip graduates’ entrance to other faculties than theology through EU pressure around freedom of religion (Bogdani, 2011; Dağı, 2006; Usul, 2010). It was also the case that,

\(^{26}\) The AKP came to power with a significantly secular narrative stressing human rights, democracy and freedom. The Kemalist state-elite in particular, but Turkish Kemalists in general, had always remained sceptical towards this secular language and thought the AKP had a hidden Islamist agenda (Akdoğan, 2006; Findley, 2010; Dağı, 2006; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008).
in adopting a pro-EU discourse, the AKP hoped to obtain votes from Turkey’s business elite, who would appreciate the economic opportunities of membership, as well as from the secular majority maintaining a Westernised life-style (Çarkoğlu, 2006). Although the AKP attained most of these goals by passing the corresponding laws under harmonisation packages (Daği, 2006; Usul, 2010), the EU’s anti-headscarf attitude and perception of headscarf wearing as an anti-secular behavior, like the Kemalist elite, has disappointed the AKP and diminished their EU enthusiasm, especially when accompanied by that elusive membership date:

Since the 22nd term, we worked on those harmonisation packages until midnights but what happened? Chapters been closed! Privileged partnerships been proposed. It turned into a snake story27. So, if they say Copenhagen criteria, we say Ankara28 criteria especially (!) in an issue as sacred as private as family (TPOL1).

The disappointment caused by the headscarf issue has also been shared by the Islamist women’s organisations. A removal of the headscarf ban has been deemed to be the reason for these organisations’ emergence in the first place; therefore, these organisations appeared in and supported almost every action concerning the headscarf. For instance, they stood behind medical student Leyla Sahin, who was suspended from university for wearing an Islamic headscarf and subsequently brought her case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Sahin, who was represented by one of four lawyers in AKP’s establishment committee, received great support from Islamist women’s organisations and became a symbol in Turkey in terms of headscarf discussions (Hürriyet, 2005). Throughout the trial, Islamist women’s organisations expected the case to end in their favour. However, the ECHR decided in the opposite way and did not interpret the headscarf ban as a human right abuse (Lüle, 2005). This

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27 Turkish idiom used to describe messy problems/situations that have no solutions.
28 The president Recep Tayyip Erdogan uses the term ‘Ankara Criteria’ consistently in order to express his disappointment about Turkey’s EU accession process (CNNTurk, 2005). While explaining her reluctance to Europeanise the Turkish WFLR model, this interviewee also referred to Erdogan.
created a shock effect among headscarf supporters, but especially on Islamist women’s organisations, and stirred an anti-EU discourse among them, which is reflected in all areas even fourteen years after the closure of the case:

where was the EU while we were being detracted from our occupations, being detracted from doing things that we like, where was the EU when our souls were bought? Nowhere! We achieved everything by ourselves within the boundaries of this country. So now, thanks very much but we do not want the EU anywhere (TNGO5).

The aforementioned disappointed domestic actors perceived the EU as a non-genuine unity on the grounds of nepotism. Although their disappointment did not originate directly from WFLR related issues, it had an influence on WFLR: the main source of this disappointment was the sense that Turkey could not get what it deserved in return from the EU for her efforts, wherein WFLR constituted a major space. Therefore, an unfair exchange between the EU and Turkey, accompanied by the sense that the EU was not there for Turkish actors when they most needed it, created considerable and crucial disappointment among the MHP, the AKP and the Islamist women’s organisations, paving the way for them to support the status quo rather than the Europeanisation process. In line with what RCI suggests, the MHP, the AKP and feminist women’s organisations decided not to Europeanise the Turkish WFLR model because according to their cost-benefit calculation, the cost of Europeanisation was far greater than its benefits as the EU remained highly insufficient in meeting their expectations.

6.3. Conclusion:

This chapter has endeavoured to understand whether and to what extent EU standards with respect to WFLR policies have been internalised by German and Turkish domestic actors, who have contributed to the Europeanisation processes of each country. It has aimed to illustrate the level of socialisation pursued at national levels, through an
examination of domestic actors’ views and discourses on Europeanising the domestic WFLR models. The observations made in this chapter contradict the ‘governance by hierarchy’ argument, which expects Europeanising hard-WFLR policies to have an impact on domestic policy-making paradigms. These findings also contradict the ‘facilitated co-ordination’ argument, which expects soft-Europeisation of WFLR policies to create policy learning through the sharing of good practice. These contradictions can well be explained through the existence of a salient number of antagonists, leading to the dominance of thin learning over other potential soft-Europeisation outcomes. Relying on the reasons explained throughout this chapter accompanied by modest policy changes, it is argued that both Germany and Turkey exhibited a thin learning in this policy field, which refers to a modest policy-paradigm change among domestic actors. A number of exogenous and endogenous factors, resonating with all three forms of NI, have had an influence on this thin learning. EU’s supranational character and generous funding opportunities together with the domestic actors’ appeal to ‘European identity’ have contributed to domestic actors’ social learning, whereas the subsidiarity principle, disapproval of EU standards, voter concerns and distrust of the EU have presented obstacles to the internalisation of EU WFLR. Literature on Europeanisation and process tracing has already established (as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) that these factors have influenced the socialisation of domestic actors, but a more important question – how this occurs – remains unanswered. To this end, NI theory has been applied. Accordingly, as can also be revealed from Figure 6.2 below, the perception of WFLR Europeanisation was shaped most by local values and norms. However, this does not mean that domestic actors’ views on WFLR, female employment, motherhood and their expectations from the EU were the only causal mechanisms. The domestic political and cultural history, as well as domestic actors’ rational calculations, all contributed to the ways in which Europeanisation was
perceived. This might originate from the policy area itself. As the subject matter chiefly concerns family-related issues, which have been accepted as private, domestic actors have remained reluctant to unbrace their own norms and values. Even if their decisions are based on rational calculus or shaped by a historical incident in a path-dependent or reactionary fashion, they have not abandoned their social norms and values. This observation adds another layer to the actor-oriented theoretical approach; the three different forms of New Institutionalism are not mutually exclusive. Two different forms can simultaneously be key to explaining a domestic response to Europeanisation.

**Figure 6.2:** Summary of factors influencing domestic actors’ socialisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rational Choice Institutionalism</th>
<th>Historical Institutionalism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote-concerns</td>
<td>Europeanness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss of trust in the EU</td>
<td>Subsidiarity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disapproval of EU WFLR policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constructive pressure coming from the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU funding as a reform facilitator</td>
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Having examined the domestic actors’ stances towards the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR legislative framework, together with their reasons, the thesis proceeds with these actors’ contributions that originate from their positions throughout the process.
CHAPTER 7. POLITICAL EUROPEANISATION:

This chapter furthers an exploration of domestic actors’ contributions to the process of Europeanisation. More specifically, it seeks to explain how the activities of the domestic actors tend either to accelerate or decelerate the process. In order to do so, it is organised into three sections. The first section explores the tactics and strategies that both catalysts and antagonists tapped into in the achievement of their aims. The second section looks at the barriers that have been faced by the domestic actors in each country. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the capacity of each different domestic agent group to influence the policy-making process, together with their limits, in order to contribute to the view that Europeanisation is a two-fold process, which comprises both the push from the EU and the pull by the domestic actors. While the previous chapter found that it was the social norms and values that mostly shaped the domestic actors’ perceptions of the Europeanisation of WFLR, this chapter contends that it is rational choice institutionalism (RCI) that dominates domestic actors’ inputs to the process. Yet, that is not to say that domestic actors have become completely rational actors throughout the process. Shared norms and values still continue to play a salient role, especially while forming collaborations. Domestic actors consciously prefer to collaborate with the players that they see as ideologically close to themselves. In other words, it is still sociological institutionalism (SI) that forms the collaborations among different domestic actors. This finding relates to the key aim of the chapter, which is to explore the behaviour, and suggests that domestic actors are likely to leave their social norms and values aside to a certain degree and act more rationally in order to reach their initial goal.

7.1. Strategies and tactics of the domestic actors:

Each different domestic group related to WFLR policy-making at national level has chosen a different strategy while contributing to the process of Europeanising the
domestic model. Strategy here refers to the overall plan in order to catalyse or veto the process. Although the domestic actors had utilised similar strategies in both countries, the ways in which they employed those strategies differed slightly due to the socio-political conditions of the time. This chapter, differentiates the term ‘strategy’ from the term ‘tactic’. Strategy can be defined as the long-term and larger overall plan that is less likely to change, whereas tactic translate as different parts of the overall plan that are needed for the realisation of the plan (Meyer, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). This differentiation between strategy and tactic is expected to highlight the impact of inner dynamics intrinsic to each country.

As mentioned earlier, catalysts and antagonists have employed different strategies, and thus different tactics, while accelerating or decelerating the process. This difference in terms of strategic and tactical choices is intentional and stems from their different stances towards Europeanisation as well as their different positions within the societies. As in Chapter 6, this chapter also analyses catalysts’ and antagonists’ contributions to the process separately.

7.1.1. Catalysts:
Throughout the processes of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR policies, catalysts have utilised three key strategies and various tactics while accelerating the defamilialisation process. They have exploited certain structural opportunities in line with the ways in which they have perceived the process.

**Lobbying:**
Both the German and Turkish catalyst NGOs have engaged in a wide range of lobbying activities in order to persuade the national governments to Europeanise their WFLR models, which chimes with what Nyland (1995) and Najam (1999) argue. Nyland (1995), exploring the roles of NGOs in societies, claims that lobbying is one of the most
effective strategies for change. Drawing on Nyland, Najam (1999) points to NGOs as the most influential lobbyists. He sees them as policy entrepreneurs, able to shape both the agenda for policy-making and the policy outcomes by leading the government towards a certain approach (cited in Ketola, 2013). The overlapping goal of all German and Turkish NGOs in terms of their lobbying activity has been to de-familialise German and Turkish WFLR models. Yet, their lobbying tactics and their partner choices have decisively differed. This differentiation stems from their political ideology, number of members, size of budget and their working relations with the political actors (working relations do not necessarily have to be with the ruling party as these catalysts both in Germany and in Turkey usually preferred to collaborate with oppositional parties); sometimes the organisation has naturally chosen to use a certain tactic.

In both countries, catalyst NGOs start their lobbying activity with comprehensive research. This research is usually conducted by medium and large organisations who have contacts with universities and international women’s organisations. The aim of the research is to gather data from each region of the country, as both of the selected countries are highly diverse with respect to WFLR needs and practices, then to develop the model and the policy content for which the NGO will lobby. As expected, such comprehensive research would be highly costly for an NGO. Therefore, the ‘Promotion and Protection of Women’s Rights’, a subprogram funded by the EC’s delegation in Turkey that provides grants to women’s organisations concerned with female employment in Turkey and the ESF, and which granted more than fifteen billion Euros to Germany (ESF, 2018) has been said by a number of interviewees to be very useful for Turkish and German women’s organisations conducting research on WFLR issues (TNGO6; TNGO8; TNGO11; TNGO14; TNGO16; GNGO2; GNGO8; GNGO10).
As can also be seen from Figure 7.1 above, research is the first step of lobbying activity and has a particular importance for women’s organisations. The women’s organisations conduct the research in order to ground their arguments on a scientific base as they are aware of the difficulty of persuading the government to adopt a more Europeanised and de-familialised WFLR model. For example, a policy expert from Turkey, who works in a very vocal lobbyist women’s organisation, argued:
We need to go to them with the facts and different models, so that they can think and chose the one closest to their minds. You know convincing AKP is already hard. But at least when we go with several options and examples from European countries, we present some alternatives and we say ok you are not doing what we exactly are asking from you, but at least chose one among these models (TNGO6).

Once the women’s organisations have researched and developed the content that the lobbying activity will be based on, they share the findings with other catalysts, so that each can set their own lobbying tactic. The most preferred repertoire for lobbying was said by interviewees to be a direct approach to MPs on the grounds that it would have an immediate effect as the lobbyist group would be directly addressing the person responsible for policy-making.

Two very important campaigns, for example, one in Turkey and one in Germany, used this lobbying tactic, and the campaign participants expressed how the tactic was beneficial for them. Prior to the 2015 general elections in Turkey, 31 women’s organisations from 16 different cities came together and formed a platform called ‘Kindergarten is a Right (Kreş Haktır Platformu)’ to lobby the government for European-style childcare standards. The campaign followed the aforementioned lobbying process. Accordingly, campaign participants regularly visited MPs from different parties in order to convince them to include the Europeanised childcare model in their official documents. Similarly, prior to the 2017 general elections in Germany, an umbrella organisation of 60 nationwide women’s and family organisations, which also occasionally collaborate with trade unions, formed the ‘Federal Forum Men (Bundesforum Manner)’ in order to achieve European-wide gender-equal parental leave. Alongside organising events and lobbying the public for a mindset change, this forum’s most important duty was regularly visiting politicians. Similar to Turkish catalysts, German catalysts tried to convince the political parties to cover gender-equal parental
leave schemes in their documents, which eventually would bring about official legislation.

These two aforementioned campaigns were organised in a very similar way to two highly influential and successful campaigns run by a large number of women’s organisations in Turkey in the early 2000s (see Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Anil et al., 2005; Ketola, 2012), in a path-dependent fashion. Given the success of these campaigns, catalyst women’s organizations have preferred to follow their predecessors’ tactics. Notable feminist scholars have highlighted the positive impact of well-functioning collaborations among Turkish women’s NGOs on the Turkish Civil and Penal Code reforms in 2001 and 2004 respectively (Ketola, 2013). Ketola saw this success as a great step further in terms of NGO-government relations, as the NGOs are no longer seen as anti-governmental rebel formations, but potential sources of information and trustworthy partners that might contribute to the policy-making process. However, almost a decade and a half later, when the campaign tactic was duplicated, it did not bring the same success.

The participants of both the Turkish campaign and the German forum mention a considerable difference in terms of openness of the political parties to any potential meeting with them. In both countries, the left leaning political parties appear to be more open to hearing the NGOs’ opinions compared with the right corners of both the Bundestag and the TBMM. While this difference stems from parties’ views on Europeanised WFLR in both cases, the legacy of the right-left struggles that Turkey experienced during the 1960s (Findley, 2010; Ketola, 2013), also contributed to the difficulties faced by Turkish lobbyists. As mentioned in Chapter 6, neither the German nor Turkish right have appeared as enthusiastic as the German and Turkish left in terms of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model. In that respect, and in line with SI, they remained reluctant to collaborate with catalyst organisations in the policy-making
process. Moreover, Turkey has intensely experienced the leftist movements of the 1960s. Particular segments of the extreme left and right, openly affiliated with NGOs, mostly the feminist and environmentalist ones, became highly militant and threatened social harmony. As a result, the women’s organisations created a poor image of themselves in the eyes of the rightist governments (Findley, 2010), which has not been changed even today. Referring to the Historical institutionalism (HI), this attitude of the politicians has made it difficult for Turkish organisations to lobby politicians. To this end, most of the lobbyists interviewed under the scope of this research, mentioned the ease of reaching deputies from the People’s Democracy Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi- HDP) and the Republican People’s Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) in Turkey and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD) and the German Left Party (die Linke) in Germany:

Well, let’s say there is this topic A, we have all the contact details of all political parties. We send them the email at the same time. We stood beside the one, who embraces the issue but of course as you could imagine as well, so far it is generally even always the HDP, who first embraces our issue and gets back to us (TNGO9).

In like manner, a deputy from CHP stated:

I am very much in favour of NGOs’ existence, I even believe that their number should be increased because we as the party believe that there would not be any development in societies wherein no NGO exists. We call them ‘democratic nongovernmental organisations’ rather than civil society organisations. Accordingly, we try to pay attention to their ideas because we do trust their conclusions. They really are working (TPOL7).

Similarly, chiming with Langenbacher (2015), who argued that German left parties have historically been close to women’s movements, a senior deputy from the SPD (arguably one of the most NGO-friendly parties in Germany) stated:

We have a dialogue with NGOs, you know, we have different working groups in different fields and our working group here is the employment and social policy, so we worked on our party programme, we have a first draft now and we will give this first draft to some women’s organisations and they will come here and discuss this with our party-leadership. They will give their feedbacks on the
proposal that we have made in this draft. So, I mean it is very institutionalised (GPO4).

On the other hand, the right, centre right and extreme right parties of both countries were not necessarily opposed to the existence of NGOs, but expressed their displeasure about being the target of lobbying (TPOL1, TPOL3, TPOL5, GPO1, GPO2). Referring back to the three forms of New Institutionalism (NI), the political parties’ responses to women’s organisations are highly suggestive of SI but also RCI. Their perception of women’s organisations – which means whether they perceive the organisation as an antagonistic foundation or a trustworthy partner – clearly shaped their stance. Parties who were open to the existence of women’s organisations were responsive in practice, so that the organisations could lobby the politicians. On the contrary, parties who did not consider women’s organisations as source of information remained silent, which led to unsuccessful lobbying. Additionally, more so in Germany but also in Turkey, political parties see women’s organisations as messengers who would convey their citizens’ needs and demands. In order to appeal to the public, political parties had to address their electorates’ needs and demands and benefitting from women’s organisations at this stage reveals a rational activity this implies a rational calculus.

Difficulties in reaching some politicians directly led Turkish and German catalysts to seek other lobbying tactics in order to de-familialise the national WFLR models. The three most common tactics in both countries were informal visits and personal relationships; use of various media tools; and activism.

a) Informal visits and personal relations:

As mentioned above, due to a lack of any systematisation in terms of NGO governance as well as rightist political parties’ reluctance to collaborate with NGOs, representatives
of women’s organisations and trade unions have developed various informal methods.

Annual breakfasts in Germany and regular Eid visits in Turkey were most common:

I mean it’s a long time, we are not sitting here, we are always trying to do things for German women, we try to have these breakfasts with politicians twice a year (GNGO7).

This respondent was from an umbrella organisation and for them it was easier to arrange these relatively more institutionalised meetings because they were a big organisation representing German women’s organisations in the international arena. In other words, they were an accepted organisation. For smaller and local organisations, approaching politicians has required more effort. As they do not have pre-organised meetings with the MPs, they have tried to take the advantage of every possible occasion, which recalls RCI:

On certain congresses, just as a kind of coffee-break meeting. If we hear in advance from our personal contacts that politicians/policy-makers are going to an event, we definitely go to that event and try to have a small chat during the breaks (GNGO5).

On the other hand, in Turkey even big organisations have faced difficulties in reaching politicians and have had to lean on more personal relationships or spontaneous visits:

We are 20 years old. So, we have our contacts in each party so through them we can learn the schedules of the deputies and we do our regular visits. But these visits, they are well-organised, we go with our reports, with our files and we try to tell them what we believe… Apart from that if we need the government party, we do the Eid visits, which would be appreciated by them (TNGO15).

These spontaneous visits to politicians strongly resonate with RCI, as they put their norms and values aside and act in a results-oriented manner. Take a republican women’s organisation located in Ankara as an example. It would not be expected for them to emphasise religious practices as they are the civil society branch of Kemalist ideology, which seeks to create an obvious distance from Islamic practices. However, this organisation left their ideology aside and acted in a way which they rationally thought
would bring more efficiency. By the same token, none of the German respondents interviewed expressed any particular party name as a lobbying target.

Although none of the NGOs mention a particular political party name, they underline how they pay greater attention to their personal connections and try to take the maximum advantage from their social networks. German catalysts for example, seek ways to approach the moderate reals as they have higher hopes of their cooperation, on the grounds that they hold similar views towards a Europeanised German WFLR model. Turkish catalysts, as well, have tried to benefit from the femocrats for the exact same reasons. What was interesting in the Turkish case was the ways in which they have approached these facilitator MPs. They have two channels by which to do so: while the first one is quite predictable; the second channel was highly unexpected. Ethnicity and socio-political ideology play an important role in women’s organisations’ personal access to MPs. An umbrella women’s organisation, which does not necessarily have Kurdish members but which holds a highly sensitive view on the Kurdish conflict as an organisation ideology, emphasised the notion of the ‘mother language’ when approaching the HDP, knowing the HDP’s sensitivities around children’s deprivation from their own language:

For example, when we are appealing to HDP, we do not say we need to increase the number of the Kindergartens but we say we need Kindergartens, educating children in their mother language… We are not lying at all because we also are against human rights abuses, especially with respect to Kurds (TNGO6).

By the very same token, a well-established women’s organisation based in Istanbul expresses the importance of being able to find common ground with CHP through the shared Kemalist ideology. Most strikingly, in Turkey, catalysts from the trade unions happen to be aided by some of their former colleagues, who now are members of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP). Despite the ideological cliff between the catalyst organisations and the AKP in terms of WFLR
Europeanisation, the fact of being former co-workers appears as a synthesiser buffer, if only to a certain degree as the former colleagues have had to adopt the party ideology in order to secure their own positions within the party. Yet, they have made some exceptions for the sake of having worked together:

Well, some people we know from the sector now are AKP members. Of course, they have changed, I mean they pretend to be changed, and OK, I see their points as well but it is horrible. Well anyways, as we have their personal phone numbers we can reach them. For example, once we were trying to get an appointment for a meeting, we directly called one particular MP…hope you understand what I mean as I cannot be more open…” (TTU1).

From a theoretical lens, it can be argued that while German actors’ new tactics for reaching politicians resonate with RCI and SI, in the Turkish case, collaborating with the former colleagues also recalls HI alongside the RCI and SI.

b) Different tools of media:

Almost every single catalyst NGO in both countries used the media as it is cheaper, easier and, for Turkish catalysts, safer than other means of lobbying. Each tactic that catalyst organisations employ in order to compensate for the difficulties in reaching politicians directly requires different collaboration; using different media tools also requires different types of collaboration. Here, catalyst organisations need the aid of media institutions.

Although eventually both Turkish and German catalyst NGOs have formed the partnerships they needed, in the process of forming those partnerships, socio-political dynamics played an important role. In the Turkish case, the conflict between the Islamists and Secularists was as apparent in the media sphere as in any other institutional sphere (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). Similarly, despite Article 5 of the German Basic Law, which covers the freedom of press and free speech, the German media also is regulated in a top-down manner (Dick, 2015). To this end, the Turkish catalysts could only collaborate with the secularly-oriented media, especially the secularly-oriented
print media, whereas the German catalysts have formed partnerships with left-leaning and alternative media.

This limitation on collaboration clearly shows how the political climate of the country can constrain domestic actors’ activities while shaping the Europeanisation process. Freedom of the media seems irrelevant to Europeanising the national WFLR models. Yet the political ideology of the media institutions in Turkey and the top-down manner in Germany has curtailed the NGOs’ actions and compelled them to take norms and values into consideration alongside the rational calculus, while making their decisions with collaboration partners. In other words, German and Turkish catalysts’ choice of media tools in order to address the difficulties faced while directly pressuring the politicians strongly chimes with RCI. However, collaborating only with certain media organisations rather than all, also resonates with SI as catalysts cannot leave the norms and values aside while acting result-oriented. Nevertheless, both German and Turkish catalysts benefitted from the tools of media to influence policies in a more Europeanised way. The participants of the aforementioned Platform in Turkey and Forum in Germany, especially, mentioned that the media gave leverage to the process by publishing the press releases they prepared, announcing the public calls for marches, rallies or demonstrations and most importantly, spreading their views on Europeanised WFLR.

A Turkish women’s organisation representative, for example, mentioned the positive role of the media in their activities but interestingly, highlighted the safety of using media in lobbying:

We are sharing our views from our websites and also most of the women journalists are our friends, so they also cover our issues. We really cannot do more than this as thanks to GONGOs as we are not NGO in the eye of the government anymore… So, through the media we at least spread our views against their views because we cannot go on streets anymore, we cannot go to Parliament… This is the safest thing we can do (TNGO12).
The emphasis on the ‘safe nature’ of the media takes the issue beyond the mere catalyst contribution to process and relates to internal challenges to NGOs’ freedom of action. As discussed in the previous chapters, Turkey has been under a state of emergency since July 2016, which has restricted the activities of some NGOs. These recent constraints have led Turkish catalyst organisations to rely more on media tools, which they still consider relatively safer. This shows how domestic actors adapt themselves to the changing conditions of the day while progressing toward the initial goal. In other words, while employing the overall lobbying strategy, domestic actors have utilised different tactics. Turkey is a less democratic candidate country wherein human rights, freedom of NGOs and freedom of media is low, while Germany is a democratic founding member state, which already has EU standards in human rights, relative NGO freedom and a relatively free media. While German catalysts appear to have more freedom in their lobbying activities, Turkish catalysts have been exposed to more constraints, which over time has led them to seek different lobbying tactics.

c) Activism:

Finally, activism has appeared as another lobbying tactic that benefits catalysts, mostly in Turkey but also very rarely in Germany. The adversary trade unions and women’s organisations, especially the grassroots ones in Turkey and the ones located in the former Eastern German cities, mentioned the positive impact of being active in the streets.

It was the recent political climate in Turkey and the legacy of the past in Germany that led catalysts to ‘go back to basics’ (GNGO5). This difference between Eastern and Western women’s organisations with respect to activism perhaps stems from Germany’s feminist movement history. Radical feminism has historically been prevalent in the FRG. Accordingly, German radical feminists paid all their attention to politics of body and sexuality (Katzenstein, 1987). For them, freeing women from maternal activities in general and child-rearing in particular, as through artificial wombs
and separate public spaces for men and women, was the most efficient path to women’s liberation (Williarty, 2010). To this end, they mostly sought private spheres for women (Guenther, 2010) and thus did not consider the street a proper place to mobilise. Some former Western organisations have remained loyal to this legacy in a path-dependent fashion and do not engage with activism. This is accompanied by the fact that Eastern women became the lowest status of German citizens after the Unification; Schaeffer-Hegel (1992:101) calls them ‘victims of the unification’. For these women, going into the streets was a highly appealing option. In this regard, some Eastern organisations still follow their predecessors and engage in activism while lobbying the government, which implies HI.

A number of relevant activism examples can be found in both Turkey and Germany. A panel organised by the Kreş Haktır Platformu on the 11th of April 2013 (TNGO6) could be given as a very important example of lobbying the Turkish government for a Europeanised childcare structure. Organised on the 25th of June 2017 and aimed to change the family model and achieve the implementation of the adult worker family model (GNGO5) provides an important example in Germany. Another salient difference between Germany and Turkey in terms of activism is the nature of collaboration partners. While activist organisations of Germany have mainly collaborated with other national grassroots organisations and civil activists, some politicians from the leftist camp show a particular interest in activism and appear to be more collaborative in Turkey.

**Direct approach to public:**
While catalysing the processes of Europeanising Turkish and German WFLR models, the second strategy that catalysts have tapped into is bypassing the government and approaching the public directly, as seen in Figure 7.2 below.
Figure 7.2: Summary of catalysts’ direct approach to public.

Although this strategy has been used by the German catalysts for a longer time, Turkish catalysts also have come to use this since 2010, a date that resonates with the waning EU impact on NGOs, solidifying the roles of the NGOs in society. As İzduygü (2011) and Ketola (2012) state, Turkey’s European aspirations paved the way for the empowerment of NGOs and considerably expanded the functioning of the NGO, including women’s organisations and the trade unions. However, with the diminishing influence of the EU in Turkey, secular-oriented women’s organisations lost ground for lobbying. In order to continue their work, they have steered their activities to the public sphere. Ketola (2013) has already pointed to realisation of policies as one of the three roles of the NGOs in society. Similar to the role that Ketola cast for the NGO, both Turkish and German catalysts engage with raising public awareness on existing domestic WFLR policies and the corresponding EU standards, as well as providing some WFLR in the absence of state provision, which can be seen from Figure 7.3 below.
a) Awareness raising:

In line with HI, a number of German women’s organisations still follow Germany’s first institutionalised feminist group, the Women’s Union. During the post-war era, the Women’s Union organised the very first social gatherings and charity events to enlighten German women about women’s political and reproductive rights as well as the importance of economic independence (Williarty, 2010). On the other hand, secular women’s organisations in Turkey, who have gradually been losing ground in terms of social dialogue and access to politicians, in line with the RCI sought to find other ways to continue their work. Both Turkish and German catalyst NGOs put considerable effort into organising educational event series and running projects with the aim of raising
public awareness of the de-familialised WFLR model, women’s legal rights with respect to maternity leaves, childcare and working time arrangements as well as the importance of fathers’ involvement in parenting. Their awareness raising repertoire have ranged from organising international conferences and local and regional workshops; establishing bookshops and women’s centres in Universities (in Germany only); publishing articles in feminist and national magazines; and preparing flyers, brochures and handbooks, as well as putting up posters and talking with individuals on the street.

Although the target here is the public, this is not to say that awareness raisers do not need the government, because they do, even perhaps more so than when they lobby the government. As shown in Figure 7.3 above, raising public awareness requires strong cooperation with the local governments for the event venue and transportation facilities, which are highly costly for a women’s organisation; such cooperation is also needed to get the permits for hanging posters or distributing flyers, brochures and handbooks, Cooperation with local women’s organisations is also necessary, in order to mobilise the local public and gather information specific to that particular area; and also with international women’s organisations, in order to exchange ideas and be aware of alternative models.

b) Providing WFLR services:

Alongside organising awareness raising events, a number of catalyst organisations from both countries also provide WFLR services. However, due to the nature of WFLR policies, there is not much to provide apart from childcare services. Accordingly, a number of German, and a smaller number of Turkish, women’s organisations try to contribute to their Europeanisation processes by operating as a kindergarten. Considering the EU standards as a blueprint, these organisations offer affordable, sometimes (depending on their ability to get funding) even free, childcare facilities
compatible with universal working times in order to enable women’s labour market participation.

Given that running a kindergarten is a very costly job (GNGO9; TNGO7; TNGO10), these organisations need a number of partners. As Turkish organisations do not have enough budget, they try to reduce the cost as much as possible. In doing so, the first thing they seek is the support of the local governments, who could provide the building, which would allow women’s organisations not to pay the rent, electricity, water and heating. On the other hand, alongside the local governments, German catalysts also referred to the importance of private companies, evangelical organisations and the women’s co-ops in delivering WFLR service:

Well now, compared to 15 years ago, we are in a less needy position. In the past, we really needed local government’s partnership especially for practical things like the building, the heating, the staff everything. But now, private companies and especially women’s coops are so very open to support us on this. If not them, then there is also always the evangelical organisations. They have this huge fund coming both from the government and the Church, which allow them to rent the building for the kindergarten. And I think it is easier to collaborate with these new partners because they let us to do our job. With the local governments, they try to regulate the opening times, the food we provide, even sometimes the curriculum. But with women’s co-ops, especially private companies, they only provide us the technical support (GNGO9).

Germany’s ability to be more flexible than Turkey might be explained through the relatively greater awareness of WFLR issues. More and various actors being sensitive to WFLR has led to more potential partnerships for the women’s organisations, which in turn enables them to run the kindergartens on the basis of the EU standards, especially with respect to opening times. In addition to having fewer collaborator options, Turkish catalyst organisations have also been facing barriers from increased physical standards. Kindergartens run by the women’s organisations have been regarded as private kindergartens even though they are more affordable than the market-run kindergartens. Accordingly, those accommodating children aged three to five years are regulated by the MoE, whereas ones accommodating children below the age three are regulated by
the MFSP (İlkkaracan et al., 2015). Both of these ministries have numerous legislated standards for the safety of children. These standards include the location of the building, indoor and outdoor space, heating, the condition of the floor, the condition of the painting of the building and many more (Aran et al., 2016). Although representatives of the women’s organisations operating as a kindergarten agree with the corresponding ministries on the importance of children’s health and safety, they also expressed their doubts about the sincerity of the government in introducing these criteria:

This is a bit my interpretation of their [government’s] intention as I cannot really prove it but I strongly think all these criteria, which are quite impossible to meet, is another strategy of the government to push childcare back to familial sphere. At the end of the day, here we are trying to provide a neighbourhood kindergarten so that children will not take the shuttle with their mother for two hours in the morning. They will come here in five minutes while their mothers at work. We are doing this with our own resources so how can we find a building with whatsoever square meter garden or so. Even if we have more resource than this do you think this is feasible given Istanbul’s overcrowded geography (TNGO10).

At the time this interview was conducted, women’s organisations did not have a tactic to overcome this problem. Yet they openly expressed their determination to continue operating as a kindergarten in order to provide ECEC for the children of disadvantaged families, as well as to enable women’s economic liberation:

As you know these are hard times but we will not give up; yes, maybe we cannot provide a garden with pine trees but at least we are providing ECEC to children of this neighbourhood, who would never be able to go to a private kindergarten and meanwhile we are trying to contribute to mothers’ employment and we will continue doing this as the way we have already been doing (TNGO7).

From an actor-centred perspective, the organisation’s determination to continue to operate as a kindergarten even under the relatively more constrained conditions resonates with SI. Although the maintenance and operation costs of operating as a kindergarten are greater than its gains, catalyst organisations did not give up on the grounds of their strong commitment to the process.
This difference between Germany and Turkey again shows how the Europeanisation process is filtered by the domestic dynamics. Although German catalysts appeared to be facing lesser difficulties than Turkish catalysts in providing WFLR service, this does not mean that German catalysts have not faced any difficulties at all. The differing level of enthusiasm of local governments in signing the protocol with the women’s organisations appeared to be the biggest obstacle. As was the case in regard to lobbying, in both countries, right-leaning local governments remained highly reluctant to cooperate with catalyst NGOs when compared to social democratic or leftist local governments. Again, in the Turkish case, women’s NGOs have expressed the difficulty of signing the protocols with mostly the HDP, but also with the CHP-led local governments. A very active respondent from one of the deep-rooted organisation, when discussing their collaboration with the local governments during their path-breaking campaign, ‘7 is too late’, recalled:

Due to ‘Deniz’s era’, the AKP and the MHP see us as bugaboos. They have this idea that we go to their neighbourhood in order to mobilise the locals and threaten their harmony. I mean if harmony is women being forced to stay at home and care for the children, care for the elderly, then yes excuse me but we will threaten this harmony. Joking aside, there is a huge difference between municipalities. You know I mean, while it was really very easy to sign the protocol with Kadikoy or Besiktas (two neighbourhoods in Istanbul governed by the CHP) municipalities, it was that hard to sign it with let’s say Bahcelievler or Bakirkoy (two neighbourhoods in Istanbul governed by the AKP) (TNGO14).

In a similar vein, a policy expert working in a Bremen women’s organisation mentioned the warm relations with the local government, which is led by a coalition between the SPD and die Linke:

Bremen is under SPD-Linke coalition for a very long time and usually they are cooperative, I should say. Of course, they have limited resources and cannot cover all our needs but especially with respect to childcare, I need to admit that we sign the protocol with more or less the amount that we demand (GNGO8).

29 Deniz Gezmis is a Marxist-Leninist political-activist, who became a symbol of the left in the late 1960s, when Turkey was witnessing the left and right-wing armed conflicts. The respondent referred these left-right conflicts that Turkey has gone through by using the term ‘Deniz’s era’.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, MPs from the right corners of the parliament in both countries do not welcome the EU’s involvement in this sphere. In line with their party’s stance, the local governments have avoided facilitating an event aiming to Europeanise the domestic model. Referring back to NI theory, it would be justified to link this to SI as it clearly stems from actors’ ideologies. In the Turkish case, this reluctance recalls HI too, as the respondents recalled the older bad image of the NGOs. On the other hand, as already noted above, the leftist governments have always been supportive to the feminist movement as they believe in the strength of the NGOs. As a result, the CHP and HDP in Turkey; SPD, Greens and the Left party in Germany appear to be more cooperative with the women’s organisations, which again resembles SI.

In addition to the aforementioned right-left difference in terms of local governments’ openness to collaboration, which exists in both cases, this chapter further finds that local governments in the former GDR cities were more open to these partnerships than the local governments in FRG. Despite its repressiveness, the GDR gave women’s organisations more opportunity to form partnerships with the local governments. Although it was almost impossible to form an opposition group, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, these women’s organisations and the local governments successfully came together and formed a number of alliances. For Guenther (2010), this was partly due to their mutual dependencies on each other and partly due to the fact that they see women’s emancipation through employment as a key element of socialism. Still, after 28 years, in a path-dependent fashion, the cooperation between women’s organisations and local governments functions better in the former GDR cities when compared to cities located in the former FRG region:

Well, to be honest with you, for us municipalities are more important because things we get from them have a quicker impact. We get concrete things – we get free place, we get free transport and we physically use them. But local
governments are not any easier than Berlin. Here it is CDU/CSU and they really are not any supportive. But go to Leipzig, even in a CDU/CSU-led region you will hear a complete different story... It has been 30 years now that the wall went off but if you are working in a social sector, you still feel that East and West are not same (GNGO6).

Under these constrained conditions, in order to work together with the local governments and take the maximum advantage from them, the catalyst organisations in both countries have developed three new tactics, which are highly rational and quite creative: (i) forming partnerships with private companies; (ii) initiating women’s centres in universities; and (iii) organising events in mosques.

i) Forming partnerships with private companies:
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is a very recent strategy. It is only since 2010 that private companies in both countries have come to be more sensitive around social responsibility projects. Catalyst organisations, who saw this as a great window of opportunity, verged towards these private companies to form partnerships.

In Turkey and Germany, some particular companies prioritised Europeanisation in their social responsibility projects. One of the former Prime Ministers, Turgut Özal, aimed at weakening the state’s control over the economy and creating new entrepreneurs in small, formerly neglected and pious towns of Anatolia through a number of economic and political reforms during the 1980s. This at the end resulted in an ideologically polarised market in Turkey (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). A number of religious provincials have come to own large companies in Turkey’s big cities, who have known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). In some respects, Germany also has an ideologically segregated labour market. Some big companies, mostly engaged with non-manufacturing sectors, exist beside manufactural companies dominated by the male working culture (GA1; GA2, GNGO8). While the former hold more modernised views on gendered division of labour and appear more sensitive to women’s employment rights, the latter favour male employees and prefer not to be sensitive to
the work and family life conflict of women. Unsurprisingly, the Anatolian Tigers of Turkey and the male-dominated companies of Germany did not take part in social responsibility projects involving WFLR. Therefore, secularly-oriented companies in Turkey; non-manufacturing sectors in Germany; and some international companies, who are openly blamed by the media for the destruction of nature and are thus seeking ways to change their public image, appeared as potential co-operators of catalyst organisations. To this end, catalyst organisations asked for their help in publishing their flyers, handbooks and brochures as publishing those materials is an additional cost for the organisations, especially if it is a small and local one. Moreover, in the search for required venues for events, as well as for operating as a kindergarten, the buildings of these large companies appeared to provide an opportunity.

From an actor-centred perspective, the attitudes of both catalyst organisations and private companies, especially those aiming to remould their public image, strongly resonates with RCI as it clearly exhibits a win-win situation. As the formation of partnership was also based on shared social norms and values with respect to Europeanised WFLR models, it would be plausible to link this to SI as well.

ii) Initiating women’s centres in universities:
Another tactic of the catalyst organisations, when compensating for the local governments’ non-cooperation, is initiating women’s centres in universities, then working together with those centres. It is important to note that only German catalyst organisations have utilised this tactic.

In Germany, women’s organisations have gradually begun to support feminist students’ demands for the establishment of women’s centres in universities. These women centres differed from gender and women’s studies departments in terms of their functions. They did not have an academic orientation and they did not aim for academic research on women’s and gender issues. Instead, the raison d’être of these student-run
centres was to create awareness around women’s rights, including WFLR among students.

While supporting the formation of these centres, women’s organisations in return hoped to pass some of the workload to them, and also expected these centres to reduce the cost of awareness-raising events. In line with women’s organisations’ hopes, these women’s centres used university facilities to print campaign posters, flyers, brochures and handbooks. They also contributed to the distribution of these materials. This mutual support implies both SI and RCI on the grounds of shared norms and values but also shared goals.

iii) Organising events in mosques:

As evidenced by notable Turkish studies scholars, Turkey has rapidly come to practise an Islamic way of life, which led journalist Ece Temelkuran (2016: 16) to refer to the current situation as the ‘Dubaisation of Turkey’. Regulations on tightening alcohol sales (States news service, 2013); the removal of the headscarf ban (Findley, 2010); and the considerable increase in the number of Imam Hatip Schools and Quran courses (Cornell, 2015) clearly show that Turkey is going back to Islamist practices, from which Kemalist elite radically disconnected Turkey.

Under the conditions of the new Turkey, some Turkish women’s organisations have employed a very unpredictable and striking tactic. Although this met some criticism from overtly Kemalist organisations, a number of catalyst organisations began to organise awareness-raising and educational events in mosques during Quran courses in pious neighbourhoods:

We keep on running our consciousness-raising campaigns. There is no nuisance there. But we did something, which is not us at all. We changed the venues to Mosques. Why? Because the new conditions… Turkey is not secular anymore. Apart from those few saved neighbourhoods, Turkey is Saudi Arabia. So, we need to organise events to influence – even a bit – women living in those areas. Even if we arrange an event on street, there is no way the fathers or husbands of
those women that we target would let them come. But if it is a mosque, they are softer. Because why? Mosque is a mosque, a house of worship. So, it is safe, women would go with their female friends and they would not offend the neighbourhood dignity (TNGO9).

This new strategy of Turkish catalyst organisations clearly resonates with RCI. Women’s organisations which have stood against and actively raised their voices against any kind of regulation which might impair the secular character of Turkey, put their social norms and values aside just to Europeanise the Turkish WFLR model. Organising an event in a mosque requires a constant exchange, mostly with the Directorate of Religious Affairs and also other religious governmental and nongovernmental institutions. Although, these women’s organisations would not have any relationship with these institutions under normal circumstances, they have regarded the gains of maintaining their activities as greater than the losses of forming those relationships, and so successfully continue their events in mosques.

**Cross-party alliances:**

The last strategy of catalysts appears to be happening at the political level. Alongside individual efforts, such as bringing the WFLR issue to the table in Parliamentary meetings, covering the issue in party programs and elections manifestos and establishing working groups within the parties, the catalyst MPs (who mainly come from the opposition parties) believe in the strength of cross-party alliances.

Although Germany has been said to have a better working democracy compared to Turkey (Hale, 2006), Turkish opposition parties have managed to come together and form alliances far more easily than German opposition parties. This might be explained through the more monopolistic position of the AKP compared to CDU/CSU. Given the current political climate in Turkey, wherein AKP holds 317 of the total seats, which is
more than the total seats for the opposition parties\textsuperscript{30} (seçim sonuçları, 2015), catalyst MPs have left their socio-political ideologies behind and worked together in order to Europeanise the Turkish model. Conversely, within the German Parliament, where the difference between the seats of each mainstream party is less than in Turkey\textsuperscript{31}, catalyst MPs cannot form these alliances even though they express the importance of working together. Along with the less monopolistic position of the CDU/CSU, a number of ideological reasons contribute to the failure of German catalyst MPs. German catalyst MPs remain less effective in putting aside their social norms and values to work together for a more Europeanised WFLR model when compared to Turkey, wherein women’s issues including WFLR have been mentioned as the easiest topic to bring about these alliances:

Women’s rights issue is one the very few issues that oppositional parties can come together and speak from the same mouth (TPOL9).

An alliance between the CHP and the HDP can be given as a very striking example. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the HDP and the CHP have nothing in common apart from their leftist views on the role of the state in providing the welfare of its citizens (Findley, 2010). As mentioned several times in this thesis, the CHP is the overt guardian of Kemalist ideology, which is dedicated to building a ‘Turkish nation’. Notable Turkish historians have referred to these efforts of the CHP as ‘Turkification’ and ‘social engineering’ (Ergil, 2000; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). As could be ascertained from the name, this Turkification overlooks Kurdish citizens. Accordingly, an alliance between the CHP and the HDP would be unexpected. However, when it comes to women’s rights issues, even the HDP and the CHP manage to meet on common ground:

\textsuperscript{30} CHP: 134; HDP: 59; MHP: 40.
\textsuperscript{31} Left Party: 69; SPD: 153; AFD: 94; Greens: 67; FDP: 80 and CDU/CSU: 246 (Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/e7c7d918-a17e-11e7-b797-b61809486fe2).
I totally believe the strength of oppositional parties’ unification and with respect to women’s issues is we form these unifications even with the CHP, which we usually can never harmonise (TPOL10).

This attitude of the Turkish catalyst MPs from the oppositional parties, superimposing the bigger aim of having a stronger voice against AKP’s familialised WFLR policy-paradigm over their own social norms and values, could clearly be explained with reference to RCI. The reform of the Civil Servant Code, which brought a ten-day paid leave to fathers working in the public service, is one example of such successful cross-party alliances. A number of interviewees, from both the CHP and HDP, mention the positive impact of being together and voting for the same policy outcome during reform.

Although they also have a consensus on the urgent need to amend Article 88 of the Labour Law, they could not succeed yet. When discussing the reasons for this delay of this amendment, the lack of support from the female AKP members appeared as an important factor. Although it would be quite interesting to see deputies from the AKP in these cross-party alliances, due to their opposite views on Europeanising Turkey’s WFLR model, the majority of the MPs interviewed, as well as a considerable number of NGO representatives, pointed out that these opposing ideas are not the genuine ideas of some female AKP deputies. Instead, they are the party ideology imposed on the party members, which chimes with Sultan Tepe’s (2006) findings. According to Tepe, AKP has serious problems with respect to collective decision-making. Some particular members of the party, close to the leadership cadre, have more autonomy in decision-making compared to other members. These relatively more autonomous members are mainly men and convince the dissident members, especially the female ones, to abandon their own ideas and inhibit them from acting autonomously. Resonating with Tepe, a representative from a catalyst trade union recalled:

Well, I know her, we worked together for I do not know how many years. She has the exact same opinions with us. She worked so hard to increase female employment in Turkey and better women’s positions within the labour market.
But now, since she has been part of the AKP, we even could not understand how she did that but anyways, since she became an MP, she is giving all those horrible bench speeches. But I am telling you it is not herself speaking there, it is the party. She is not speaking from her mouth, she is speaking from the party mouth (TTU1).

This imposed party image has kept female AKP members from this potential alliance, which in the end has had a prosaic impact on catalysts’ efforts to accelerate the Europeanisation process.

On the other hand, within the German Parliament, it was only the MPs from the Greens and the SPD who from time to time could come together and form these unofficial cross-party alliances. The first attempts to Europeanise the German WFLR model were made under the Red-Green government. The MPs of the Greens and the SPD, being highly satisfied with those reforms, maintained their partnership unofficially after losing the office to CDU/CSU, in a path-dependent fashion. This act of transferring the utilised strategy to ensuing years on the grounds of its success clearly resonates with HI. However, this harmony has not been realised among other parties of the German catalyst camp, even though they have openly supported the process of Europeanising the German model. They have struggled to collaborate due to a number of reasons extraneous to WFLR. MPs from different parties interviewed under the scope of this thesis have openly criticised other MPs and expressed their lack of interest in collaborating.

a) Critiques of the SPD:

Among all the parties, the SPD has received the most criticism, especially from die Linke. First and foremost, the SPD has been accused of becoming more and more rightist and neo-liberal. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, being the biggest representative of the social democracy in Germany, the SPD has always been in favour of a social state. More than this, the SPD has adopted a ‘workers’ party’ image and aligns with the working class. However, over time the SPD has alienated itself from this image and has
increasingly come to protect the interests of the middle and upper-middle classes. The majority of the interviewees mention Chancellor Schroder’s predisposition to third-wave politics as a key reason for this ideological change. This also resonates with the observations of a political scientist at the University of Göttingen, Matthias Micus. Micus (2016), while delineating the party ideologies in Germany before the 2017 general elections, posits that, for SPD today, the meaning of ‘left’ has shifted away from protecting the economic conditions of the working class in Germany (Delckier, 2016).

In line with Micus, an MP from die Linke stated:

Honestly when we talk about the gender-politics, we cannot see much difference between the SPD and other so-called centre-right parties anymore. Like if you ask me today’s SPD and CDU, I cannot tell you any different things because now they are so close and tangled. Yes, the SPD used to be much better in helping the weak links, the weak strata in society but now they are much better in destroying them, 100,000 people have been hit by the new social security system that the SPD brought (GPOL10).

This alleged neo-liberalisation of the SPD has an explicit and an implicit impact on the Europeanisation process. Prior to the 2009 general elections, the SPD started implementing a number of austerity policies under the ‘Agenda2010’, which are still in place today. The aim of the Agenda2010 was to introduce cuts to social spending on the grounds that the number of people relied on the welfare system has rapidly increased, which eventually has discouraged the productivity of Germany (Rippert, 2013). Agenda2010 was followed by the Agenda2020, which did nothing but intensify the provisions of Agenda2010. The combination of SPD’s Agenda2010 and Agenda2020 has created a secondary labour market associated with low-paid and part-time jobs. In the immediate aftermath of implementation of the Agenda2010, the number of people working part-time reached 5.5 million in 2005 in Germany, while the number of people earning less than €7 per hour reached 4.1 million in 2007 (ILO, 2013). Given the parental leave scheme of Germany, which pays only 67 per cent of the monthly income during
the leave, Germany has maintained its misfit with the EU, rather than narrowing it. Additionally, this new image of the SPD led other opposition parties from the catalyst camp to avoid collaboration with the SPD as they could not find a common ground; this in turn lowered the voice of the opposition parties trying to persuade the CDU/CSU on a Europeanised WFLR model.

The second reason for the catalyst MPs’ reluctance to form cross-party alliances with the SPD was the heterogeneity within the party. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some members of the SPD are deemed to be old and conservative (GPOL5), sustaining their own daily lives on the basis of the gendered division of labour, which has been nourished by capitalism and patriarchy (Kandiyoti, 1988). In that sense, these members of the SPD skip over patriarchal and capitalist relations while discussing how to reform the WFLR policies. This refusal to see ‘the whole picture’ riled the catalyst MPs from other parties in general, but the MPs from die Linke in particular, resulting in the failure of cross-party alliance formation:

Yes, maybe the ‘SPD’ also wants better-off family politics, maybe they also want better work-family balance policies but they are not as brave as us to be vocal about the reform needs. For example, they can never say out loud that we need a system change, why, because SPD is polyphonic. The right corners of the SPD, that you can find many of them here in Bremen, are not progressive. They are progressive in opposite direction and because they are quite powerful in the party, they can lead the younger generation in the party. For example, SPD is here in Bremen in for 72 years now and we are their coalition partner for the last 10 years, I have never seen them taking the childcare as an important issue. I mean the SPD is as macho as almost all other parties. For them women’s issues are gedungs, which means unnecessary, unimportant things (GPOL10).

b) Critiques of die Grüne:

The Green Party has been accused of increasing their focus on ‘interesting’ (GPOL5) topics such as tax and social justice alongside their bread and butter topics: environment and climate change. It has also been argued that even if the Greens focus on family politics, they bypass the still unresolved problems concerning women’s work and family life conflict and prefer to focus on LGBTI individuals’ familial problems. Although the
catalyst MPs have never underestimated the issues regarding LGBTI families, they underline the Green Party’s exaggerated concern on these issues, which hardens collaboration with the Greens.

Additionally, during the 1980s, Germany witnessed a ‘pedosexual movement’, lobbying for the de-criminalisation of consensual paedophilia (Lagenbacher, 2015). The Greens back then appeared on national and international media as supporters of the movement (Rogers, 2014). This paved the way for the Greens to be condemned by other political parties, who wanted to appear sensitive to ethics and children’s rights as well as children’s physical and mental health. To this end, the catalyst MPs preferred to avoid forming alliances with the Greens, especially until 2014, when the new party leader Simone Peter publicly apologised on behalf of his predecessors. In that sense, an MP, who identifies herself as socialist feminist from die Linke argued that:

Well, I need to admit that apart from the members of the Greens determined with saving the planet, there are members who are as progressive as us but in the past Greens was involved in a paedophilia debate that tarnished their image so much. In order to be not affected from that many parties including us, especially us as we already are highly extreme and marginalised, avoided working with the greens for a while (GPOL9).

The legacy of the 1980s, even after twenty years appeared as a barrier to catalysts’ actions in a reactionary fashion, which among the three forms of NI, clearly chimes with the HI.

c) Critiques of die Linke:
Die Linke, which has been critical of almost every single party from the German catalyst camp, was also been the subject of criticism from other catalyst MPs. Although the catalyst MPs and the NGO representatives interviewed under the scope of this research very much appreciated die Linke’s efforts in modernising the German WFLR legislation, the fact that die Linke takes its roots from the GDR restrained them from forming partnerships with die Linke.
The party was founded in 2007 through the unification of the Party of Democratic Socialism (*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* – PDS) and the Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (*Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit* – *Die Wahlalternative* – WASG). Although it was this combination that gave die Linke its socialist approach and made the party highly sensitive to WFLR issues, the very same combination also alienated die Linke within the Bundestag (Lagenbacher, 2015) as the PDS is the legal successor of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* – SED) of the GDR. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Germans are not proud of their divided years. They especially disregard the socialist character of the GDR, which left no room for any alternative ideas or lifestyles under Soviet rule (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010). To this end, die Linke has been disliked on the grounds that it recalls the unpleasant past of Germany. Although this would seem irrelevant to WFLR, it has strongly affected the decisions of catalyst MPs from other oppositional parties regarding collaboration. For instance, an MEP from the SPD stated that:

> Well, the Left is ok, I mean while all the parties even the Greens now are questioning how progressive we can be due to the emergence of the AFD, the Left party is never doubting that. But they also are a bit conservative in a way. I mean they are very very reactionary. And half of the members of the Left are from the SED you know the nation party from the GDR. So, I think they are a bit dangerous sometimes because they are too extreme. It is very difficult with them (GPOL6).

This attitude of the catalyst MPs from other parties towards die Linke, which resonates with HI, goes beyond merely WFLR and chimes with the broader political history of Germany and parties’ views on the divided years. This perhaps adds another layer of analysis to HI as it exemplifies a situation wherein path dependency combines two highly different areas to each other.
All in all, although German and Turkish catalysts have had their own ways of contributing to the policy change, they have managed to come together when necessary and form what has been described as the ‘velvet triangle’ (Woodward, 2004) referring to the cooperation of women’s organisations, academics and female-friendly parliament members. Despite the aforementioned efforts of the catalysts in accelerating the Europeanisation process, accompanied by a high level of adaptational pressure coming from the EU, as already illustrated in Chapter 5, neither Germany nor Turkey exhibits ‘transformation’, both countries continued showing misfit with the EU. This continued misfit stems from the contributions of the antagonists to the process; this chapter will address this next.

7.1.2. Antagonists:

In both countries, antagonists have had a relatively more powerful position within the society, as they were the members of the ruling parties, and NGOs affiliated with the ruling party in the case of Turkey. This relatively greater power has enabled antagonists to be more successful in shaping the process; compared to catalysts, they are not required to seek out as many strategies in the achievement of their aims.

Capitalising on the government position:

In the ideal democracy, policy-making involves a number of actors. The party institutions are engaged with researching the public needs and demands prior to making the law. In better-operating democracies, this goes deeper and NGOs also participate in this research process (Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011). However, neither Germany nor Turkey generally developed WFLR policies in line with this ideal. While their processes of policy-making differ, both Turkish and German antagonists have capitalised on their ruling-party position. In so doing, the German government has employed one single tactic, whereas the Turkish government has employed two.
a) Rapid passage of the laws:

The antagonist ruling parties of both countries appeared to be bypassing the negotiation process and passing laws rapidly. Although this was more the case in Turkey, due to the state of emergency, German antagonists also apply the same tactic to a certain degree. Rapid passage is arguably highly useful in making new laws, as it leaves no room for any alternative ideas. Given that the antagonists support a non-Europanised WFLR model, it is in their interest to pass legislation rapidly without negotiating with oppositional parties, who mostly acted as a catalyst in the Europeanisation process of this specific policy area.

The 2015 Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan in Turkey and the 2012 Homecare Allowance Law in Germany could be given as perfect examples of how both governments legalised a familialised initiative. The Plan involved a number of ambiguous notions, which Turkish catalysts tried to avoid. Additionally, prior to passage of the Plan, the catalysts tried to convince the government to make the Plan address the kindergarten issue through obliging local municipalities to provide childcare. However, the final version of the Plan, which was passed overnight, lacked all the inputs of the catalysts and echoed the antagonists’ policy paradigm:

There is no negotiation in Turkey anymore, there is no dialogue mechanisms in our country anymore. Besides, the process is highly strange now. When there is a policy proposal, heaven knows why, it passes all the related commissions immediately. I mean the proposal turns into a law over a night, we cannot keep up with the pace. Like, what I know is when there is a proposal, there should be at least 10 days to work on it, to make the amendments, to hear the objections etc. Because policy-making, I mean law-making, they are serious stuff. But we never have that time anymore… And even if we have for example, last year when the family package was on the agenda, we were discussing perfect we were there at least invited this time. So, we pressured for the Kindergarten issue, you know the one obliges municipalities to provide a kindergarten and we thought we agreed on this but they excluded it, it is not in the package you know (TTU1).
By the very same token, the 2012 Homecare Allowance Law was passed in spite of all the objections of the German catalysts. Although it took seven years of negotiation process, the legalisation of the decision was quick:

Yes, we and other oppositional parties, we were highly against this law, because obviously it is a backlash. Like it is just the opposite of what we have been working since the beginning. Of course, we objected but then they remained silent for a while and passed it without our consent (GPOL8).

The rapid passage of the laws has successfully silenced the oppositional voices and allowed the antagonists’ own ideas to dominate the content of the law. From an actor-centred perspective, rapidly passing the laws strongly chimes with RCI. Antagonists, in order to preserve the domestic WFLR model, have successfully taken the advantage of their powerful positions within the society and passed a number of familised WFLR policies. This is a very clear example of the tension between the Europeanised WFLR model and antagonists’ understandings of women’s employment and motherhood. For them, the gains even of diverging with democratic ideals are greater than Europeanising the domestic model.

b) Turning social dialogue to good account:
The second tactic affiliated with the capitalising on government position strategy appears only in the Turkish case. In Turkey, wherein the AKP government dominates the political sphere by holding 317 of the 596 total seats in Turkish Parliament as well as through the appointment of particular individuals affiliated with the party as ministers (Sözen, 2006), the government appears to be co-opting the social dialogue.

Although Turkey has deep-rooted ‘tripartite’ institutions, which are meant to ensure the social dialogue, they historically have operated inefficiently (ILO, n.d.). Additionally, since the 2011 elections their functioning has been impaired, coinciding with the start of AKP’s monopolistic attitude. Ideally, social dialogue is the exchange of ideas between the social partners and the government for the good of the society in pre-
policy-making process (Zihnioğlu, 2013). In Turkey, however, the representatives of the social partners in social dialogue appear to have been limited to GONGOs. When discussing the operation of the social dialogue with both antagonists and catalysts, a few overlapping social partner names were given as representatives of the NGO in those social dialogue meetings. These names are seen to belong to those GONGOs and reflect the AKP ideology, rather than the civil society, due to their close affiliation with the party:

Of course, there are trade unions and trade unions. You know, obviously trade unions that they see distant from themselves such as us can never be involved in the process. The government is perfectly carrying out this social dialogue with those trade unions that they feel closer. You understand me, those ones, which would never ever oppose the government (TTU1).

As the key representative of the antagonist camp, in addition to inviting NGOs selectively, the AKP misled the social dialogue. A number of catalyst women’s organisations and trade union representatives stated that they have been seeing their signatures under policy documents which they are completely against. By pretending as though there is consensus on a policy proposal from both sides of the social dialogue, the antagonists have contributed to the passage of a familialised law:

I have been telling you since the beginning of this interview, nothing, none of the mechanisms are working here. First, we are deleted from the picture, if we still manage to be on the picture, if we manage to attend any of those meetings of course, we reject the proposal because no need to mention that they are awfully Islamist and the whole holy motherhood issue. But then when they publish the report, once we see it, we see XXX32 has participated. It was approved by the XXX. Well, brother, OK we participated but we objected. We did not agree (TTU1).

Given that it was during the EU accession process that social dialogue mechanisms were strengthened in Turkey (Ketola, 2013; Zihnioğlu, 2013), it is likely that antagonists have successfully taken the advantage of the Europeanisation process and used it in tandem

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32 The respondent has mentioned the name of the institution that she belongs to. However, as this thesis stated that all the interviews will be anonymous, rather than the name of the institution, ‘XXX’ has been put.
with their own goals. Referring back to the three forms of NI, the ability to use the Europeanisation process itself in order to create a de-Europeanised model, could be described as RCI.

**Avoiding responsibility:**

The second strategy in preserving the status quo appears to be avoiding political responsibility with respect to WFLR policy-making. In so doing, both Turkish and German antagonists utilised two tactics: (a) not responding to catalyst NGOs and (b) leaving the WFLR issue under other institutions’ competence.

a) Not responding to catalyst NGOs:

Due to increased international attention paid to de-familialised WFLR in general, but to childcare in particular, over the last three decades, antagonists from both countries have come to acknowledge the fact that an overt refusal would be highly costly for their own positions within the societies. Being the ruling party in a climate where the majority of women are struggling to balance their work and family lives, antagonist MPs had to emphasise the WFLR issue for the continuation of their power. However, the conservative mind-set of these antagonists has constrained them from genuinely de-familialising the WFLR model. To this end, rather than rejecting the lobbyists, antagonists have preferred to remain silent and postpone action as much as possible. A number of catalyst MPs from both countries, as well as catalyst lobbyists, have mentioned that they have never heard an immediate rejection from the government during the consultation process of a law. Yet they also added that they have not seen action. While discussing the current CSO-government relations in Turkey, the project coordinator of a catalyst women’s organisation located in Istanbul mentioned that:

Well, if you could ever reach AKP deputies, you would never hear a straight no. Because MPs would never act as they are disagreeing with you especially in such a ‘neutral’ – in inverted commas – as it would be really costly for them. But then
would they ever take an action. No. It would be too naive to expect that. While we were developing our community-based kindergarten model a number of ministers came, we went on investigative visits, they saw the kindergartens and everything. They really liked it, they said yes, we need to extend this model and so on. But then it has been ten years now that we had this conversation, what has changed? Nothing! How many of those kindergartens… we could build maybe five or six with our own resources (TNGO10).

In a similar vein a representative of a women’s organisation mostly engaged with lobbying and activism stated:

The reason why we went back to streets is because the promises made to us are not being kept. Yes, we participated into God knows how many meetings with the MPs, but here the situation is obvious. They have not done anything that they have promised. But maybe they will start keeping their promises next year, at the end of the day it is the election year. You know (GNGO5).

Relying on this attitude of antagonists, it is likely that a greater emphasis placed by the EU on WFLR issues and an increased adaptational pressure coming from the EU, inspired an interest at the domestic levels and softened the antagonists’ strong oppositional ideas. However, in line with Anna Van der Vleuten (2007), who argues that the state is the biggest authority in terms of responding to those EU pressures, this interest towards WFLR could last only so long. The antagonist governments of both countries rationally found ways to maintain their familialised policy paradigm, wherein not responding to catalyst NGOs appeared as an effective tactic.

b) Leaving the WFLR issue under other institutions’ competence:

Second, both Turkish and German antagonists have preferred to elude responsibility for WFLR policy-making. While German actors have remained in favour of Germany’s historical multi-actored childcare arrangement, Turkish actors continuously conferred the responsibility to different institutions.

As discussed in Chapter 5, it is Article 88 of the Labour Code, as well as the Article 14 of the 2005 Municipal Code in the Turkish case, and the ways in which the TAG and its revised versions were formulated in the German case, that openly freed the Turkish and German governments from taking the responsibility for childcare provision.
Although the lack of central government involvement in childcare was highly criticised by the EU, both Turkish and German antagonists believed in the positive impacts of decentralised and localised childcare arrangements. In that sense, a senior politician from the CDU/CSU group argued:

> We have a law that we are highly in favour of that says Kindergarten is under the responsibility of länder, not the federal government. Therefore, instead of trying to change the Basic Law and abolishing the federal nature of Germany like some other parties do, we need to accept the responsibility and competence of the länder and encourage them to work with enterprises or cooperatives. Because we as the CDU/CSU believe that we cannot do everything by law; it would be authoritarian and we are a democratic state (GPOL1).

However, catalyst actors have had difficulty in believing in the sincerity of the antagonists and have openly expressed their scepticism. For catalysts, the reason behind antagonists leaving the childcare provision under other institutions’ competence does not stem from the benefits of localised childcare arrangements. Instead, it is directly related to their reluctance in adopting a Europeanised childcare infrastructure, which necessitates a comprehensive and affordable childcare network provided by the national governments:

> In order to make things sustainable, there has to be a government policy. I think sustainability is the biggest problem in Turkey anyways. Because the government distributes the responsibility among various actors. Private companies are involved, local governments are involved, NGO is involved. This much number of stakeholders means this much different opinions. I mean you go and convince the regarding person, once you managed to sign the protocol then the person changes. Eh back to basics, the whole story from the beginning all over again. Therefore, we need a certain and written government policy, that whoever comes needs to follow. But will we ever get that of course, no! Because this version suits the government’s book. As they never favoured easing women’s labour market participation, they perfectly passed it to private sector or to the local governments (TNGO6).

Referring back to the three forms of NI theory, it is plausible to argue that this strategy of antagonists implies a combination of RCI and SI. Both Turkish and German antagonists have come to face the fact that they can no longer overlook the WFLR issues; their importance and urgency have been acknowledged both at the national and
international levels. However, they could allow the actions to be taken only to the extent that their conservative ideology permitted. To this end, both the German and Turkish antagonists rationally preferred to avoid responsibility either by remaining silent or by appointing other institutions.

**Gaining the public consent:**

The final strategy utilised by both German and Turkish antagonists (on the political level) has to do with appealing to the public for their sympathy. This strategy has been tapped into after the decision regarding the passage of the law is made in order to accustom the public to the new law. To this end, both the Turkish and German antagonist MPs centred their attention on legitimising the new law by using a relatively more liberal language. German antagonists have legitimised the existence of their familialised laws through the *Wahlfreiheit* argument that has been discussed in Chapter 6, whereas Turkish antagonists have given fancy names to those new laws.

The principle of freedom of choice is a much-contested argument in WFLR policy-making. It has been argued as a universal right for parents (mostly mothers) to be able to choose between continuing their career after the child-birth and staying at home to raise their own child (Hakim, 2002). For the realisation of genuine freedom of choice, the governments have to provide both the comprehensive and affordable childcare infrastructure and the home-care allowances simultaneously (Nyby et al., 2017). However, in the German case, the *Wahlfreiheit* argument appeared to be inadequate and token. The German antagonists, mostly the CDU/CSU group, have appealed to this argument while refusing to Europeanise the domestic WFLR, particularly while introducing the 2012 Homecare Allowance law. Through the relatively liberal and progressive tone of the argument, the makers of this policy endeavoured to gain the
public consent and aimed the continuation of the familialised paradigm behind the WFLR policy-making:

Choice, it is choice that differentiates us from the GDR, wherein women were forced to work. Also, a strong government, thinking about its citizens should provide options. So, we will never give up on Wahlfreiheit… Never… (GPOL1).

Similarly, Turkish antagonists also legitimised their policy-making paradigm in order to prove their modern image. However, rather than using one single argument, they preferred giving various names to policies regarding WFLR. Two recent initiatives, the Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan and the Grandmother allowances. could be given as clear examples of this strategy. As illustrated in Chapter 5, the alleged aims of these documents were higher numbers of women active in the work sphere, and improved conditions. However, a closer examination of the provisions indicates a lack of paradigm-change in both the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP), the overt supporters of these initiatives. Such initiatives induce women to interrupt their careers and push them back into the familial sphere, which highly opposes the EU logic of WFLR policy-making. Yet, it is important to note that in such a sensitive area, by stressing the importance of family and familial relations, the AKP and the MHP managed to spark public sentiment:

Unfortunately, in Turkey the mind-set is based on ‘pretending’ rather than taking real actions. Look at this grandmother allowance project. The government announced it as a great solution to childcare problem. But I mean, come on, what are you solving with paying 430TL to grandmothers? The solution is allocating real money to childcare infrastructure expansion, not giving pocket money to grandmothers. But, no the government plays the family card very well with their perfect narrative and everybody believes them. Grandmothers think well, we have already been raising our grandchildren, now, God save them, they are paying us for that. So, what now? Erdogan the hero again! He solved the historical childcare problem. But I understand if you go to field, you see the poverty. It is at maximum so people need even these little amounts. You call it vote-concerns, you call it intelligence but this ‘pretending’ is dangerous, But I cannot go any further (TNGO8).

In gaining the public sympathy, antagonists greatly need the aid of the media. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the media in general, but the print media in particular,
is far from homogeneous in both of the selected countries. Therefore, the antagonists have collaborated with the Islamic media in Turkey, most of which have business contracts with the government, and the rightist media in Germany, which are deemed to echo the government tone (Aldıkaçı- Marshall, 2013; Skiba, 2015). All in all, a number of antagonists both from Turkey and Germany have mentioned the positive role of the partnerships that they could form with media institutions in informing the public about the new laws and expressing their logic behind those laws.

From an actor-centred perspective, it makes sense to link this last tactic of antagonists to both RCI and SI. Antagonists from both countries were highly aware of the fact that they need the public’s consent for the continuation of familialised WFLR policy-making as well as for their implementation. To this end, they have rationally worked to gain the public sympathy which required a number of collaborations. A closer examination of the process of forming those partnerships indicates that they have been made on the basis of shared norms and values, which chimes with SI. Additionally, it is also plausible to relate German antagonists’ appeal to the freedom of choice argument to HI, because another of their reasons for supporting a home-based childcare was to make a radical break with the socialist/communist past of the GDR. The CDU/CSU members preferred to obliterate the traces of the divided years of Germany on the grounds of feeling guilt. Thus, in line with the HI yet in a reactionary fashion, they have maintained familialised WFLR policy-making.

7.2. Barriers faced by domestic actors:

Throughout the processes of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR models, both the catalysts and antagonists, alongside the immediate difficulties emerged in the establishment of partnerships, have come to face an additional number of barriers leading to reduced impact of their efforts on the process. These barriers, like the
strategies used, showed some differences between catalysts and antagonists. Therefore, they have been discussed separately and the chapter proceeds with the catalysts.

7.2.1. Catalysts:

In the achievement of a Europeanised WFLR model, both Turkish and German catalysts have faced a number of barriers. It is highly important to note that these barriers mostly were of relevance to WFLR and none of them were in common. Therefore, this section discussing the barriers faced by catalysts is structured differently than the previous section. Given that these barriers are country-specific, the section is structured on the basis of countries, rather than themes.

**Turkey:**

Turkish catalysts have faced three major barriers. These are the Syrian War; the constitutional referendum; and the legacy of Ataturk’s reforms and his Kemalist ideology. It is important to note that none of them has any direct impact on WFLR policy-making. However, catalysts mentioned each of them as an important challenge, which considerably slowed catalyst efforts at Europeanisation. The indirect impact of these country-specific incidents is worth discussing because they clearly show how the Europeanisation pattern of a country is shaped by the domestic dynamics of the day and solidify the main argument of this thesis: Europeanisation is an uneven, reciprocal and context-dependent process.

a) The Syrian war:

Since 2011, there has been an ongoing armed conflict in Syria, which has had a number of severe impacts all around the world. Like any other war, the Syrian war has created wretched conditions. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights’ latest data, 33,425 Syrians have lost their lives since the start of the war (Syriahr, 2017). On top of these impacts, more than five million people have fled from their country and
sought asylum and humanity from other countries, the ‘refugee crisis’. Due to Syria’s geographical location, it is Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey who have had to welcome the majority of those Syrian refugees, who did not even have access to adequate drinking water (BBC, 2016). Under these circumstances, the Turkish government implemented an ‘open door policy’ and Turkey has welcomed 3,523,981 war victims (UNHR, 2018).

Although the majority of Turkish population, out of humanity, have supported the refugees, it was the Turkish NGOs who ‘took the first initiative to establish a safe haven for those fleeing from an oppressive regime’, in the words of Shady Zahed (2017). To this end, Turkish NGOs quickly came together and provided a wide variety of supports, ranging from establishing Temporary Education Centres to providing sexual health services to war victims. Although this was the attitude that would be expected from a neighbouring country’s civil society, a number of women’s organisation representatives interviewed reported that it impaired their Europeanisation activities in Turkey. Neither the Turkish government nor the Turkish NGOs were prepared to welcome such a large number of refugees, and international aid organisations were also caught off-guard, as Zahed (2017) observes. In the absence of the physical resources to revive Syrian refugees, the action had to be made by a number of Turkish grassroots groups and various NGOs, even those not necessarily affiliated with formal humanitarian bodies. In that sense, Turkish NGOs working in various fields, including LGBTI rights, women’s rights, children’s rights and many more, have come to be assisting Syrian refugees in Turkey. This in the end withheld catalyst women’s organisations from maintaining their own agenda. Due to the overwhelming job of providing for the social re-inclusion of Syrian refugees, women’s organisations which originally engaged with female employment have had to shift their focus, resulting in the disruption of the female employment activities:
You know the registered number of Syrians living in Turkey now is more than 4 million and with the unregistered ones, I assume it easily is around 6 to 7 million. Ehh, since Erdogan is doing nothing other than corrupting the funding coming from the EU, it is us again showing solidarity to them and sorting this situation out. So, I need to admit that other subjects including WFLR have been sidelined. Particularly our organisation, we still are focusing on female employment and only collaborating with the refugees, so for us this whole refugee issue I need to say left us alone. We cannot find the support that we need from other organisations because they are crazy busy, you know. So, I am not blaming them but the government (TNGO14).

This unintentional focus shift among Turkish catalyst organisations served as a barrier, threatening to shelve the Europeanisation of the Turkish WFLR model.

Additionally, as mentioned by a number of interviewees, there are several women’s organisations which have gradually begun to use the severe conditions of the refugees to their own advantage. In the ensuing years since Turkey’s absorption of a massive number of Syrians, many international funding donors have offered funding opportunities to Turkish CSOs which provide material assistance to Syrian refugees or advocate for their rights (such as equal access to education, health and the labour market). While the main donor appears to be the EU, who have contracted €1.4 billion to be used for meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable refugees under the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), a social assistance scheme (EC, 2018), the UN and various other international organisations have also agreed to support Turkish CSOs in this humanitarian job. Accordingly, some Turkish women’s organisations are purposely focusing on refugees, even if humanitarian aid has never been their central focus, just for the sake of the increased funding opportunities.

Shifting focus as a response to an additional funding-channel has been highly criticised by some other women’s organisations, who have remained loyal to their original activities. They object to the ‘sectorising’ and ‘marketising’ of the CSOs (TNGO8) and argued that it is slowing progress:

Now, for example, the new trend is these international bodies investing in the southern regions. At the beginning it was the humanitarian aid and of course, it
was ok, I understand we had to look after those people. We needed to feed them, we needed to cure them and everything. But now things have changed. It has completely turned into a market. All these international organisations are coming here to invest in the refugees, for their re-inclusion, because they know that these people will end up in their countries and of course, they prefer them in a better shape. And our NGOs here, they are cooperating with these international organisations because it is a great source of income. Civil society lost its spirit now. That is what I would say. It is sectorising day by day.’ (TNGO8).

A similar attitude towards the NGOs is documented by Ketola (2013). During the early 2000s, in response to expanded project funding, a number of Turkish NGOs began to provide project preparation assistance; Ketola calls them ‘Broker NGOs’ (2013:146). The ability of Turkish NGOs to adopt new roles according to changing conditions and new opportunities shows how NGOs can become distant from the normative aspects of being an NGO and make decisions on the basis of utility maximisation. Referring back to three forms of NI, this intentional focus shift clearly recalls RCI, whereas the unintentional one strongly resonates with SI. This is because women’s organisations have perceived more gain in emphasizing aid to refugees than in maintaining their original area of interest. On the other hand, the unintentional shift in the foci of the women’s organisations relates to their understanding of being a representative of civil society. They have refocused on an issue which requires urgent action as the ‘right thing to do’, thus they have acted on the basis of their social norms and values, which fits the definition of SI.

b) The constitutional referendum:

Alongside the so-called refugee crisis, the recent political climate in Turkey also has constrained Turkish catalysts’ efforts to Europeanise. As mentioned in Chapter 1 (see Footnote 2), on the 15th of July in 2016, a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces attempted to take over the government. After the failure of the coup, the Turkish government announced that Turkey would hold a constitutional referendum on the 16th April in 2017; the referendum would decide whether to amend the Turkish constitution
on the basis of new proposals made mostly by the AKP and MHP (Economist, 2017). Like the Syrian war, although the referendum was not of explicit relevance to the process of Europeanising Turkish WFLR model, it successfully restrained catalysts’ activities.

The proposed amendments to the Turkish constitution posed a great challenge to the democratic and secular character of the Turkish Republic. They included the abolishment of the office of the Prime Minister; replacement of the existing parliamentary system of government with an executive presidency and a presidential system; and increased authority to the president in terms of appointments to the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Hacaoglu and Kozok, 2017). Turkish CSOs, including the women’s organisations, dropped everything and gave an incredible amount of attention to anti-referendum campaigns. As was the case in aiding Syrian refugees, here again catalyst women’s organisations had to have a focus shift. Organisations meant to be working for advanced WFLR policies or increased female employment turned to raising public awareness on how the constitution change would impair women’s already suppressed positions in Turkey. Although this referendum was argued to be a matter of life and death, and the contribution of the NGOs was very important, it has also sidelined WFLR Europeanisation.

c) Legacy of Ataturk’s reforms and his Kemalist ideology:

The final barrier to Turkish catalysts, chiming with the HI, is Ataturk’s set of reforms and his Kemalist ideology that introduced ‘State Feminism’ to Turkey.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, modernising and Westernising Turkey was the cornerstone of Kemalist ideology. Women’s rights issues have occupied an incredible space in this modernising and Westernising process (Ketola, 2013). In the provision of a number of rights to women, the Kemalist elite leap-frogged a particular group sustaining their lives in line with religious practices (Findley, 2010). Today, the feminist members of those pious groups have come to be the founders and
representatives of the so-called GONGOs. Holding that past grudge, these GONGOs, who today represent the CSO in social dialogue meetings, did not hesitate to overlook the catalyst women’s organisations. GONGOs, who are very close to the government and hold the potential to shape government decisions with respect to content and passage of the laws, preferred not to collaborate with the catalyst organisations. Given that they believe in familialised WFLR, they hesitate to convey the catalysts’ messages to the government on the occasions that catalyst organisations are not invited to the table, Turkey remains highly de-Europeanised in this specific policy area:

Well, very easy, we are not invited to any social dialogue meeting any more… since they have their own CSOs, whom I call ‘democratic mass organisations’, we are completely deleted from the picture. But of course, we did not give up, this time we tried to somehow appeal to these democratic mass organisations hoping that maybe we can persuade them so that they can lobby the government but nothing! Nothing, they hate us, still even if they have their headscarf, right now they still are bringing the same old story and saying since you left us alone, since you ignored us, since you tortured our souls whatever, now we are not helping you… but joking aside, this costs a lot to us (TNGO6).

The very early years of the Turkish Republic appeared as a great barrier to catalysts a century later, which clearly suggests an HI argument in a reactionary fashion.

**Germany:**

In the Europeanisation process of German WFLR, catalysts have faced two key barriers. These were the backlash regarding gender equality issues at the EU; and the SPD’s role in the Grand Coalition\(^\text{33}\). Unlike the Turkish case, the barriers faced by German catalysts (particularly the first one) are relevant to the WFLR policy area itself. As further discussed below, this is likely to stem from a relatively more stable political climate in Germany, as Europeanisation is a process filtered by domestic political dynamics.

a) Gender equality backlash at the EU:

\(^{33}\) Grand Coalition refers to the ruling coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD in the German Bundestag.
As discussed in Chapter 4, by the second half of the 2000s, WFLR policies were no longer an EU priority that is, until 2014, when they were reprioritised. Yet, meanwhile, the number of corresponding initiatives has been reduced. This creates a great barrier to German catalysts as the external pressure has diminished. There has been less scrutiny by the EU and German antagonists have taken maximum advantage of this, passing a number of familialised WFLR policies. The 2012 Homecare Allowance Law, which provided monthly €150 to parents (mostly to mothers), who do not put their children into crèches and care for them at home until the child turns into three, is an example of this. Although the law has been criticised by the EU in the ensuing years, German antagonists have successfully discouraged German mothers from paid employment under this climate:

In 1990s, things were all very good. But since then I must say things have been stilled completely at the EU. And I think it was part of the broader context of backlash and gender equality in Europe there is a stagnation at the moment. And nothing is really going forward and this includes reconciliation as well as you already know. This brought kind of a freedom to Germany and we saw a bigger backlash than the backlash at the EU. Opposition parties and civil society lost the solid ground that they used to base their arguments on and the result is a couple of laws passed, which we now trying to abolish (GNGO7).

One aim of this thesis is to compare the ways in which Europeanisation operates in a member and in a candidate state. So far, the differences between Germany and Turkey in terms of their relation with the EU did not play a major role in the operation of Europeanisation. As both countries showed a salient misfit with the EU, they both received a similar level of adaptational pressure. Yet, the negative impact of the backlash at the EU on German catalysts’ actions shows how the EU has a more immediate impact on its member states, through its sanctions in the cases of non-adaptation. This chimes with the governance by hierarchy argument, which refers to member states’ obligation to download the EU initiatives into their own legislative frameworks. Relatively less emphasis on WFLR at the EU level resonated in the German context and significantly
decelerated Germany’s Europeanisation process. It concomitantly appeared as an important barrier to German catalysts both from the governmental and nongovernmental levels.

b) The SPD’s role in the Grand Coalition:

Last but not least, the SPD being the small partner in the Grand Coalition and thus being less powerful than the CDU/CSU in decision-making, appears to be another factor constraining the German catalysts – both the SPD itself and other catalyst actors 34.

Despite the aforementioned traditional voices within the SPD, who are in favour of a familialised WFLR model, the SPD as a party is in favour of de-familialised WFLR and thus supports the process of Europeanising the German model. To this end, members of the party have supported the NGOs, developed a number of alternative Europeanised WFLR models with the NGOs and carried them to the Bundestag as a policy proposal. However, those models initiated by the SPD have often been attacked by their antagonist coalition partner CDU/CSU:

We have done everything we can with the conservatives within the coalition… so, I think the enemy is within the government… They either stop things or delay their passage… The coalition is not equal, they are stronger than us. I mean, they have more seats so when they say no then it is a no (GPOL7).

The belated passage of the Wage Transparency Act (Entgelttransparenzgesetz) provides a recent example of how the SPD is stopped by the CDU. The very progressive family minister Manuela Schwesig from SPD, who is determined to increase fathers’ involvement in childcare, found the gender pay gap to be the biggest reason for unequal distribution of parental leave. She believed that if fathers and mothers had the same income, fathers would be more eager to take parental leave and engage more with

34 It is important to note that in the aftermath of the 2017 general elections in Germany, the SPD leader Martin Schulz had strongly been against to renewing the coalition agreement. Yet, during most of the process of Europeanising German WFLR model (2005-2017), the SPD was the coalition partner, which highly impaired catalysts’ actions.
childcare. Accordingly, she wanted to pass an Act which would provide employees the right to know what colleagues in similar jobs are paid. Although Ms. Schwesig had been working on this law since the summer of 2015, the Act would come into force only in January 2018 (GA1, GA2). This delay in the passage of the law stems from the CDU/CSU group’s reluctance:

This latest law was again an SPD initiative. OK, it is fine now, the law just passed but I mean, it should not take three years for a law as useful as this to pass. Of course, it has been cut by the CDU in the negotiation process within the coalition and I strongly believe they would never allow us to pass this law if Schulz was not this clear in the coalition discussions. Merkel was kind of hopeless so that she convinced her party to pass this law (GPO7).

This approach – delaying the passage of the law – is one of the most common strategies used by the antagonists of both countries. Here, an antagonist strategy appeared to be a barrier on catalysts and saliently assuaged their actions. In line with what process tracing has suggested, the actions of each actor groups have had an opposing impact on the other one.

All in all, throughout the process of Europeanising the domestic models, German and Turkish catalysts have faced various barriers resulting in passage of familialised WFLR measures and continuous misfit with the EU standards. While, surprisingly, the barriers faced by German catalysts have brought an immediate de-Europeanisation – exemplified with the 2012 Homecare Allowance Law – the barriers faced by Turkish catalysts restrained their actions and concomitantly slowed the Europeanisation process down. Although being far fewer in number and far less effective, antagonists also face a number of barriers when working for the status quo, to which the chapter now turns.

7.2.2. Antagonists:

The antagonists in both countries appeared to be more powerful compared to catalysts. Yet that is not to say that they have not faced any barriers in decelerating the processes of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR models – like the catalysts, antagonists
have also faced a number of barriers. While the progressive voices within the antagonist political parties appear to be a key barrier faced by both Turkish and German antagonists, Turkish antagonists have also had to overcome the relatively relaxed climate within the Islamist circles in Turkey in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections.

**Progressive voices within the antagonist parties:**

As discussed in Chapter 6, political parties from the antagonist camp in Germany are far from homogenous. This is also the case for the key agents of the Turkish antagonist camp. The CDU/CSU, the AKP and the MHP harbour a number of MPs who are relatively more open to an Europeanised WFLR model. Although fewer in Turkey than in Germany, the existence of these MPs, who are more open to Europeanisation of domestic WFL, has successfully fettered antagonists.

The former Family Minister and current Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen; the Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany; the former Family Minister and current Gaziantep\(^{35}\) Mayor Fatma Sahin; and MHP deputy Deniz Depboylu, who also is a current board member of the Committee on Equality of Opportunity for Women and Men, are mentioned by a number of interview partners to have relatively more modern and Europeanised views on WFLR than the other members of their parties.

A combination of the interviews conducted under the scope of this thesis and the related literature has evidenced that the CDU/CSU underwent a modernisation process under Merkel (Williarty, 2010). Merkel’s open-minded personality, perhaps originating from her childhood in the former GDR (GA1), accompanied by the equally open-minded and strong family minister Ursula von der Leyen, empowered the progressive CDU cadre:

\(^{35}\) A city located in the western part of Turkey's South Eastern Anatolia Region.
There are many contradictions in Germany. For example, the strongest family ministers were always from the CDU and also Merkel, she is also in the wrong party. They put CDU/CSU in a bit ambivalent position in terms of their views on gender. I know Ursula von der Leyen personally, I worked with her in Berlin, when she was the family minister. She was a very strong person, she even managed to convince the Bavarian politicians with her way of arguing and giving speeches. But she also had the support of Merkel. This was crucial too. Third argument, she was very close to feminist organisations and trade unions. So, she had the support of both Merkel and CSO. With all these, she did a lot, I would say. Sometimes even more than so-called leftist parties (GA1).

This empowered intra-party group, also backed by the catalyst oppositional parties and the NGOs, have taken considerable steps in Europeanising the German WFLR model, which has impaired antagonists’ plans. These include first and foremost the establishment of the European Alliance for Families, which was directly von der Leyen’s initiative; the seven-year delay in the passage of the 2012 Homecare Allowance Law; the new maternity leave scheme introduced in 2007; additional funding through the Day-care Facility Expansion Act of 2007; and the Child Promotion Act, which came into power in 2008.

By the very same token, the reform of the Civil Servant Code in 2011 and the 10th Development Plan, which brought the first paid paternity leave to male public sector workers and increased the target for pre-school enrolment rate, respectively, have been credited to Fatma Sahin’s efforts while she was serving her term as Family Minister. Moreover, the representatives of various women’s organisations have mentioned the convenience of approaching the AKP either for interpellation or lobbying during Sahin’s tenure. On the other hand, due to the low number of seats that the MHP owns in the TBMM, Deniz Depboylu could only contribute to other oppositional parties’ and NGOs’ activities, rather than bringing about legislative changes:

Believe it or not, it is not the whole AKP that supports the holy motherhood. Yes, the significant majority is in favour of stay-home mothers, whom I call the ‘holy family-supporters’, but there are also some few, who are maybe not in favour of equal distribution of care and work but are OK with the idea of women in the labour market. Fatma Sahin, whom was exiled to Gaziantep now, she was amazing. During her Family Ministry, we were able to talk to the AKP, those
visits to our kindergarten model were all thanks to Fatma Sahin. She was very interesting, she was very good with women’s organisations and everything. Also, there is a very intelligent and very modern woman in the MHP. She is also trying to collaborate with us as much as possible (TNGO9).

This lack of systematisation, which increases the importance of individuals’ opinions in decision-making, is one of the major difficulties that catalysts have faced in both countries while accelerating the Europeanisation processes. Yet, this time, the very same non-systematisation benefitted the catalysts but impaired the antagonists. A number of individuals from the political parties of the antagonist camp have held different ideas than their antagonist colleagues, more similar to those of catalysts. Their relatively less strong stance against Europeanising the domestic WFLR models, eventually led them to be involved in a number of activities that would accelerate the process rather than decelerating it, which resonates with SI. In the absence of shared norms and values with other antagonists, these MPs are more open to Europeanisation, even though they belong to the cornerstone antagonist parties and refused to take part in actions aiming to maintain the status quo with respect to WFLR.

The relatively relaxed climate within the Islamist circles in Turkey:
The 2007 general elections brought success to the AKP one more time as the party increased its votes from 34.4% to 46.5%, which was deemed to bring a relatively more relaxed climate to the Islamist circles in Turkey (TNGO4, TNGO5).

A number of interviewees from the GONGOs criticised their colleagues for losing their enthusiasm, which perhaps did not directly contribute to the Europeanisation process, but indirectly did so by benefitting the catalysts. While the GONGOs were enjoying the rights given to Islamist women, the catalyst women’s organisations continued their activities, which eventually constrained the antagonists by creating some difficulties for collaboration. As collaboration is sine qua non for NGOs, GONGOs who
lost the support of their counterparts had to decrease the number and extent of their activities, while the catalysts continued full blast:

When Islamists came to power, we faced a dash actually. Because when the Kemalist regime, in inverted commas, was in power, Islamist circles, in order to bring themselves into being, were collaborating way better than this. Especially until the resolution of this headscarf issue, we were way stronger, way braver and way more hardworking than this. But now, everybody is in this weird relaxed attitude. Others, who are not relaxed, they kept their hands off the civil society and started practising their own profession, which they were not able to before the headscarf freedom. So, here we need partners, we need volunteers and we need enthusiasm (TNGO5).

From an actor-centred perspective, it is possible to link this attitude of Islamist women to RCI. Under relatively more restricted circumstances, a higher number of Islamist people engaged with NGOs and worked for their freedom. After gaining a number of rights and witnessing the AKP’s second electoral victory, a party which they see as their own political voice, the number of these people and the level of their enthusiasm has considerably reduced. It is plausible to argue that this allowed the catalyst NGOs to be more effective, and thus assuaged the process of vetoing Europeanisation.

7.3. Conclusion:

This chapter has sought to illustrate the contributions of the domestic actors to the process of Europeanising the national WFLR models, together with the barriers that they have faced while catalysing or vetoing the process. Analysis of domestic actors’ roles throughout the process reveals that catalysts and antagonists have tapped into different strategies, formed different collaborations and faced different barriers in either catalysing or vetoing the process. Furthermore, this chapter also found a difference in terms of the employment of strategy among countries, which has been referred to as tactics. Due to domestic socio-political dynamics, German domestic actors and Turkish domestic actors employed the similar strategy in a significantly different way. This
eventually shows how the Europeanisation process of a country is shaped in practice by the existence of domestic actors and the time present conditions of a country.

Although the ways in which domestic actors perceived the Europeanisation of WFLR was mostly shaped by SI, RCI dominated their inputs to the process. Yet that is not to say that domestic actors acted completely rationally, because their shared norms and values played a salient role in the formation of partnerships. This solidifies the observation made in the previous chapter that the three different forms of NI are not exclusive. They might simultaneously appear as the motivation of an actor. This finding, accompanied by the findings of the previous chapter, demonstrates that theories which explain the Europeanisation process from an actor-centred perspective might consider a new form of NI or might develop an interpretation of the existing forms to an extent that would take this finding into account. In other words, the three forms of NI are highly intertwined. Domestic actors’ historical roots play an important role in the formation of their social norms and values. Moreover, even if domestic actors are aiming at utility maximisation, they continue to take their social norms and values into account. Therefore, a new form of NI or a different interpretation of the existing forms might refer to simultaneous existence of these three forms, which at the end could be useful in explaining this tangled situation.

The initial aim of explaining the process from an actor-centred perspective was to uncover the most important factor behind the Europeanisation pattern. This chapter has found that in both countries it was the antagonists that faced fewer barriers compared to catalysts and they could easily overcome those barriers. This in the end appeared to have a bigger influence on the policy outcome, which perhaps explains the contradictory Europeanisation processes that both Turkey and Germany underwent. It is plausible to link this larger influence of the antagonists to their more powerful position in terms of decision-making, compared to catalysts. This finding adds another layer to the actor-
centred theoretical framework: that, alongside the existence and number of catalysts or the antagonists, their positions (whether they are from the ruling party, working in an NGO close to the ruling party or are from the oppositional parties) within the societies greatly matter in shaping the outcome of the Europeanisation process.

Having explained the ways in which domestic actors have perceived and contributed to the process of Europeanising the national WFLR models, the following chapter will turn to the last phase of the Europeanisation process, and the extent to which the EU model of reconciling work and family lives has been practised by the German and Turkish citizens.
CHAPTER 8. SOCIETAL EUROPEANISATION:

Having explained the WFLR policy development in Turkey and Germany under the EU influence, this final empirical chapter turns to assess the implementation of those policies. More precisely, it questions why and to what extent the EU model of reconciling work and family lives has been practised by German and Turkish public.

The chapter, begins with a discussion of the changing WFLR trends in the selected countries between 2000 and 2017. After presenting the current WFLR trends in each country, the chapter proceeds with the illustration of the reasons behind those daily work and family life reconciliation practices. It is important to highlight here that even though each Europeanised WFLR experience at the domestic level is a contribution to the process, individuals who practise the European trend are not referred to as ‘catalysts’ in this chapter. By the same token, individuals who preserved the national trends in terms of WFLR have not been considered as antagonists. Instead, they practise the EU reconciliation trend or maintain the domestic trend, highly related with the potential social learning. A number of notable Europeanisation scholars have already put forward that if domestic societal actors have been socialised throughout the process, they have come to practise the EU model (Diez et al., 2005). Relying on the literature on soft-Europeanisation (see page: 40), individuals who have combined their work and family lives in de-familialised ways, in this chapter are called the ‘thick learners’ and the ones who have remained committed to the previous domestic model are called the ‘thin learners’. Having explained the main rationale behind domestic actors’ WFLR trends, the chapter concludes by discussing the level of execution of EU norms and values regarding WFLR practices at domestic levels.

Observations made in this study have revealed that, in both countries, a number of thick learner families co-exist with other thin learner families. Due to the actor-
centred approach of the thesis, particular attention has been given to reasons behind these domestic practices, rather than focusing on the statistics. In so doing, neither the EU, nor the EU’s greater involvement in this specific policy area, has appeared as a push factor. Instead, the economic necessity of women’s active labour market participation, their career aspirations, parents’ good education desires for their children, and changing fatherhood trends have encouraged German and Turkish citizens to Europeanise their WFLR habits. On the other hand, existing generous familialised incentives, fear of assimilation, domestic societal actors’ disapproval of existing WFLR services, the high gender pay-gap, fear of stigmatisation, and women’s status ambitions have appeared to be discouraging societal actors from Europeanising their daily practices. As discussed below, domestic societal actors mostly make their decisions on how to reconcile their work and family lives on the basis of rational cost-benefit calculations, which once again highlights the importance of domestic socio-political and socio-economic dynamics on the Europeanisation outcome.

8.1. Work and family life reconciliation trends at domestic levels:

Both countries have appeared to be highly heterogeneous in terms of WFLR patterns. A voluminous body of research has demonstrated that there are major disparities among individuals in each country with respect to their WFLR practices (Hansen and Hawkes, 2009; Kakıcı et al., 2007; Schöber and Stahl, 2014; Unterhofer and Wrohlich, 2017). In both countries, although the number of families who have come to be practising a relatively more Europeanised model of WFLR has increased over the last decade, the number of families maintaining the traditional pattern also remained significantly high.
The official statistics evidenced a 9 percent increase in women’s labour market participation in Turkey and a 4.3 percent increase in Germany over the last decade. These ascendant numbers regarding women’s employment, together with the increase in the number of families using non-familial public childcare facilities and the increase in the number of fathers taking relatively longer parental leaves (only in Germany) demonstrate a societal Europeanisation fringe in each country. However, simultaneous strong consensus on the argument ‘women should first focus on their family and then their career’ (GA1, GA2, GNGO7, GNGO2) in Germany and on the argument ‘men make houses, women make homes’ (TA1, TNGO7, TNGO9) in Turkey dilutes the defamilialisation impact of the Europeanisation process at the societal level and leads to the aforementioned disparities. The current WFLR practices, therefore are highly tangled in both countries, to the extent that it is almost impossible to make a sharp distinction between families who have aligned their WFLR routines with the EU and families who have not. Given the complexity of the situation, there has been a large body of literature focusing on WFLR practices in general; fathers’ parental leave usage trends; families’ childcare preferences; and the division of labour within households in particular (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2011; Ray et al., 2010; Günay and Bener, 2011; Gündüz-Hosgör and Smits, 2006; Tanaka, 2005). Analysts found that age, education and

36 Female employment rate increased from 23.3% in 2005 to 32.3% in 2017 in Turkey (Retrieved from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=TR) and from 50.7% in 2005 to 55% in 2017 (Retrieved from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=DE).

37 The childcare enrolment rate in Germany increased from 6.5% for children below age 3 in 2005 to 18.3% in 2016 and increased from 22.1% for children between ages 3 and 6 in 2006 to 44.8% in 2016 (Retrieved from: https://github.com/gut-leben-in-deutschland/bericht/blob/master/content/04/02/preschool.csv). On the other hand, it only increased from just below 10% for children between ages 3 and 5 in 2006 to 33.3% in 2016 (Retrieved from: http://www.egitimepedia.com/turkivede-erken-cocukluk-egitimi/) and increased from just above 20% for children between ages 4 and 5 to 43.5% in 2016 in Turkey. Yet there is a lack of official statistics for Turkish children below age 3 (Retrieved from: http://www.egitimreformugirisimi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ERG_EIR_2015-16.pdf).
marital status are the key determinants in shaping the WFLR practices in both countries (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2011; Günay and Bener, 2011; Schöber, 2014).

While older parents still prefer to reconcile their work and family lives on a traditional basis, most of the younger couples practise a dual-earner/dual-worker family model. Younger couples are more likely to use non-familial care, compared to older generations in both countries (Günay and Bener, 2011; Schöber and Spieß, 2015). In a similar vein, Geisler and Kreyenfeld’s research on German fathers’ parental leave usage found that younger fathers have gradually started to take longer parental leaves, which contributes to their involvement in childcare. Although there is a huge gap in the literature on Turkish fathers’ use of parental leave, a number of interview partners from women’s organisations argue that even if Turkish fathers have gradually begun to take more part in their children’s lives, they still do not consider taking parental leaves.

Moreover, Schöber (2014) and Uraz et al. (2010) have pointed to education as an important determinant in individuals’ decisions about the ways in which they combine their work lives with their family lives. In both countries, parents with university degrees share both the employment and household responsibilities more equally in comparison to parents without university degrees. While university graduated mothers appeared to be returning to their positions quicker than non-university graduated mothers, German fathers holding a university diploma appeared to be taking longer parental leaves. The likelihood of sending children into day-care places is also higher among university graduated parents than the parents without university degree.

Finally, in both countries, research has shown that single parents (be it mothers or fathers) are the ones who have the most need of the EU way of work and family life reconciliation (Günay and Bener, 2011; Schöber and Stahl, 2014). Building on the previous research, this study further argues that, alongside the aforementioned factors,
a number of rationally-, sociologically- and historically-driven reasons have also played important roles in domestic societal actors’ WFLR decisions.

8.2. Main reasons behind societal actors’ WFLR practices:

Practising the EU standards in terms of WFLR has been considered the last step of the process of Europeanising the domestic model, which happens after the relevant laws have been transferred into the domestic legislation. Since this very last step of the process concerns the daily practices in Turkey and Germany, its actors are German and Turkish citizens who have a work and a family life to be combined.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these societal actors, who have a work and a family life that needs to be reconciled on a daily basis, are not the direct contributors of the process. That is to say that the ways in which they reconcile their work and family lives do not have an accelerating or decelerating impact on the process of Europeanising the domestic model. Therefore, domestic actors of the societal Europeanisation process have been categorised as thick learners and thin learners, wherein the former group refers to individuals who have aligned their WFLR routines with the EU, and the latter to individuals who have preferred to maintain the domestic model.
Figure 8.1: Key reasons behind domestic societal actors’ WFLR practices.

As can be seen from Figure 8.1, on the left, individuals from each group had different reasons for practising or not practising the EU standards at the national level. This chapter analyses WFLR habits of the thick learners and thin learners separately.

8.2.1. WFLR practices of thick learners:

Although it is hard to link the Europeanised WFLR habits of the thick learners directly to the EU, a significant number of families in both countries have come to be living under the de-familialised WFLR practices. Notable academics specialising in gender equality and women’s employment, together with a number of women’s organisation representatives engaged with research rather than advocacy or WFLR service provision, and interviewed under the scope of this research, have pointed to four key reasons behind German and Turkish citizens’ more Europeanised WFLR practices.

**Necessity for Europeanised WFLR:**

The first reason why a number of German and Turkish citizens have come to practise relatively more Europeanised WFLR, and more Europeanised childcare in particular, is
the increased necessity for non-familial care arrangements. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the number of people who do not necessarily choose but need to maintain European-wise childcare practices has increased more in Germany but also in Turkey due to a consolidation of several overlapping but also differing factors.

a) Economic necessity:

A significant number of interviewees mention that the difficulty of sustaining a living on a single wage has contributed to internalisation of the EU way of WFLR in both de-industrialised Germany and Turkey.

Although the economists cite the German economy as one of the strongest in Europe, an increasing gap between income and prices, stemming from a wage restraint in the last decade, has also been noted (Economist, 2014). In a similar vein, the stubbornly increasing inflation in Turkey (Nichols and Sugur, 1996), has created severe conditions for Turkish families trying to make their livings through one income. Therefore, in both countries, a number of families need to employ dual earner or at least one-and-a-half earner family models for their survival. Women’s engagement with full-time employment, or even part-time employment, on the other hand, meant that they would not be able to be the full-time child-minders any more. This in the end induced families to seek non-familial care alternatives. While German families have turned their faces to public day-care centres, Turkish women took some other alternatives into account and relied on close relatives, close neighbours and also close friends alongside the public day-care option. Solidarity has always been, and probably will always will be, the cornerstone of the Turkish family system (Duben, 1982). While material or emotional support within the families has been the foremost principle of the Turkish family contract (Kavas and Gündüz-Hosgör, 2013), the German understanding of family lacks this principle (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the economic necessity for more women in the labour market encouraged the
German citizens to combine their work lives with their family lives in an EU manner, as compared to Turkish citizens. While discussing the current female employment trends in Germany, a policy expert from one of the biggest think tanks argued:

The minimum income has not raised in the last 20 years in Germany. But the prices of the goods have been increasing day by day. Therefore, in Germany the model where men are working and women are staying at home is not applicable anymore. I mean people cannot survive with that model anymore. So, it is kind of a pressure I would say rather than a choice. Women are under economic pressure to work. And to work they need to sort out the childcare issue. So, now many more women are sending their kids to Kindergartens compared to 10/15 years ago (GNGO11).

b) Familial necessity:

In addition to economic necessity, a growing number of lone parent families also contribute to the societal Europeanisation processes of both countries in terms of care arrangements. In the last two decades, both countries have exhibited an ongoing increase in divorce rates, from 0.46 per thousand during 1990s to 1.7 in 2015 in Turkey and from 1.9 per thousand during 1990s to 2 in 2015 in Germany (DeStatis, 2018; Kavas and Gündüz-Hosgör, 2013). These ascendant statistics went in tandem with the increase in lone parenthood. Single parents have become a significant component of both Turkish and German family compositions as well as the thick learner camp of their Europeanisation processes.

Since single parents do not have the partners to feature the paid employment and unpaid domestic work divide, they need to take care of both spheres by themselves. In other words, single parents are responsible for both home-making and earning a living. According to a number of Turkish and German women’s organisation representatives, this double burden of familial and occupational responsibilities has encouraged mostly German but also Turkish citizens to rely on public day-care places, which resonates with the EU WFLR practices and thus contributes to the societal Europeanisation processes of both countries. A Turkish NGO representative, for example, stated:
In today’s Turkey, the number of parents left alone with their kids for any reason, be it divorce, or be it separated or be it never married, is extremely high when compared to Turkey of 15 years ago. And these people regardless of their sexes need to work. And in order to work they need to sort out their childcare problem. Usually they have three options. First if they lucky, if somehow they have close ties with their elderly or if they live in the same city, the grandparents look after the kids so that single parents can go to work. If this is not the case, then the close friends… If they have close friends living close by or if they have good connections with the neighbours then they leave their kids with these people and manage to go to work again. But there are also a considerable number of single parents, who do not have any of these people that they can be aided in terms of childcare. And yes, these people are the ones, who desperately need and highly use public day-care places…” (TNGO14).

Similarly, a notable academic from Germany mentioned:

Kindergarten demand is considerably increasing over the last ten years in every single länder because now in Germany there are so many different family types. In the past it was a simple traditional family, a mother, a father and two children but now we have so many single parents. Especially they are the ones highly demanding for affordable and also reliable Kindergartens because they don’t have anybody to leave their children but they also need to work to survive (GA2).

According to key academics and women’s organisation representatives, a number of families in both countries are no longer able to maintain their lives on the basis of work/care dualism. An increased gap between the wages and living costs, as well as the lack of partners to share either the labour market or family responsibilities, encouraged some German and Turkish citizens to practise the EU-wise WFLR, especially in terms of childcare arrangements. In other words, these individuals, who have come to be reconciling their work and family lives in de-familialised arrangements, have successfully contributed to their countries’ Europeanisation processes at societal level. However, this transition in German and Turkish people’s daily practices did not stem from the EU influence. Instead recent demographical and economic changes intrinsic to Turkey and Germany persuaded people to Europeanise their WFLR habits. Referring back to three forms of New Institutionalism (NI), it is likely to link these behaviours of thick learners from both countries directly to rational choice
institutionalism (RCI). For Turkish and German thick learners, under the conditions of new Turkey and Germany, being in the labour market was *sine qua non*. Therefore, they considered the gains of practising de-familialised childcare arrangements to be greater than continuing to reconcile their work and family lives on the basis of the familialised domestic model based on familial care arrangements.

**Women’s career aspirations:**

Both in Turkey and in Germany, women have historically been expected to be the cornerstone of the family and facilitate the functioning of the family. This social expectation, in return, was well-accepted and internalised by women. Historically, both the German and Turkish women have prioritised home-making and centred their lives on their familial duties. They have made numerous sacrifices in order to fulfil their home-making responsibilities including giving up on their education or career. However, since the early 1980s in Germany and early 2000s in Turkey, in spite of a significant number of obstacles surrounding women’s entrance to higher education, in both countries stemming from a stubbornly patriarchal family structure, the number of women in higher education is on the rise (Acar, 2006; Read and Kehm, 2016).

These university educated urban women, who constitute a very small segment of Turkish society and a relatively bigger (but still rather small) segment of German society, in return, wanted to reap the benefit of their higher education by building a stable, secure and a lifelong career for themselves. In the pursuit of this desire, the career-oriented minor groups in both countries practise the EU WFLR with respect to both care and leave arrangements:

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38 As of 2015, only 0.47 and 0.45 per cent of the total number of individuals in tertiary education was women in Germany and Turkey respectively (Retrieved from: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/8/8b/Number_of_tertiary_education_students_by_level_and_sex%2C_2015_%28thousands%29_YB17.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/8/8b/Number_of_tertiary_education_students_by_level_and_sex%2C_2015_%28thousands%29_YB17.png)).
Now we do have a change in the perception of female education. Let’s say in Germany, now, we have more women who have more and longer education. So, girls in higher education is rising, rising and rising. And these many women with better education are looking for high-quality jobs. They are no more OK with part-time jobs which would pay them some sort of pocket-money. They are ambitious now, they are competitive. They would no more quit their jobs to raise their kids. This is no more the German reality. And the society’s started to accept this paradigm change. I mean of course, the number of these ambition women is still very low compared to common image and their acceptance is very slow. And these women, whom we expect to be role model to others, are going back to their work right after their maternity leaves end, they share the paternal leave equally with their partners and they do not see any harm in sending their kids to kindergarten at age 1 (GA3).

As the senior university research fellow mentions above, a very small number of women from the middle and upper-middle parts of the socio-economic pyramid in relatively more modernised regions of Germany, but also Turkey, now realise the EU way of WFLR in their daily lives.

From an actor-centred perspective, this behaviour of Turkish and German thick learners resonates directly with RCI on the grounds of utility maximising calculus, but also recalls sociological institutionalism (SI) due to shared values with the EU. Yet, it is important to note that neither the cost-benefit calculation nor the shared values concern the issue of contributing to the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model. German and Turkish women experiencing a more European way of reconciliation in order to secure a high position within the labour market is of relevance to adaptational pressure coming from the EU. Once again, an internal factor, which has nothing to do with the EU influence on German and Turkish WFLR models, led German and Turkish women to adapt their daily reconciliation habits to match the EU. These spontaneous Europeanisation fringes in both countries took the issue beyond the mere domestic impact of the EU. They epitomise the main argument of this thesis – that the Europeanisation process has been rendered by the social, political and economic dynamics as well as the existence of domestic actors. This perhaps adds another layer
of analysis to actor-centred Europeanisation as it exemplifies a situation wherein Europeanisation occurs unconsciously.

**For children’s self-development:**
When seeking to understand why EU-wise WFLR have begun to be practised in Turkey and Germany, children’s social investment appeared as a significant driving force in both countries. While a number of families saw investing in their children as a potential source of upward social mobility, some relatively younger German families paid a particular attention to their children’s development in order to prove their parenting skills to other parents.

a) Upward social mobility:
Both Turkish and German cultures have historically seen children as the society’s future and thus, emphasised childcare (Bozçağa, 2013; Ostner, 2010). Both cultures have historically done this through assigning childcare particularly to mothers or at least to somebody from the family. However, according to key academics and women’s organisation representatives interviewed under the scope of this thesis, this strong faith in the familial care has met a gradual demise among a small number of Turkish and German families.

When discussing the current WFLR in trends in Germany and Turkey, notable ECEC scholars and women’s organisation representatives engaged with research have argued that a number of working-class families have come to acknowledge the importance of non-familial childcare in ending the poverty cycle (GA1; GA3; GNGO11; TA2, TNGO9). These people living not below, but on the edge of, the poverty line have come to see their children as a window of opportunity in terms of upward social mobility. Therefore, they prefer to send their children to Kindergartens at the possible earliest age. Although this did not necessarily stem from their aim of contributing to the
societal Europeanisation processes of their countries, eventually they have come to accelerate the process by featuring the EU care arrangements at the national levels. They regard sending their children into Kindergarten as an ‘investment’ (GA1). For them, the earlier their children start being educated, the more likely it is that they will find prestigious and better-paid jobs. These expectations of Turkish and German thick learners chime with the literature on ECEC, highlighting the importance of ECEC in tackling the poverty (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot 2010; Drew et al., 1998).

Referring to the three forms of NI, it is possible to link Turkish thick learners’ behaviours with both RCI and SI, whereas German thick learners’ resonate only with RCI. In both cases, actors preferred EU care arrangements on the grounds of upward social mobility expectations. That is to say that, they considered sending their children to Kindergartens more gainful than practising the domestic model. In addition to this cost-benefit calculation, the social norms and values also played a role in the Turkish case because it is a very important and deep-rooted Turkish tradition that parents try to do the best for their children at all costs. The importance attributed to Turkish parents’ sacrifice might perhaps be proven by Turkish sayings such as ‘have not eaten but fed, have not dressed but clothed.’ To this end, parents who want the best for their children also have combined their work lives with their family lives on the basis of EU standards.

b) Parenting skills:
In addition to this rational decision-making behind practising EU care arrangements, a very German characteristic – ambitiousness – has also compelled a number of families to align their childcare trends with the EU. It was argued during the interviews by German academics that young couples who have recently had children are highly child-centric. Although parents in general would want to see their children doing well in life, according to a notable university professor’s research on parenthood and parenting,
young couples pay exceptional attention to their children’s self-development in order to win an invisible ‘competition’ on parenting:

I think now the importance of ECEC has been acknowledged by the parents, especially by the young ones. Now, they are racing each other to send their kids to the top Kindergartens because they are trying to raise the best kid. Now, there is this sort of invisible social pressure on young couples. They feel the need to prove that they are the best parents to their counterparts. Therefore, they are sending their children to Kitas since the age 1 and when the kid is a bit older they start taking additional courses like piano or additional language and so on (GA3).

This behaviour of young German thick learners also chimes with both SI and RCI. First and foremost, it reflects SI as they practise EU standards on the grounds of their success. This does not necessarily mean that German actors have perceived EU standards as better than the German standards. Rather, what German actors perceived as the better way was already what the EU was asking from Germany. Therefore, it would be plausible to argue that the young German thick learners’ decisions indicate SI as they have been made on the basis of shared norms and values. Second, this also resonates with RCI. German actors saw EU care arrangements as the most useful and gainful way to achieve their aim of being the best parents.

**New fatherhood trends:**

There is some evidence from research in Germany (Kottwitz et al., 2016) and in Turkey (Beşpinar, 2016) that the child-related behaviour of both men and women has been changing. Likewise, a number of interviewees from both countries have mentioned how men and women are becoming alike in terms of work- and care-related characteristics. According to some German and Turkish academics and women’s organisation experts, perhaps being influenced by the recent intense awareness raising events on fatherhood, a number of relatively younger and more educated fathers, mostly living in urbanised big cities, have come to share the care responsibilities more equally with their partners. According to a German professor of parenthood and parenting, there is an ongoing
mind-set change among the younger, more educated, urbanised German fathers, which has also been observed by Beşpinar (2016) in Turkey. To this end, an increased number of fathers, more in Germany, but – even if very rarely – also in Turkey, have started to interpret the meanings of fatherhood and masculinity differently than their own fathers.

While in the past a strong father image was constructed around providing economic support and the disciplinary control (Bertoia and Drakich, 1993), this is not the case anymore. The dominance of this traditional fatherhood image has been challenged by the emergence of new ideas on fatherhood. In today’s world, fathers who have been there for their partners and children since the very outset of the pregnancy have come to be seen as good and strong fathers. In that sense, a small number of fathers from both countries have started spending more time with their children and even taking parental leaves, which also allows women to be more active in the labour market:

Honestly, people from the West especially have made a huge step because there is now really a big change going on. There is this real change of mind. People do not have those old ideas anymore that children should be raised by their mother and financed by their father. Now, people started to believe that a healthier and a happier child is the one who is raised in Kindergarten with the emotional support of both parents (GA3).

Although there is no evidence proving the EU’s role in this mind-set change, there is a mind-set change. A small but growing number of German and Turkish families have come to feature a relatively more Europeanised share of parental leaves. From the lens of NI, this resonates strongly with the SI as the domestic societal actors have come to see the EU standards as the right things to do. Yet again, this socialisation did not necessarily stem directly from the Europeanisation process itself.

In sum, pioneered by the relatively younger and relatively more educated individuals living in the more urbanised regions of both countries, a number of domestic societal actors demonstrate a thick learning. In other words, throughout the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR, they have come to reconcile their work and family
lives in a relatively more Europeanised fashion. However, similar to discursive and political Europeanisation processes, the societal Europeanisation processes of both countries, as well, have been assuaged by the existence of a significant number of people featuring a thin learning, hence, maintaining the national WFLR practices. The chapter proceeds with the illustration of the reasons behind thin learners’ preferences of maintaining the national practices.

8.2.2. WFLR practices of thin learners:
While a number of people have gradually been Europeanising their daily WFLR behaviours, a considerable number of people in both countries, have either consciously or unconsciously remained unsocialised. Hence, they have continued combining their work lives with their family lives on the familialised traditional basis. Similar to the thick learners, thin learners also make their decisions with respect to their daily WFLR routines, mostly on the basis of cost-benefit calculations but also their social norms and values. There were six key reasons behind thin learners’ familialised WFLR practices.

**Benefitting from the familialised WFLR measures:**
Despite the high level of adaptational pressure for de-familialised WFLR policies coming from the EU, a number of significantly familialised incentives encouraging the traditional gendered work/care dualism remained in force in both countries. As detailed in Chapter 5, these incentives included the taxation system and Homecare Allowance Law in Germany; and the Back to Family and Home-based Childcare projects in Turkey. A significant number of German and Turkish societal actors, in order to benefit from these familialised incentives, refused to Europeanise their WFLR arrangements. It is important to note that this was not a direct reaction to the idea of Europeanising the WFLR trends. Both German and Turkish thin learners continued to practise the domestic model on the grounds of their generosity in terms of cash payments.
Since 1958, Germany has employed a taxation system favouring heterosexual married couples. This so-called *Ehegattensplitting* calculates the mean of the taxable income of both spouses and applies the tax rate to the resulting amount. This taxation system is most efficient among the one-and-a-half earner as well as the male breadwinner family models (Haase et al., 2016; Steiner and Wrohlich, 2008). According to German social policy scholars, policy experts and women’s organisation representatives interviewed under the scope of this research, the majority of the German population benefit from this taxation system even though it favours the unequal distribution of paid employment and unpaid domestic work. To this end, in order to reduce the amount of the income tax to be paid, couples prefer to practise a model wherein fathers work full-time and mothers work part-time or do not work at all. Since the mother is already staying home or working part-time, she also cares for the kids so that the couple is able to reduce or avoid Kindergarten expenses:

I think clever economic politics is to bring women into the labour market, not having a tax splitting law like this. I think this law is against economic growth because it’s against female employment. But it’s again a struggle between the culture and what is needed. And as a result, we have this *ehegattensplitting* since decades that everybody uses. I cannot tell you the actual numbers but there are maybe millions of families living happily ever after with the presence of this law. They get married, woman quits her job or switches to part-time. She cares for the kids, perfect, no childcare fee, no struggle to find the right kindergarten plus lower tax to pay (GNGO10).

All in all, this very German taxation system once again appeared as a factor jeopardising the process of Europeanising, this time at the societal level. As discussed in Chapter 6, a number of German politicians (mostly from the CDU/CSU group but also from the SPD) benefit from this law and prefer to preserve the domestic model in order not to abolish this law. In a similar manner, a considerable number of German couples maintained the national WFLR practices in order to take the maximum
advantage from the taxation system, which at the end assuaged the societal Europeanisation process.

In a like manner, the existence of the Homecare Allowance Law in Germany, the Back to Family and Home-based Childcare projects in Turkey have successfully increased the number of thin learners. A significant number of women both in Turkey and Germany found those purportedly generous cash payments logical and attractive in the short run. Several interviewees from both countries have mentioned that in the absence of affordable and sufficient day-care places, many women prefer to withdraw from the labour market and care for their children by themselves. Although they think this withdrawal is temporary and plan to return to their jobs once their children reach mandatory school age, it ends up being permanent. This mismatch between the plans and the reality stems from the fact that the more time they spend at home, the less attractive they become for the employers:

Women get into hot water when they give birth because in Turkey today raising a child is something really expensive. Imagine the minimum income is 1400TL while the kindergarten fees range between 1000 and 2000. Then once the child gets older these expenses get higher too. Under these circumstances couples start thinking over and over and at the end they decide that the woman would quit her job for couple of years and look after the child. By the way here I am not talking about the conservative crew, this is very much the reality of an ordinary middle-class Turkish family. Anyways, they say OK, the woman will quit the job until the child starts primary school. Since the government is paying for this OK why not. Nobody cares how wrong this decision is, how bad long-term consequences this decision has. They are just trying to save the day (TNGO10).

Again, it would be unjustified to argue that domestic societal-actors continued to practise the national WFLR model in order to sabotage the process. Yet the temptation of the generous cash benefits accompanied with the high day-care fees resulted in non-socialisation so that a significant number of individuals have resulted in not employing the EU model.
Referring back to three forms of NI, it can be argued that domestic societal actors’ preference for the national model over the EU model, on the grounds of the economic benefits, clearly resonates with RCI. Both German and Turkish couples clearly consider the gains of familialised incentives bigger than the gains of practising the EU WFLR and thus keep the national model alive. This benefit-maximisation calculus resulting in favour of the domestic model’s implementation perhaps solidifies Turkish antagonists’ concerns as discussed in Chapter 6. A number of Islamist women’s organisations from the antagonist camp were highly worried about the fact that the EU was overlooking the domestic dynamics while expecting its standards to be downloaded and implemented. Although what Turkish antagonist organisations meant were the cultural codes, here, the EU’s top-down manner have had a clear impact on societal Europeanisation. In other words, the fact that the social policy structure of societies and existing welfare states not being fully ready to off-set the EU’s requirements clearly slowed the societal Europeanisation down. Here, the incomplete policy Europeanisation worked in tandem with an incomplete societal Europeanisation, which perhaps adds another layer of layer of analysis to Europeanization literature by showing how two different Europeanisation levels are interconnected.

**Gender pay gap:**

When seeking to understand the reasons behind the thin learners’ non-Europeanised WFLR practices, the stubbornly remaining wage gap between men and women in both countries appeared as another salient theme. According to recent statistics, the gender pay gaps in both countries are considerable and larger than the EU average\(^\text{39}\). Although the literature on female employment found women’s care responsibilities and the

\(^{39}\) According to the latest Eurostat statistics, the difference between women’s and men’s earnings is 21 and 16 per cent in Germany and in Turkey respectively, while the EU average is 16 per cent (Retrieved from: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:UnadjustedGPG_Figure1.PNG](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:UnadjustedGPG_Figure1.PNG)).
unequal division of labour at home as one of the most important factors contributing to this gap (Acar, 2006; Kızılırmak, 2008; Moghadam, 1997; Selezneva and Van Kerm, 2016; Ucal et al., 2015), a number of interviewees from both countries mention the opposite.

One of the most repeated reasons for German women’s disproportionate take-up of parental leave – and for both German and Turkish women’s giving up their careers for childcare – is their low wages. Although the German parental leave addresses both men and women, in order to avoid any income loss, fathers take only those two months which would be cancelled in the cases of non-use:

Well, I would say a change is on. If we were talking about Germany 15 years ago, I would not even imagine a man taking parental leave. But now, the number of fathers using those daddy-months have been increasing day by day. And I strongly believe if we had lower gender pay gap the numbers would be even higher (GA4).

While this non-transferable two-month benefit encourages fathers to take up parental leave, the simultaneous gender pay gap, on the other hand, restrains fathers from taking longer leaves, which eventually contributes to maintenance of the domestic trends rather than socialisation of the EU WFLR trends.

In a similar vein, economic concerns cause a number of families to practise the familialised domestic model in terms of childcare arrangements. Mostly, the cost-benefit calculation of couples results in women’s withdrawal from the labour market. Rather than paying the day-care fee, which is almost equal to women’s wages (even higher in some cases), women opted to quit their jobs and care for their children themselves, which would also allow them to receive the childcare benefits. A Turkish women’s organisation representative delineated this situation through a very common Turkish idiom:
The game is not worth the candle… well, you know the number of public Kindergartens, very low and the quality? Highly negotiable. Then what is the alternative? Childminder, which is very costly or private Kindergarten, which is as costly as the childminder. So, what is the result? Low Kindergarten enrolment and high female unemployment rates (TNGO8).

Here again, it was not the idea of Europeanising their daily WFLR habits that caused the domestic societal actors to act in this way. They preserved the national model in their everyday lives in order to maximise the household income and provide a better future for their children, yet in so doing they have successfully assuaged the societal Europeanisation processes of both countries. Resonating with the RCI, this behaviour of both Turkish and German thin learners contributes to the aforementioned argument that implementing the EU standards in terms of WFLR does not depend only on the idea of Europeanising the daily habits. It requires domestic infrastructures to be ready to offset the EU standards as well, especially economically.

**Service-related reasons:**

The difficulty of sustaining a living on a single income and the growing number of single parent households have caused a number of Turkish and German families to Europeanise their daily childcare arrangements. In the same way, the insufficient number of day-care places, and the considerably high fees of those places as well as their incompatible working hours with families’ work schedules, led other Turkish and German families to practice the national model.

a) The insufficient number and high fees of day-care places:

The consolidation of the data collected under the scope of this research and official statistics (İlkkaracan et al, 2015; Schöber and Spiess, 2015) show that the number of day-care places in both countries is far below the supply-demand equilibrium.

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40 ‘The game is not worth the candle’ is a very common Turkish idiom, which is used to delineate situations where the cost of the action is considerably bigger than the potential gain.
According to German women’s organisation representatives, the number of day-care places in Germany is significantly low, so German women start searching for a day-care place to enrol their children even when they are pregnant, especially in crowded länder like Berlin or Nordrhein-Westfallen. At the end, this mismatch between demand and supply leads parents to search for alternative childcare options. Quitting their jobs appeared a common option for mothers:

It’s not that women say no, I won’t work, but I’ll care. It’s kind of destiny. What can they do when there’s not enough place of course, they care by themselves. We know that people try so many ways. For example, most parents end up writing to twenty institutions and asking for a space like a cover letter or for example, here in Berlin many people went to Court because they couldn’t get a spot in any day care centres (GNGO2).

Again, it would be unjustified to link this non-socialisation in terms of childcare habits directly to German and Turkish societal actors’ reluctance to Europeanise their WFLR practices. Yet, at the end, the insufficient number of day-care places in both countries leads families to maintain the national trend and successfully sabotages the societal Europeanisation process. Since the demand for a day-care place is much higher than the supply in both countries, the fees are high, which discourages parents from registering their children in day-care. Given the wage difference between the mothers and fathers, mothers once again give up on their careers, at least for a couple of years, and return home in order to compensate for the lack of affordable public day-care places. Here again, it is not that German and Turkish parents have decided to continue practising the national model, but that conditions in both countries have pushed them to do so.

b) Incompatible operating hours of the day-care places:

In addition to insufficient numbers and the concomitant high fees, the opening hours of the day-care places also play an important role in the non-Europeanisation of German and Turkish families’ childcare habits. In Turkey, the majority of day-care places function on a part-time basis, with the single exception of private ones (Ağırdağ et al.,
2015), which is not a commonly preferred option anyway. Similarly, German day-care places either function part-time or close their doors for a couple of hours during lunch (Internations, n.d.). In other words, German day-care places do not take responsibility for children’s lunches. Mothers or fathers have to pick their children up, feed and return children to the day-care place after lunch. Therefore, in neither Turkey nor Germany could parents focus on their own daily grindstones (be it their jobs or any daily activities) with their minds at peace.

Given the already expensive fees and the difficulty of finding a place, according to a number of German and Turkish academics and women’s organisation representatives, parents who cannot consign their children full-time to day-care places, prefer not to send their children to a day-care place at all:

What is another problem in almost every länder is the opening and closing hours of childcare institutions. Like sometimes they would close at 2pm in the afternoon, and they send kids home for lunch, like these kinds of regulations they have. And then what sort of job are you supposed to do between 9 and 2, hours are actually quite difficult, most of the childcare places are open only from 8 to 4, which means you need to leave your job at 3pm because it takes an hour to travel to childcare place but you can’t do this. I mean your job would not allow you to leave at 3pm or let’s say 3.30pm every day to pick up your child. So, from 8 to 4 is not useful at all for parents. So, instead of putting themselves into this busy schedule everyday what they do, mothers quit and care themselves so that they don’t pay the fees for a place, which is not really handy (GNGO2).

Once again, rational cost-benefit calculation by both German and Turkish parents constrained them from Europeanising their WFLR habits. Since the domestic infrastructure was not ready to supply the Europeanised care arrangements, a number of families had to maintain the national trends, which strongly implies the RCI perspective as the main driving force of thin earners’ decisions was utility-maximization.

**Fear of assimilation:**

In addition to all the aforementioned utility-maximization related reasons, a number of ideology-driven reasons are expressed by Turkish and German academics and NGO
representatives to be restraining Turkish and German citizens from Europeanising their WFLR habits. As mentioned in Chapter 6, a number of politicians and NGO representatives from the antagonist camps of both Turkey and Germany perceive Europeanising the national WFLR model as a potential source of assimilation. To this end, in order to raise a generation moulded with the Turkish and German norms, values, customs and traditions, they refused to Europeanise the Turkish and German models.

In a similar vein, interviewees suggested that a significant number of families in both countries hesitate to send their children to day-care places and prefer to look after the children by themselves at least until the third birthday of the child. It is also argued by German and Turkish academics and the NGO representatives that this hesitancy stems from a belief that children would not be able to learn and process Turkish and German norms, values, customs and traditions in a crowded place like a day-care centre as well as they would learn at home from their mothers:

There is also the trust issue. Some parents do not believe in the quality of the day-care places, they do not believe in the sufficiency of the child-minders, the teachers working in day-care places. They say it is not the day-care place that would be able to teach my kid the German traditions. You know, Germans prioritise these kinds of issues. Like German history, the German traditions, these things are important for German people and they obviously want their children to learn them as well. Therefore, mothers take up this role and stays at home with their kids a couple of years after the birth and teach the German norms to their children (GA1).

It is important to note that Turkish academics and NGO representatives cited this fear of assimilation more than the German academics and NGO representatives. This could be because of religious-related concerns. As has been mentioned several times in this thesis, Turkey is a very fragmented country in terms of the daily practice of Islam. It houses a number of highly pious people sustaining their lives on Islam and its teachings, together with a number of highly secularised people deliberately avoiding the Islamic teachings and practices. Although the tension between these two opposing
groups is quite high and they have almost nothing in common, not sending their children to a day-care place for religion-related reasons appears to be one of the few areas where these two antagonist groups could find a common ground.

According to rights-based women’s organisations from the Turkish catalyst camp, a number of secular families, who would be expected to Europeanise their daily WFLR habits, hesitate to register their children in day-care places and prefer to maintain the national WFLR model by caring for their children at home. That is because these secular families do not trust the day-care places’ curricula. As mentioned in Chapter 7, since 2010, Turkey has rapidly moving away from its Westernisation project towards an Islamic way of life, which has been reflected in the national school curricula as well. Although the religious culture and moral knowledge course became a mandatory course in Kindergartens and primary schools only in 2017 (Artigercek, 2017), women’s organisation representatives interviewed under the scope of this study mention that some Kindergartens had already been teaching Islam for the last five to seven years. Secular parents, who perceive this as ‘brainwashing’ (TNGO6; TNGO12; TNGO14) and do not want their children to learn Islam at that age, therefore, maintain the national familialised model. Accordingly, the mother quits her job and stays at home with the child while the father continues his career, unless they are coming from the upper middle and upper classes, who are able to seek private solutions such as a child-minder or private crèches.

On the other hand, a number of faith-based women’s organisation representatives mentioned how worried the religious parents – who were believing in natality (fitrat) and sustaining their lives according to its teachings, which assign domestic work, especially childcare, to women – were about sending their children to day-care places. For them, caring for the family, and particularly for children, is a very important duty assigned to women by God (Tongar, 2015). They dedicate themselves to raising their children and thus relaying the Islamic knowledge to them. Therefore, in
order to fulfil their motherhood duties, they continue to practise national work and family life reconciliation habits. Even the increasing religious motives within the Kindergarten curricula are not sufficient to convince them to Europeanise their WFLR practices by enrolling their children into a day-care place:

Well, parents are worried about what their children are learning in Kindergartens. You know, we have the cultural codes, we have the religious codes, and you can never be sure whether those codes are taught in Kindergartens or not. Well, now there are cameras and everything, you can of course check but I mean instead of dealing with all those, mothers just take a couple of years off from work and take care of their children. Because you know we have to teach our kids to start a meal with Besmele41, we have to teach our kids not to leave food in the plate and the Islamic circle thinks these things should be taught at home at the children’s early ages…” (TNGO1).

This protectionist positions of both Turkish and German parents, as well as Turkish religious parents’ efforts to fulfil the motherhood duties assigned them by Islam, paves the way for maintenance of national WFLR practices. This behaviour, which in the end cripples the societal Europeanisation processes of both countries, strongly chimes with SI on the grounds that domestic societal actors do not consider the EU practices the ‘right things to do’, hence they continue the national ones.

**Social pressure:**

Socially constructed guilt feeling is another significant factor preventing German and Turkish parents from Europeanising their WFLR practices. While both Turkish and German mothers prefer to maintain the domestic WFLR practices due to social stigmatisation of employed mothers, fathers’ concerns stemmed from patriarchy- and masculinity-related stigmatisation.

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41 A Turkish prayer, usually prayed before the meals.
a) Social pressure on mothers:

According to a number of German and Turkish interviewees, the legacy of Nazi propaganda addressing women in Germany and the resurrection of patriarchal doctrines under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) government in Turkey have successfully created a tense polarisation between employed mothers and housewife mothers, wherein the former group have been stigmatised and felt excluded.

While coming to power, Adolf Hitler had one big goal in mind: to realise the Blood and Soil (Blut und Boden) ideology (Grebe, 2009; Roberts, 2016). In Nazi Germany (1933-1945), in the light of the Blut und Boden ideology, Hitler and his political NSDAP emphasised the idea of creating the ‘high and noble Aryan race’ that would live in territories historically belonging to Germany (Blamires and Jackson, 2006). And it was the motherhood role attributed to women that headlined the achievement of this goal. Hitler and some other senior ministers from the Nazi government believed that it is the family that provides the nations’ strength and continuation and it is the woman who is the cornerstone of family. For them, women had three missions: be beautiful; bring beautiful children into the world and raise those children. Accordingly, throughout the history of the Nazi Germany, motherhood was highly romanticised and glorified (Haste, 2001). From the women’s perspective, Cate Haste (2001) argues that the majority of them were highly pleased about being house-bound so that Hitler’s party got half of its votes from women. Yet, a small group of women, displeased about being discharged from the public sphere, also existed. As expected, this minor group were not welcomed by the society and considered as rabenmutter. Although modern Germany has always been ashamed of the Nazi-era and paid particular attention to making a radical break with this severe period, this concept of rabenmutter somehow survives today.
A number of NGO representatives interviewed under the scope of this thesis argue that the *rabenmutter* concept has successfully discouraged domestic societal actors from Europeanising their WFLR routines. It is argued that a significant number of German women maintain the national WFLR trends, or at least limit themselves in terms of Europeanising their practices, in order not to be stigmatised as *rabenmutter* by their peers:

Mothers always compare themselves with others. It is always about the norms especially here in Germany, wherein the historical norms are still exist. You know the concept *rabenmutter*, right? It is still a frequently used concept. So, women always try very hard to avoid the social critique. They care for their children by themselves to avoid the social pressure. If they do not have other option, if they really need to send their children to a kindergarten, then they try not to be the last one to pick the child up because that is another reason for criticism. Or even if they want to and even if they have the legal right to return to their jobs one and a half months after the birth, they try to prolong the maternity leave. So, what we found from our research is the social pressure is highly strong both among mothers and fathers (GNGO10).

From an actor-centred perspective, this self-limitation strongly resonates with Historical Institutionalism (HI) as a concept from the 1930s has come to influence domestic societal actors’ decisions. In addition to HI, it is also plausible to link this behaviour of thin learners to RCI as mothers perceive the costs of social exclusion as greater than the gains of Europeanising their WFLR habits and thus prefer not to, even if they personally want to.

In a similar vein, Turkish academics and NGO representatives argue that the growing dominance of the Islamic practices and discourse over secular practices and discourse in Turkey has influenced Turkish thin learners’ decisions. As mentioned several times in this thesis, the longer the AKP holds the monopolistic power, the more overt its Islamic aspects become (Findley, 2010; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). To this end, since 2008, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a number of governing party politicians have openly showed that they support women’s motherhood roles through the ‘three children’ and ‘holy motherhood’ slogans (Korkut and Eslen-
With the use of these most repeated two slogans, the governing party politicians prioritised women’s mothering duties and encouraged women to have children. In other words, rather than changing the laws and policies, through a socially constructed narrative, the governing party aims at pushing women back into the familial sphere. In return, a number of Turkish women suffer pangs of conscience just because they registered their children into day-care places, and even unregister them:

They are playing to people’s conscience. All those statements, three children, three children. They are all planed. And I assure you, the plan is again as always working. I know so many women are withdrawing their kids from Kindergarten just because they feel the guilt. At the end, this was what the AKP was aiming for and once again they are getting what they wanted to (TA1).

Discursive governance argument states that political language, especially the slogans and strategic metaphors within the language, is one of the most influential instruments in imposing a certain ideology on public (Korkut et al., 2015; Korkut and Eslen-Ziya, 2016). In line with this argument, the top-down constructed guilt feeling successfully influenced Turkish women’s decisions and slowed the societal Europeanisation process down. Referring back to the three forms of NI, the ways in which Turkish women receive the politicians’ messages and allow them to shape their decisions strongly resonates with SI. Since domestic societal-actors have not come to consider the EU model work and family life reconciliation as the ‘right thing to do’, they have felt guilty and continued practising the domestic model rather than Europeanising their habits.

b) Social pressure on fathers:

In addition to social pressure on Turkish and German mothers, Turkish and German fathers have also been mentioned by the interviewees to be subject to at least an equal level of peer-pressure at the workplace, resulting in non-Europeanised WFLR trends. As detailed in Chapter 7, neither the German nor the Turkish labour market exemplifies a
working climate wherein the EU WFLR practices could be practised, especially for fathers on the grounds of masculinity and patriarchy, respectively.

Although German fathers have the legal right to ask for at least for two months of parental leave, they do not feel confident in negotiating this within the highly male-dominated working culture of Germany. According to a notable professor, German fathers, especially the ones working in the manufacturing sector, remain very timid in asking time-off from their bosses for care-related reasons because they are worried about being subject to mobbing by their colleagues. Although Germany is moving forward in terms of breaking the taboos with respect to traditional male and traditional female roles, it is still the rare case where a father takes a long leave. In order to avoid any kind of sexist jokes or mobbing, German fathers prefer not to take up the parental leave lawfully given to them:

It is very much about the workplace culture because it is very new to big industrial companies that fathers have the legal right to parental leave. I mean fathers would like to take some time off to care for their children. I mean, it is still quite a new norm so the companies are not really ready to this mind-set change. I mean the minds of the companies have not changed yet. So, bosses would not appreciate it. Also, the colleagues, who have not digested this new norm yet either, will start making jokes you know those male jokes, which are quite famous in Germany. So, the father, who genuinely wants to take the leave, also ends up not taking the leave, because the climate is not ready (GA3).

In a similar vein, according to Turkish academics and women’s organisation representatives, Turkish fathers, who have only a ten day long official parental leave do not feel comfortable in asking any more days off from work. The highly religious Turkish labour market, dominated by the Anatolian Tigers, operates on the basis of Islamic teachings, which assigns a career role to women and a breadwinner role to men. The majority, who have never experienced any other alternative, would not even think about asking for additional parental leave, whereas a small group who appear to be more sensitive to parenting cannot find the courage to bring the issue to the table, on the
grounds of dignity. Therefore, the pious Turkish labour market as well has constrained Turkish families from sharing the domestic work and paid work equally:

Actually, the number of participants of our ‘father support program’ has always been above our expectations. Fathers regardless of their socio-economic and socio-cultural backgrounds, seemed interested in taking part in their children’s lives. But what they were saying was they cannot go and ask their bosses for some time off from work for childcare. They say, nobody would understand them and they would lose all their esteem, which they did not seem keen (TNGO14).

As can be seen, in both countries there has been a change at micro-levels. A number of mothers and fathers have mentioned preferring the EU WFLR practices over the national practices. However, the lack of mind-set change in the broader context causes a number of Turkish and German fathers to maintain the national practices in order to preserve their statuses within their workplaces. From the actor-centred perspective, this strongly implies RCI, as the decision is solely made on the utility-maximization calculus despite the shared norms and values. In other words, even the domestic societal-actors have come to consider the EU WFLR trends as ‘the right things to do’, they have not practised them in their daily lives. That arises from the current Turkish and German labour market structures. Turkish and German fathers perceive the losses of practising the EU model within the religious Turkish and male dominated German labour markets as greater than the gains.

**Womanhood:**

Finally, women’s status needs emerge as an important but not overlapping theme. German interviewees argue that in Germany a significant number of women, who have accepted and internalised the motherhood identity which the male dominated society ascribed to them (Roberts, 1995), remain loyal to the national WFLR trends on the grounds of status determination. A voluminous body of research has already proved the close link between fertility, motherhood and womanhood (Mason, 1984; Özbay, 1993; Whyte, 1978). It is argued that in conservative societies, wherein the male stream norms
and patriarchal values are quite visible (Ökten, 2009; Özbay, 1993), or in societies where the fertility rates are low (Krapf, 2014; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka, 2017), giving birth in general, but giving birth to a boy in particular, contributes to women’s status. Given the fact that Germany features both aforementioned conditions, German women want to preserve their motherhood identities.

According to a number of German academics, German women refuse to share the unpaid domestic work with their partners in order to maintain their powerful position within the familial sphere. In other words, since women are the full-time carers, they also are the full-time decision-makers in issues regarding children and household. Since they are enjoying this situation, they do not want to Europeanise their WFLR practices; they believe that fathers’ involvement in domestic work would go in tandem with their involvement in decision-making. Therefore, in order not to share the power of decision-making with respect to familial issues, they maintained the national model:

It is something like womanhood or motherhood or kind of privilege or honour for them. Because of course, it is also about power and gender relations. Like they believe if I go to work very early after my birth, of course I would gain some power by going to work and earning money but also I would lose some power in the family this time. Because then the father would have more sayings on children like which school we should send them, or what clothes they would wear and so on. So, I think both sexes are recently changing but not much because it is not necessarily something they like (GA3).

From the NI perspective, German women not Europeanising their WFLR practices in order to maintain their dominant position within the familial sphere strongly chimes with RCI. Since Germany has not been fully Europeanised in this specific policy area yet and is still in a transition period, the domestic cultural codes are still highly prevalent. To this end, the combination of low fertility rates and the high patriarchal motives intrinsic to Germany has increased the value of motherhood. Under these domestic circumstances, according to German academics and NGO representatives, German women have found serving their motherhood duties more gainful then being active in
the labour market, which in the end discourages them from Europeanising their WFLR routines.

8.3. Conclusion:
This last analysis chapter endeavoured to illustrate the implementation of the German and Turkish WFLR laws introduced under the EU influence. In other words, it sought to explore why and to what extent Turkish and German citizens have come to practise the EU WFLR.

Observations made in this chapter revealed that, in both countries, a number of families who have started to Europeanise their WFLR habits coexist with another number of families who have been perpetuating the domestic habits for various practical and ideological reasons. As discussed throughout this chapter and summarised in Figure 8.1 above, the reasons behind both thick and thin learners’ decisions were related to domestic country specific dynamics. It was found that even the changes in thick learners’ daily WFLR routines were not a direct outcome of Europeanisation process itself. But still, it would be quite plausible to argue that a socialisation process has occurred in both countries, even though it was en passant and triggered by the country specific economic and cultural dynamics. Theories that explain the societal Europeanisation might consider involving a dimension which explains incidentally Europeanised member and candidate states as well.

The findings of this chapter further contend that, similarly to the reasons behind domestic actors’ strategies that are mentioned in Chapter 7, it is again the RCI that dominates domestic societal actors’ daily practices in terms of WFLR, which can also be seen from Figure 8.2 below. In other words, domestic societal actors’ decisions on how to reconcile their work and family lives are influenced predominantly by their rational cost-benefit calculations. When making their decisions on how to reconcile their
work and family lives, both German and Turkish societal actors have put their economic concerns and their children’s future in front of their norms and values and tried to take the maximum advantage of the existing conditions.

**Figure 8.2:** Summary of reasons behind domestic societal actors’ WFLR practices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rational-Choice Institutionalism</th>
<th>Historical Institutionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic necessity</td>
<td>Women’s career aspirations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familialized incentives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender pay gap</td>
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<tr>
<td>women’s status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children’s self-development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service related reasons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social pressure</td>
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<tr>
<td>New fatherhood trends</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of assimilation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sociological Institutionalism

This finding suggests that, under today’s economic difficulties, wherein people have been subject to bad straits, societal Europeanisation goes beyond domestic actors’ mere views on the idea of ‘Europeanising their WFLR habits’ and involves the practicality issue too.

All in all, the findings of this chapter suggest that due to different reasons, resonating all three forms of NI theory but mostly the RCI, a salient number of thick learners with their relatively more Europeanised WFLR practices have contributed to the Europeanisation process of their countries at the societal level, whereas another salient number of thin learners have successfully decelerated the process through their national WFLR habits. This simultaneous presence of two opposing WFLR trends only contributes to the contradictoriness of the overall Europeanisation process in both Germany and Turkey.
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION:

This research explored the Europeanisation patterns of German and Turkish WFLR policies. In so doing, the four empirical chapters of this thesis have illustrated the Europeanisation pattern of each country at policy, discursive, political and societal levels. The thesis has discussed how Turkey’s and Germany’s Europeanisation processes have been influenced by the German and Turkish actors. This final chapter draws together the main theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis and discusses their implication for theory, policy process and research. The chapter, therefore, is organised into four sections. It begins by restating the research objectives and the theoretical tools applied in the achievement of those objectives. The second section maps the main findings into the main research questions. The third section focuses on the implications of the research in terms of both theory and policy process. It aims at elaborating how New Institutionalism (NI) was combined with Europeanisation, and how it contributed explaining the Europeanisation pattern of Turkey and Germany. Finally, the thesis concludes by showing the future directions for further research.

9.1. Restating the research objectives and research tools:

With the EU requiring a stronger convergence from its member and candidate states in the policy area of WFLR, the member and candidate states have found themselves in a process of change. This Europeanisation process asked Turkey and Germany to adapt a set of EU-induced WFLR policies into their national legislation. Alongside the policy adaptation, Turkey and Germany were also required to implement those policies. However, as has been reiterated throughout this thesis, Europeanisation is an interactive process and filtered by the existence of domestic actors. Theoretically speaking, this high level of adaptational pressure coming from the EU did not necessarily bring a convergence either to Turkey or to Germany. In other words, neither Turkey nor
Germany have fully been Europeanised. The attitudes of Turkish and German actors relevant to WFLR policy process towards Europeanising the Turkish and German models, as well as their contributions to the process, have had a significant impact on the potential policy change, whereas the daily WFLR habits of Turkish and German citizens who have a work and a family life to be reconciled have influenced the implementation of the corresponding policies.

The purpose of this thesis has been to trace the Europeanisation processes of Turkey and Germany within this specific policy field, with a particular focus on the intervening domestic actors as any legislative piece is argued to be a conscious preference of a certain ideology (Tsebelis, 2002). For a complete and careful illustration of such an uneven and actor-centred issue, this thesis drew on two crucial aspects: (a) Europeanisation and (b) NI and in so doing developed its own theoretical framework. The term Europeanisation has been applied when explaining the EU influence on German and Turkish reconciliation models, whereas NI theory has been applied when explaining Turkey’s and Germany’s responses to and within the process of Europeanising the domestic models.

As also detailed in Chapter 2, throughout this thesis Europeanisation has been accepted as a two-way process, which includes both the bottom-up and top-down dimensions. That is to say that first the member states go through a process of endeavouring to shape the EU WFLR policy package in line with their own policy preferences. The main rationale behind this endeavour is to minimise the potential future misfit and hence, the adaptation costs. This phase of the process is the bottom-up dimension and refers to a negotiation process between MEPs and EU. In this study, this was valid only for Germany as Turkey is a candidate state. In that sense, this thesis has analysed how and to what extent German MEPs have influenced the EU WFLR policies.
Moreover, it was further argued that, once the decision is made at the EU level, the EU starts asking its member and also candidate states in this instance to transfer the corresponding policies into their domestic legislative frameworks. This is the second phase of the Europeanisation process – the top-down dimension – which applies both to Turkey and Germany.

While exploring the transmission of EU WFLR policies into German and Turkish contexts, this thesis first focused on the legislative changes. The Policy Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 5), sought to understand whether and to what extent Germany and Turkey have come to converge their domestic legislation with the EU. Given that the EU did not require only the policy adaptation but also the policy paradigm, the analysis relied on Esping-Andersen’s three welfare pillar conceptualisation and the familialisation/de-familialisation distinction. In other words, the policies made under the EU influence have been examined on the basis of whether and to what extent they support women’s labour market participation through reducing their domestic responsibilities. Since this thesis holds an actor-centred perspective, the theoretical framework developed in the scope of this thesis has centred on the illustration of domestic actors. The Discursive Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 6), categorised the corresponding domestic actors as catalysts and antagonists and revealed the ways in which they have perceived Europeanising the domestic model. As each domestic actor would behave in line with the ways in which Europeanisation is perceived, the Political Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 7) explored domestic actors’ contributions to the process both while catalysing and vetoing the process. Finally, this thesis accepted implementation of the downloaded policies also as part of the Europeanisation process. For this reason, it involved the domestic WFLR trends into the analysis, which is illustrated in the Societal Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 8).
The theoretical framework developed throughout this thesis has approached Europeanisation as a two-fold and interactive process, which includes the endeavours of uploading the national policy preferences to the EU level and downloading the EU WFLR policies to the domestic level, as well as the implementation of the downloaded policies. In doing so, it combined Europeanisation with NI and analysed the Europeanisation patterns of the selected countries from the three forms of NI.

9.2. Main research findings:

By examining the German and Turkish Europeanisation processes from a NI lens, this research has found that, at the time when the EU emphasized de-familialised WFLR policy-making, both countries were still employing the traditional male breadwinner family model. This was reflected in their legislative frameworks in the shape of a highly familialised model. This familialised WFLR model in the end caused a high level of adaptational pressure coming from the EU and a concomitant legislative reform process. A closer examination of the legislative changes pursued between 2000 and 2017 in Turkey and Germany under EU influence indicated an incomplete and a contradictory Europeanisation process.

In response to the adaptational pressure coming from the EU, both countries have put an effort into de-familialising their WFLR policies. Yet, they also continued passing familialised reconciliation laws and kept several familialising policies in place instead of abolishing them, which resulted in a highly puzzling Europeanisation process in each country. In order to solve this puzzle, the main research enquiry was supported by five additional sub-research questions that were already presented in Chapter 1. This section now revisits those questions and maps the key findings onto them.
How, why and to what extent has Germany influenced the EU WFLR policies?

The fact that Germany is a member state provides her the opportunity to influence the content of the EU WFLR policies. This potential raised a two-fold question: to what extent and, more importantly, how and why Germany has uploaded her domestic policy preference regarding WFLR to the EU level. The answer to this two-fold question is also two-fold.

First of all, as Chapter 5 found, the German paradigm towards WFLR policy-making could hardly be seen within the EU model. Both the hard and soft EU laws with respect to WFLR increasingly aimed at encouraging women’s labour market participation through alleviating their disproportionate share of familial responsibilities. In contrast, the German WFLR model has long aimed at enabling women to care for their families through reducing their labour market responsibilities. Therefore, it could be argued that although Germany has succeeded in uploading its own policy preferences to the EU level in a number of other policy areas, she remains inefficient in reflecting her WFLR policy paradigm to the EU. Referring back to the potential bottom-up Europeanisation patterns, this thesis contends that Germany has exhibited ‘fence-sitting’ in this specific policy area.

Secondly, as each legislative decision is actor-driven, Chapter 5 sought to illustrate the reasons behind Germany’s bottom-up Europeanisation pattern from a NI perspective. The most notable bottom-up Europeanisation scholar, Börzel, has already pointed to a number of important factors that affect the success of member states in terms of uploading their own policy-preferences to the EU. Two key factors were member states’ financial contributions to the EU budget and the number of their MEPs. The relevance of these factors in the German context appeared to be well worth reviewing because the reasons behind Germany’s failure in shaping the EU model highly contradicted the literature. The evidence presented in Chapter 5 suggested that instead
of the financial contributions to the EU budget and the number of the MEPs, what mattered more were the political consensus among the political consensus among the MEPs, the European Parliament Groups and the European Parliament Committees to which they belong, as well as their personal views on the idea of an EU level WFLR model. This is what, ultimately, constrained Germany from shaping the EU policy package.

As Germany could not succeed in uploading her policy preferences to the EU level, she could not minimise the adaptational pressure either and thus had gone through a top-down Europeanisation process similar to Turkey. This raised another sub-research question, which addressed the issue from another dimension, with which the chapter proceeds.

**How and to what extent has the EU influenced the domestic WFLR policies in Germany and Turkey?**

The highly familialised WFLR models of both countries have led them to exhibit a high level of misfit with the EU. In line with the goodness of fit argument, they both received a high level of adaptational pressure in this specific policy area. Relying on the combination of the policy analysis and nine in-depth interviews with EU officials, the thesis found that, regardless of Germany being a founding member and Turkey a candidate state, the EU required them both to de-familialise their legislation. In other words, the EU expected both Turkey and Germany to reform their WFLR policies in ways that would ease women’s labour market participation by reducing their disproportionate share of domestic tasks through transferring them to the state or at least to the market.

In response to this pressure, both governments did take some steps. It would be plausible to argue that each country has gone through an intense reform process. Both the German and Turkish governments have introduced a number of laws and bylaws
with respect to parental leaves, childcare provisions and working time arrangements. First and foremost, they have successfully transferred the EU standards on working time arrangements into their national legislative frameworks, and hence have managed to align themselves with the EU. However, the transmission of EU standards appeared problematic when it came to leave schemes and childcare provisions. That is because while passing de-familialised parental leave and childcare laws under the EU influence, they both continued passing familialised ones and kept the already existing ones in force rather than abolishing them. In other words, the overall picture regarding the amendments within the legislations indicated a social policy transformation in both countries that has led to an upgrading and widening in WFLR policies. Yet, it would be unjustified to argue that it was a fully-fledged transformation in terms of both speed and content, which in turn, resulted in an incomplete, contradictory and puzzling Europeanisation process in each country.

Although Germany has downloaded the EU directives on parental and maternal leaves, it was a highly belated transmission. In a like manner, Germany has also remained very slow in meeting the Barcelona targets. This slowness in responding amendments could perhaps be linked to German political elites’ reluctance in terms of de-familialising the German model. On the other hand, the trajectory of Turkey’s Europeanisation process also contains various ebbs and flows. Turkey did not have official deadlines for adopting the EU legislation. For this reason, it is hard to say whether Turkey delayed in downloading the corresponding laws or not. However, it appeared that there has been a significant difference in terms of the pace of the reforms. While the period from the 1999 Helsinki Summit to 2007 saw a greater commitment to fulfilling the requirements, the period from 2007 onwards exhibited a gradual retardation. With respect to the content of the reforms, both countries continued to preserve their misfit with the EU. Chapter 5 has gathered the puzzling notions within
the reforms under three main categories: (a) disincentives for female employment; (b) incentives for the reproduction of women’s motherhood roles and (c) lack of state responsibility in terms of facilitating the implementation of the de-familialised laws.

Relying on Tesebelis (2002), who states that any kind of policy-decision is a conscious preference of a certain ideology, this research further concentrated on the actors responsible for WFLR policy-making at the domestic levels. Accordingly, it questioned their views on the idea of Europeanising the domestic model as well as their contributions to the process and the barriers they have faced while contributing to the process, each of which stands as two additional sub-research questions.

**How have German and Turkish domestic actors responded to the Europeanisation of German and Turkish WFLR policies?**

Being the core analysis of this study, this question involved two dimensions: First, it questioned how German and Turkish domestic actors perceived the relatively greater EU involvement. Second, it sought to reveal the main motivations behind these actors’ perceptions.

By taking its lead from Europeanisation literature, Chapter 6 divided the domestic actors related to WFLR policy-making into two groups: the catalysts, who are in favour of Europeanising the domestic model and tried to accelerate the process and the antagonists, who preferred to support the status quo and aimed to decelerate the process. The findings of the chapter revealed that the left-leaning political parties, progressive women’s organisations and trade unions in both countries have successfully internalised EU WFLR policy-making paradigms and have come to use a similar policy language with the EU. Thus, they have acted as catalysts. Whereas, the right corner of both parliaments together with Islamist women’s organisations in Turkey and radical feminist women’s organisations in Germany remained non-socialised. Rather than adopting the EU paradigm, they have preferred to stay committed to the domestic
paradigm and became part of the antagonist camp. German religious, family and employers’ organisations also preferred to join the antagonist camp.

The Europeanisation and process tracing literature have successfully determined how to identify the domestic actors’ positions throughout the process, yet they remain insufficient in answering the second question raised in Chapter 6. Therefore, while exploring domestic actors’ views on Europeanisation of the domestic WFLR model, NI theory, which emphasises the domestic actors’ motivations, has been applied. From a NI perspective, the chapter found a number of both exogenous and endogenous factors resonating with all three forms of NI that have influenced domestic actors’ decisions on contributing to the process as a catalyst or as an antagonist. EU’s supranational character, generous funding opportunities and the ‘European identity’ idea were found to be the main Europeanisation mechanisms, whereas the subsidiarity principle, disapproval of EU standards, vote-concerns and distrust of the EU encouraged domestic actors to act as antagonists.

Having explained domestic actors’ positions towards and throughout the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model in Chapter 6, the thesis carried on the actor-centred discussion and further questioned their contributions to the process.

**How have domestic actors contributed to the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies?**

This thesis has expected domestic impact of the EU to be filtered by the existence of the domestic actors. In other words, domestic actors (both governmental and nongovernmental) have been expected to shape the process by their contributions to the process. Chapter 7 aimed to reveal how the domestic actors acted throughout the process. More precisely, it explored the strategies and tactics they have employed as well as the barriers they have faced throughout the process. Given that both the strategies and the barriers have been influenced by the actors’ socio-political positions within the country,
as well as the current socio-political and socio-economic conditions intrinsic to the country, the discussion carried out in Chapter 7 was highly context-dependent.

The chapter began by differentiating a strategy from a tactic, which is an important difference as it highlights the impact of current socio-political conditions on the Europeanisation process. Although strategies and tactics work in tandem, this thesis accepted strategy as the overall plans designed by domestic actors in order either to catalyse or veto the process, whereas tactic referred to smaller plans that domestic actors engage with while trying to utilize their strategies. Domestic actors change their tactics when they face a problem in order to maintain their strategy.

Evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggested that both German and Turkish catalysts from the civil society have engaged with two main strategies: lobbying and WFLR service providing, whereas governmental catalysts (more in Turkey but also in Germany) endeavour to form cross-party alliances in order to de-familialise the domestic legislative frameworks in each country. A number of catalyst organisations both in Turkey and Germany have executed a wide range of lobbying activity in order to convince national governments to Europeanise the domestic WFLR models. However, in both countries, the lobbyist organisations have appeared to be facing some difficulties especially when trying to reach the lobbying target directly. This difficulty fund to be linked to the fact that in both countries, the ruling party – the lobbying target – has happened to be an antagonist, who is not in favour of Europeanising the domestic model.

In order to overcome this aforementioned problem, catalyst organisations have developed a number of tactics. These included regular visits and emails to members of the mainstream political parties; using different media tools; attending events with politicians and trying to have unofficial chats during those events and finally, relying on their personal relations. The second strategy of catalyst NGOs both in Turkey and in
Germany was to bypass the government and reach the public directly. Instead of trying to persuade the national governments to adopt a more de-familialised model, a number of both Turkish and German organisations have fully concentrated on raising the public awareness of Europeanised WFLR and providing childcare services. By doing this, they aim at the implementation of the EU standards at domestic levels even in the absence of formal legislation. In either case, the NGOs need collaboration partners in order to share the workload and the cost. To this end, they rationally have tried to form various partnerships ranging from local governments to international organisations. While they have succeeded in collaborating with international organisations and left-leaning local governments, the rightist local governments have hesitated to form those partnerships on the grounds of lack of shared values and norms. Although failure to form the necessary partnerships was the biggest barrier that catalyst organisations faced, other barriers stem both from the existence of the antagonists and the socio-political conditions of the day, slowing the catalysts down. While they eventually managed to overcome the problems originated from the existence of the antagonists, the same cannot be said for the barriers emerged from the conditions of the day.

All in all, while the nongovernmental catalysts in both countries have engaged in a number of grassroots activities; the governmental catalysts have engaged in more political-level activities. These included bringing WFLR issues to the table in Parliamentary meetings and covering the issues in party programs and elections manifests, as well as establishing working groups within the parties, but most importantly, forming cross-party alliances. Despite being part of the political elite, this group of catalysts as well, faced salient difficulties while forming these cross-party alliances. Since the barriers that slowed the governmental catalysts down emerged from the political conditions of the day, unlike nongovernmental catalysts, they could not pass them over.
According to the literature on Europeanisation, the existence of catalysts was supposed to Europeanise the domestic WFLR model. Yet, neither Turkish nor German WFLR models have appeared to be Europeanised, which could be explained through the antagonists’ contributions to the process. Since antagonists in both countries happened to be members of the ruling parties and NGOs affiliated with the ruling party in Turkish case, they did not have to seek as many strategies as the catalysts. Besides, due to the nature of the strategies that they have tapped into, they did not need as many collaboration partners as catalysts needed. In that sense, the governmental antagonists have capitalised on their governmental positions, passed the responsibility to other domestic authorities and tried to gain public consent on familialised WFLR policies through a relatively more liberal language. Due to their relatively more powerful social positions, antagonists faced only two major barriers. While one stemmed from the socio-political conditions, the other stemmed from heterogeneity within the group. Given the catalysts in both countries were the opposition, their efforts could not prevent antagonists from translating their ideas into policy; it could only slow them down. Therefore, antagonists’ ideology has dominated the content of both Turkish and German WFLR policies.

**Why and to what extent the EU WFLR policies have been implemented in Germany and Turkey?**

Since the EU has expected the implementation of these policies from both Turkey and Germany, the last of four empirical chapters (Chapter 8) concentrated on the daily WFLR trends. It sought to reveal whether, why and to what extent Turkish and German people have come to reconcile their work and family lives on the basis of de-familialised arrangements. The data was obtained from Turkish and German academics as well as women’s organisation representatives.
The findings of Chapter 8 suggested a number of families, exhibiting relatively more Europeanised reconciliation habits and another number of families, maintaining the national reconciliation habits have co-existed in both countries. Instead of categorising the domestic actors as catalysts and antagonists, Chapter 8 categorised them as thick learners and thin learners. That is because the daily WFLR practices of these individuals are an outcome of, rather than a contribution to, the process.

According to the literature on societal Europeanisation, domestic societal actors would have Europeanised their daily habits if they had come to consider the EU practices as the right things to do. Both German and Turkish experiences in terms of societal Europeanisation are interesting because neither thick learners’ nor thin learners’ practices were directly related to the Europeanisation process itself. Resonating mostly with rational choice institutionalism (RCI), economic necessity, children’s self-development, women’s career aspirations and the changing fatherhood trends have been found to be the main mechanisms for relatively more Europeanised WFLR arrangements, whereas generous familialised incentives, service related reasons, fear of assimilation together with the social pressure, gender pay gap and women’s status needs, which resonate both with RCI and sociological institutionalism (SI), have encouraged Turkish and German citizens to maintain the domestic model. Relying on the findings of Chapter 8, this thesis suggested that rational utility-maximisation calculus played an important role in domestic actors’ decisions on how to reconcile their work and family lives. Rather than prioritising the social norms and values of the past, they sought their best interest.

In summary, the analysis carried out in four empirical chapters suggested that among the five potential hard Europeanisation patterns, identified by Börzel and Risse (2003) and Radaelli (2003), Germany has exhibited ‘absorption’, whereas Turkey’s Europeanisation pattern within the WFLR policies has resonated with ‘accommodation’.
While both patterns highlight the lack of policy-paradigm change, the level of change in absorption is higher than the level of change in accommodation. In other words, Germany has transferred more of EU’s policies compared to Turkey. Neither Germany nor Turkey, however, have come to be Europeanised in this specific policy area, which strongly contradicts the ‘governance by hierarchy’ argument, as it suggests Europeanising hard WFLR policies will have an impact on the domestic policy-making paradigm. Relying on this lack in terms of policy paradigm change, this research also suggested that neither Germany nor Turkey has socialised throughout the process of Europeanising their WFLR models. Therefore, they both exhibited a thin learning among the two potential soft Europeanisation patterns. This thin learning, at the end, highly contradicts the ‘facilitated co-ordination’ argument, as it expects soft-Europeanisation of WFLR policies to create policy learning at domestic levels. Thus, on the contrary to Europeanisation literature, but in line with the main expectation of this thesis, the findings indicated that Europeanisation processes in these two countries have been filtered by the existence of domestic actors. Due to a number of reasons resonating with all three forms of NI, both the catalysts and antagonists have successfully contributed to the process. Most strikingly, the analysis of these actors’ contributions to the process, together with the barriers they have faced throughout the process, indicated that due to their relatively more powerful positions, antagonists have translated their views into policy outcomes more effectively than the catalysts. All in all, the relevance of Europeanisation to Turkish and German WFLR policies has proved to be very interesting as they both resonate and contradict with the literature and provide fruitful ground for pushing the boundaries of gender, Europeanisation and NI discussions.
9.3. Implications:

The empirical findings of this research have implications both for theory and policy. With respect to theoretical implications, the thesis has provided insights into Europeanisation theory and its application to WFLR policies in the Turkish and German cases. However, due to the main focus of the thesis and the ways in which the research questions were formulated, it does not claim to make contributions to NI theory. As already discussed in chapter 2 (see page:34), this thesis approached Europeanisation through an NI lens, in order to explain the reasons behind domestic actors’ decisions wherein the Europeanisation literature itself remains inadequate. With respect to policy implications, it reflects on the repercussions of the EU-induced supranational policies at domestic levels and their lived consequences. In addition, the research has also explored the interaction between different domestic actors related to WFLR policy as well as their strategies for effecting the policy outcome. Finally, as the WFLR policies, by their very nature, cannot be examined in isolation from gender discussions, this thesis also adds another layer to WFLR literature by analysing their Europeanisation processes with a gender lens.

9.3.1. Theory:

The theoretical implications of this thesis fall into two major areas. The first refers to the theories on bottom-up Europeanisation by examining the causal factors that account for the member states’ capacities to influence the EU WFLR policies. The second area of consideration relates to the scholarship on top-down Europeanisation by speaking to the complexity of the process of transferring EU WFLR model into their legislative frameworks, from an actor-centred perspective. In addressing these two issues, this thesis combined literature on social policy with European studies.
With respect to bottom-up Europeanisation discussions, this research offered insights into the domestic factors that led to one of the most powerful member state’s failure to shape the WFLR model at the EU level. Adding new factors, both agentic and structural, emergent in the German experience is very important because it might broaden the explanation of member states’ contributions to the European social model. It is argued in the literature that the financial contribution of member states to the EU budget; the number of their MEPs; their membership duration; and their relations with other member states matter greatly in terms of uploading the national policy preference to the EU (Börzel, 2002). This argument might still stand in other cases or in other policy areas. However, it has clearly been falsified in the German experience in this specific policy area. Instead, the German experience pointed to the policy consensus among the MEPs, the European Parliament Groups and Committees to which these MEPs belong and MEPs’ own views towards a supranational WFLR model as key factors in bottom-up Europeanisation process. These new factors identified in the Germany’s bottom-up Europeanisation process can also be applied to other cases, as well as other policy areas. Thus, this research expands the range of causal factors that impact member states’ bottom-up Europeanisation processes.

Moreover, the findings of the interview data have emphasised the importance of social norms and values in the bottom-up Europeanisation process. Although acting rational and trying to upload the German interest to the EU level would eventually minimise the misfit and the concomitant adaptational cost, the German MEPs refused to leave their social norms and values aside. Therefore, apart from widening the range of causal factors significant for policy uploading process, this research also sheds light onto the MEP’s political debates around bottom-up Europeanisation of the German WFLR model by bringing NI theory into the discussion.
While literature on top-down Europeanisation demonstrates the Europeanisation patterns of member states in the specific policy area, it excludes the candidate states even though candidate states are also expected to Europeanise their WFLR models. Therefore, this research investigated how the operation of Europeanisation differed between a candidate state and a member state. While comparing the top-down Europeanisation processes of Turkey and Germany in a policy field where the initial misfit with the EU was high, this research has not found any significant difference in terms of the ways in which Europeanisation operates. This claim might be further tested by comparing another official candidate state (for example, Serbia) with a member state which has a familialised WFLR model (such as Greece or Spain). The potential verification of the findings is likely to add another layer to Europeanisation discussions.

Furthermore, the previous research on top-down Europeanisation approached Europeanisation as an outcome rather than a process. This in the end had two serious consequences. First, a gap emerged within the literature in terms of how the policy transmission happens. In other words, since the existing top-down Europeanisation literature did not accept Europeanisation as a mutual process, it explains only the Europeanisation pattern and the causes, but not the mechanisms accounting for that particular pattern. By accepting top-down Europeanisation as a mutual process, this research not only explores the Europeanisation pattern of German and Turkish WFLR models, but also traces the mechanisms that led Turkey to exhibit accommodation and Germany absorption. Cross-case findings suggest that in Europeanising the domestic model, the views of the domestic actors as well as their capacity of action, which stems from their positions within the societies, play a significant role. NI theory, or more precisely the three forms of NI theory, suggests a way to understand both the reasons behind political actors’ views on and their contributions to the process, each of which stand as a potential Europeanisation mechanism. In both the Turkish and German
experiences, the ways in which domestic actors perceive Europeanisation mostly stem from their social norms and values, and thus resonate with SI, whereas when it came to taking action, domestic actors brought the rational calculations forward. These findings might be highly policy area-specific and context-dependent. But the theoretical framework developed by exploring the actors’ perceptions to and actions throughout the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR models from the new institutionalist perspective can be applied to other contexts and can point to new mechanisms of Europeanisation.

The second gap in the existing top-down Europeanisation literature again stems from the ways in which Europeanisation was interpreted, and relates to implementation of the policies made under the EU influence. The research addressed this gap by exploring the daily WFLR practices of Turkish and Germany citizens, again through the lens of NI. In other words, this research also questioned how the EU WFLR model has come to be socialised by German and Turkish societal actors. The evidence presented suggests that it is the rational utility-maximisation calculus that shapes the domestic decisions on how to reconcile work and family lives. Europeanisation has not been observed to play any role in those decisions. Relying on this finding, this research proposes to add another policy learning outcome to thick and thin learning already identified within the literature, which would delineate situations where Europeanisation happens circuitously.

9.3.2. Policy process:

This research sheds light on the complexity of the policy-making process under the EU influence by explaining the politics of the Turkish and German WFLR policies through NI. Additionally, by involving societal Europeanisation into the discussion, it also speaks to policy implementation. This thesis further contributes to discussions on policy learning by illustrating the exchange of ideas between domestic actors both nationally
and internationally. Last but not least, by exploring the Europeanisation process in each country on the basis of familialisation/de-familialisation categorisation, this thesis also broadens the gender equality discussions regarding WFLR policy. However, due to the theoretical framework developed and the ways in which the research questions were formulated, this thesis does not provide any specific policy recommendations.

By illustrating the EU’s requirements of Turkey and Germany in terms of WFLR policies, together with the policy reforms made in Turkey and Germany, this research posits the Europeanisation patterns of Germany and Turkey. The analysis of the policies made under the EU influence demonstrates an incomplete and contradictory Europeanisation process in each country. Building on the premise that each policy outcome is a conscious preference of a certain ideology, this research puts an exceptional effort into understanding the views of the domestic actors related to policy-making on Europeanisation of WFLR policies.

Although opposing views towards Europeanisation simultaneously existed in each country, this research found that certain ideologies dominated the policy content. For example, progressive women’s organisations, who support a more Europeanised WFLR model, co-exist with Christian democratic and Muslim democratic politicians, who support the subsidiarity principle in policy-making. Therefore, the dissertation traces the process of translating the ideas into policy outcomes. In other words, this research analyses domestic actors’ strategies in shaping the policy content. While some strategies appear to be country specific due to socio-political conditions of the day and the context, some appeared to be general. Nevertheless, the findings of this research suggested that regardless of the context and regardless of the aim (either accelerating or decelerating the process), the strategies utilised and the barriers faced by the governmental actors and nongovernmental actors are highly different from one another and the nongovernmental actors mostly need the governmental actors’ collaborations.
Relying on this finding, nongovernmental actors aiming to shape the policy content, not just in this specific policy field but in general, may redesign their strategies by putting more effort into finding ways to network with governmental actors. Findings from the Turkish and German experiences have identified a number of ways to do so. For example, lobbying activity through Eid visits pursued by Turkish women’s organisations might set an example to NGOs in other Muslim countries. Or the failure of German opposition parties to form cross-party alliances, whilst the political consensus among Turkish opposition parties has succeeded in passing de-familialised laws, might highlight the importance of strategic partnerships.

Furthermore, another implication that the actors related to WFLR policy-making may consider is the significance of international idea exchange. As experienced both in the Turkish and the German cases, apart from transferring EU WFLR policies, attending international conferences and getting to know better examples had significant impact at domestic level in terms advancing the domestic legislation. Therefore, both governmental and nongovernmental actors may participate in these kinds of events more frequently and may learn the models applied in other countries. Although international idea exchange has appeared to be a useful tool for policy learning in Germany and Turkey, its validity might further be tested in other cases. The potential justification of this finding can point to new mechanisms that would lead to policy learning and would combine the actor-centred policy analysis with the policy learning scholarship.

Policy that induces change is also expected to alter the daily practices of citizens. In other words, a relatively more Europeanised WFLR model is expected to Europeanise the WFLR routines of people. However, especially the German, but also the Turkish, experiences have challenged this assumption. As the evidence presented in Chapter 8 demonstrates, a number of families maintain the traditional domestic trends. When questioning the causes of this non-Europeanised WFLR arrangements, a number of
service related reasons appeared, especially in the German case, where although the law gives a statutory kindergarten enrolment right to every single child older than one year old, a number of mothers continue to care for their children by themselves. The insufficient number of kindergartens and the incompatible working hours of the kindergartens, for example, appeared to be the main reasons behind this non-Europeanised habit. The insufficiency of domestic infrastructure with respect to childcare impairs the implementation of the EU induced policies. Similarly, a number of parents who identify themselves as secular in the Turkish case also hesitate to send their children to a day-care place just because they do not trust the national curricula. These problems stemming from the country-specific dynamics raise the question: is the EU’s one size fits all approach the right approach to WFLR policy? Therefore, domestic actors engaged with WFLR policy-making and WFLR service providing might take this finding into account. To this end, this thesis suggests first that up-to-date cross-country research explore the demands and needs of parents with child responsibilities.

The findings of this thesis also reiterate the complex and tangled nature of WFLR policies in terms of gender equality and labour market participation. There has already been a lack of consensus on what the WFLR policy should stand for among the feminist scholars. While for some feminist scholars, the WFLR policies should serve women’s economic independence (Mazur, 2002), for some others they should provide women the right to choose between work and care (Hakim, 2000). By exploring not only the Europeanisation of policy outcome but also the policy paradigm with respect to WFLR, this thesis realises that the meaning attributed to, and the expectations of, WFLR policy highly differ from one domestic actor to another. The analysis of EU WFLR policies on the basis of familialisation/de-familialisation categorisation indicates that the main aim of the EU, when WFLR policy-making, is to provide women’s labour market participation. To this end, both the Turkish and German catalysts (partially due to their
own socio-political ideologies and partially due to their support for the Europeanisation process) also favoured WFLR policy-making for women’s labour market participation, whereas the antagonists from both countries (partially due to their relatively more conservative stance and partially due to their anti-Europeanisation position) preferred WFLR policy-making for women’s motherhood roles. This actor-centred analysis of WFLR policy paradigm derives from the German and Turkish cases, yet might be generalised to other cases as well. This finding would contribute to feminist discussions on WFLR policies by providing insights into the domestic actors’ approaches towards WFLR policy-making.

9.4. Further research:
This study has explored the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model in two countries that are at very different levels in terms of social policy development from an actor-centred perspective. Relying on the evidence presented in four empirical chapters, this thesis indicates that the context and the policy area are crucial in explaining not only the Europeanisation process but also the pattern. In this regard, the findings of this research open up a number of areas, both empirical and theoretical, for future research.

First and foremost, future research can apply the theoretical framework developed in this thesis to other contexts or other policy areas, where the EU has the competence. Analysing the Europeanisation process of a country from four different levels offers a holistic explanation of the policy-making and policy implementation process. Relevance of this theoretical framework to other policy areas such as immigration policy, one of the most salient issues in recent politics, will bring valuable insights to European studies. Even though there is a growing body of research on how immigration policies have been changing within the last decade (Faist and Ette, 2007; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2013; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004), the politics of the
immigration policies have been well less researched. To this end, further research can enrich the literature through the actor-centred theoretical framework developed under the scope of this research, which includes both the bottom-up and top-down dimensions of Europeanisation. Moreover, the findings of this research have indicated that both Germany and Turkey have been prolapsing towards a de-Europeaisation path from a Europeaisation path. The future research might analyse the de-Europeaisation mechanisms with the actor-centred theoretical framework of this thesis.

Second, the data with respect to daily WFLR practices were obtained from the academics and from women’s organisation representatives. Hence, it reflected their interpretations of German and Turkish citizens’ daily habits. The future research can collect data from people who actually have a work and a family life that needs to be reconciled. This might identify new factors causing or limiting societal Europeaisation, not only for Turkey and Germany, but for any member and candidate state. By doing so, future research would extend the literature on societal Europeaisation, which actually is the least researched dimension of Europeaisation.

Finally, there has been a voluminous body of research on the impact of the EU on empowerment of the NGOs especially in candidate states; as well-functioning civil society is part of the Copenhagen criteria (Kohler-Koch and Finke, 2007; İçduygu, 2011; Ketola, 2013; Kohler-Koch, 2010). Studies have already offered insights on how the European integration have enhanced NGOs. However, the impact of de-Europeaisation on NGOs has been well less researched. The findings of this research suggest that with the decline of the European integration, the functioning of social dialogue has worsened, which has led women’s organisations to seek alternative methods for their own existence and development. Although this study addressed only women’s organisations lobbying, networking and funding strategies, further research can examine how other NGOs such
as environmentalists or anti-tobacco lobbyists have been affected by this de-Europeanised climate, which would push the boundaries of civil society literature.

From an empirical perspective, critical junctures such as the war in Syria; the approved Constitutional Referendum, which brought the presidential system to Turkey; and the rise of the extreme-right in Germany, especially the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AFD) winning twenty percent of the vote, may have the potential to constrain WFLR development and assuage the Europeanisation process in each country. On the other hand, this current research has identified that the Family Minister of Germany has brought forward a number of initiatives, which might contribute to the Europeanisation of the German WFLR model, especially the Transparency on Pay Act, which passed in May 2017. With the aid of NGOs, these initiatives have the potential to reduce gender inequality in German citizens’ daily practices of reconciling their work and family lives. Similarly, the potential annulment of the state of emergency in Turkey might calm the intense and anxious climate among NGOs, which could also be a factor, potentially accelerating the Europeanisation process in this specific policy area. Further research might analyse the impacts of these developments on the process of Europeanising WFLR arrangements, which adds another layer to WFLR policy studies and literature on civil society as well as European studies.

A second fruitful empirical avenue for further research might be to explore the in-country differences. In both Turkey and in Germany, there is considerable difference between the eastern and western parts. While the previous research had explained these East-West differences through the centre-periphery relations in Turkey (Mardin, 1973; Ketola, 2010) and the legacy of the divided years in Germany (Engelhardt et al., 2002; Guenter, 2010; Pfau-Effinger and Geissler, 2002), further research might focus on how
these differences are reflected by Europeanisation processes both at societal and discursive levels.
Appendix 1: Interview guide

Interview guide for MPs:

Party:

- How does your party define gender equality?
- How does your party define gender equality in terms of employment?
- How does your party define WFLR?
- Can you please comment on EU WFLR legislation?
- Can you please comment on EU’s involvement in this policy sphere?
- Can you please comment on general female employment trends in your country?
- Can you please comment on existing WFLR legislation of your country?

Goals and action taking:

- Do you have an action plan regarding WFLR?
  
  If yes:

  a) can you please mention about it?

  b) will you be collaborating with any governmental or non-governmental organization while taking action?

  c) can you please comment on your strategies while taking action (party campaign, parliamentary question, parliamentary commissions and so on.)

  If no:

  a) Can you please explain the reasons behind?

Political consensus:

- Can you please comment on your exchange with other political parties with respect to WFLR policy-making?

- Are you facing any opposition? If yes, can you please mention about it?

Civil society relations:

- Can you please comment on the CSOs of your country?

- Can you please mention about your relationship with the CSOs?
Interview guide for advocacy NGOs:

Organization:

- How does your organization define gender equality?
- How does your organization define gender equality in terms of employment?
- How does your organization define WFLR?
- Can you please comment on EU WFLR legislation?
- Can you please comment on EU’s involvement in this policy sphere? (does this involvement have any impact on your organization? If yes, how?).
- Can you please comment on general female employment trends in your country?
- Can you please comment on existing WFLR legislation of your country?
- Can you please comment on government’s position on WFLR?

Goals and action taking:

- Does your organization’s action plan include WFLR? If yes, can you please mention about it?
- Can you please comment on your lobbying strategy? (how do you identify the lobbying target? How do you set the lobbying agenda?)
- Are you facing any problems while taking action? If yes, can you please mention about them?

Networking:

- Do you collaborate with other organisations in terms of your activities regarding WFLR? If yes, can you please mention about it? (how, why, with whom?). If no, can you please mention about it? (why?).
- Do you collaborate with any governmental actors? If yes, can you please mention about it? (how, why, with which institutions?) If no, can you please mention about it? (why?).
- Do you have any exchange with any political party other than your lobbying activity? Can you please mention about it? (how, why, with which parties?).
- Do you have any exchange with any EU institutions? If yes, can you please mention about it? (how, why, with which institution?). If no, can you please mention about it? (why?).
- Do you have any exchange with any international CSO? If yes, can you please mention about it? (how, why, with which institution?). If no, can you please mention about it? (why?).
Interview guide for Academics and research NGOs:

- Can you please mention about female employment trends in your country?
- Can you please mention about key factors behind these trends?
- Can you please mention about division of paid employment and unpaid domestic work between men and women?
- Can you please mention about key factors behind this division?
- Can you please mention about current WFLR trends in your country? (care arrangements, parental leave take up and working time arrangements?).
- Can you please mention about key factors behind these WFLR trends?

Interview guide for EU officials:

Views on EU work and family life reconciliation policies:

- Can you please comment on EU work and family life reconciliation policies?
- Can you please comment on relatively increased EU involvement in terms of WFLR policies in member/candidate states?
- Can you please mention about the informational/technical and financial exchange between the EU and the member/candidate states?

Views on cases:

- Can you please comment on Germany’s/Turkey’s progress since 2000 in terms of WFLR policy making?
- Can you please mention about the informational/technical and financial exchange with Germany/Turkey?
Appendix 2: Participant information sheet

Research Title: The Politics of Europeanisation Patterns of Work and Family life Reconciliation Policy: Germany and Turkey.

My name is Nazli Kazanoglu and I am a PhD student in the School of Social Policy at Ulster University. The essential focus of my PhD is gender equality within the work and family life reconciliation policies and I am particularly interested in comparing the Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey in this specific policy area.

While there have been many accounts of the historical and contemporary development of work-family reconciliation policy both at the EU and national level, the analysis of the transmission process of corresponding EU-standards into domestic levels -especially when it comes to candidate countries- and internalization of those standards by domestic political and non-political actors have been less researched, which this study hopes to address.

I would like to invite you to participate in an interview which will last approximately an hour. Your interview will be completely anonymous and your name will not appear in any report resulting from this research. However, some anonymous quotations may be used only with your permission. Moreover, the interview may also be recorded with your permission in order to facilitate data collection and subsequent data analysis and no further copies will be made of any recordings or interview transcripts. Shortly after the interview, if requested, I will send you a copy of the transcript for you to confirm the accuracy of the interview or to clarify any points you wish.

Any material collected in the context of this research project will be only used for academic non-profit purposes and will be treated as confidential. Any information collected during the course of the research will be stored securely on password protected devises under the guidance of the Data Protection Act (1998). Only the lead researcher (Nazli Kazanoglu) and her supervisors (Prof. Ann Marie Gray and Dr. Markus Ketola) will have access to collected information and it will be destroyed ten years after the completion of this study. Your participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the interview any time without giving a reason.

If you have any further questions or would like more information on the research please contact myself Nazli Kazanoglu on 02890 368461 or kazanoglu-n@email.ulster.ac.uk or contact room 2D02 The Research Graduate Office, University of Ulster, Jordanstown Campus, BT37 0QB, Northern Ireland.

Alternatively, you can also contact my supervisors:
Prof. Dr. Ann Marie Gray: am.gray@ulster.ac.uk
Dr. Markus Ketola: m.ketola@ulster.ac.uk
Appendix 3: Consent form

Title of Study: The Politics of Europeanisation Patterns of Work and Family life Reconciliation Policy: Germany and Turkey

Researcher: Nazli Kazanoglu
Supervisors: Prof. Ann Marie Gray and Dr. Markus Ketola

Please read the following information and tick in the space provided to confirm you agree with the following statements:

1. I agree to take part in the above research project: {_____}

2. I give permission to be audio recorded for analysis purposes only: {_____}

3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and without my rights being affected: {_____}

4. I understand that my personal details will be kept anonymous: {_____}

5. I understand that data relating to this project may be archived: {_____}

6. I understand that the researchers will hold all information and data collected during the project securely and in confidence and that all efforts will be made to ensure that I will not be identified as a participant in the project (except as might be required by law) and that I give permission for the researchers to hold relevant personal data: {_____}

__________________________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________
Name of Participant                          Signature                         Date

__________________________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________
Name of Researcher                           Signature                         Date

The participant and the researcher are to retain a copy each of this form.

School of Social Policy, University of Ulster, Jordanstown Campus, Shore Road, Newtownabbey
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