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**Commentary on the film *It Stays With You: Use of Force by UN Peacekeepers in Haiti,***

**Introduction**

In this commentary on the film *It Stays With You: Use of Force by UN Peacekeepers in Haiti* (50 minutes)[[1]](#footnote-1), which I coproduced with McLaughlin (Film Studies, QUB), I argue that there is inconsistency and confusion at the heart of UN policy on use of deadly force by peacekeepers and that this lack of clarity has resulted in deaths and injuries to people that pose no threat to UN forces or anybody else and have not engaged in any violent activities or indeed in any type of crime. Such deaths and injuries are likely to recur if the United Nations continues to use the same Rules of Engagement for law enforcement operations as it does for operations aimed at curtailing violence by parties to an armed conflict. The problem would be greatly mitigated if the United Nations were to formally commit to applying customary international human rights law standards on use of force in all circumstances except those to which international humanitarian law applies.

**Authorization to Use Force under the UN Charter, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law**

Peacekeepers today are routinely expected to conduct law enforcement operations and assist host state governments maintain law and order for example through providing security so that elections can take place, arresting spoilers, controlling riots.[[2]](#footnote-2) However, UN rules of engagement and policy documents have not kept pace with the expansion of UN peacekeeping to encompass its extensive role in law enforcement and security.

Most peacekeeping missions today have a Chapter VII mandate. This means that the mission may use force to carry out its mandate without risking violating the prohibition on use of force set out in the UN Charter. However, the UN Charter deals with use of force in the inter-relations between states, sometimes referred to as the ius ad bellum: it does not deal with use of force against human beings. The ius in bello, more commonly referred to today as international humanitarian law (IHL), regulates how states must conduct operations in an armed conflict context and includes rules governing who can be targeted and in what circumstances. Law enforcement operations – which would include all state operations involving use of force outside of a hostilities-in-armed-conflict context - are governed by international human rights law (IHRL).[[3]](#footnote-3)

In 1999 the United Nations formally acknowledged that peacekeepers must comply with core rules of international humanitarian law when they are engaged as combatants in an armed conflict.[[4]](#footnote-4) The United Nations has not published any formal statement as to the legal framework governing peacekeepers’ use of force when they are not engaged as combatants in an armed conflict.

Under the Secretary General’s *Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law*,UNpeacekeepers must comply with at least the fundamental rules and principles of IHL set out in the Bulletin “when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.”[[5]](#footnote-5) The intensity threshold for meeting this criterion is high and therefore for most missions international humanitarian law applies only in exceptional circumstances.[[6]](#footnote-6) Even where the intensity threshold is met and peacekeepers find themselves engaged in fierce fighting, IHL will not become applicable unless the fighting takes place in a situation of armed conflict against members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict or civilians directly participating in the conflict. This is because ‘lawful use of armed force’ against people that are not directly participating in an armed conflict - e.g. criminals, rioters, civilian perpetrators of war crimes - is ‘a matter of law enforcement or defence of self or others’ and hence is not governed by IHL.[[7]](#footnote-7)

There is no agreement on the extent of the formal applicability of international human rights law to UN peacekeeping largely because of disputes over the meaning and scope of jurisdiction. But the UN accepts that it must comply with human rights law norms regardless of whether they are formally applicable. The UN’s Human Rights Up Front initiative, adopted in 2013, commits the UN to entrenching human rights norms into all aspects of its missions.[[8]](#footnote-8) The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations has recommended that the ‘entire United Nations system commits to the full implementation of the Human Rights Up Front initiative.’[[9]](#footnote-9)

It is a fundamental principle of law and of morality that all human beings have an equal right to life, in particular an equal right not to be deprived of their life. Outside of hostilities in an armed conflict the only circumstances in which it is permissible to intentionally kill someone is if it is the only means of preventing an attack on someone’s life or preventing serious injury. Even then any use of deadly force must be proportionate to the aim of protecting life.[[10]](#footnote-10) These norms are widely regarded as peremptory norms and hence are binding on the United Nations.[[11]](#footnote-11) But even if they are not peremptory norms they are certainly norms that the United Nations has promulgated and committed to uphold.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Despite the United Nations commitment to upholding IHRL it has not formally acknowledged that peacekeepers that are engaged in armed operations outside an armed conflict context should comply with international human rights law standards. Although IHL is seldom applicable to UN peacekeeping operations, Rules of Engagement for UN peacekeepers remain heavily shaped by it. There is no mention of IHRL in the United Nations Guidelines for the development of Rules of Engagement for the UN Department of Peacekeeping or in the model Rules of Engagement attached to those Guidelines.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Peacekeeping missions are routinely mandated to undertake operations to assist host state governments maintain security and law and order. If these operations were conducted by host state forces they would be required to comply with IHRL under standards promulgated by the United Nations.[[14]](#footnote-14) However, the United Nations currently does not require its own forces to comply with these standards.

**Consequences of the UN’s Failure to Apply International Human Rights Law Standards to its Law Enforcement Operations in Haiti**

The film *It Stays With You: Use of Force by UN Peacekeepers in Haiti* documents extremely high levels of force used by the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH to neutralize armed gangs in Cité Soleil to control gang crime in Cité Soleil and other marginalized communities. MINUSTAH’s Rules of Engagement authorize the mission to use force, ‘up to and including deadly force in order to put a stop to acts of civil unrest.’ Civil unrest is defined in the Rules of Engagement as ‘the commission, perpetration, or instigation of acts of violence that effect public peace and order.’ There is no requirement in that definition that the violence effecting public peace and order must pose and imminent threat to life that could not be averted in any other way. It is hardly surprising given this broad authority to use deadly force and heavy pressure from international and local elites to control gang crime that the UN used force far beyond those permitted under international human rights law standards.

According to the UN’s own records on July 6 2005 the mission fired 22,700, 78 grenades and 5 mortars in a densely populated neighbourhood where most people live in shacks made of salvaged bits of corrugated metal.[[15]](#footnote-15) In another operation in the same neighbourhood on 21st December 2006 the UN fired 10,000 bullets.[[16]](#footnote-16) Witnesses state that MINUSTAH fired from helicopters and the bullets penetrated the roofs of the houses and killed people in their beds including several children.[[17]](#footnote-17) The bullet holes have since been repaired with patches of scrap metal but are still clearly visible.[[18]](#footnote-18) Witnesses also state that MINUSTAH fired from heavy machine guns mounted on armored personnel vehicles, destroyed scores of houses, and killed several families.[[19]](#footnote-19) No one in Haiti other than the UN mission has helicopters. No one in Haiti other than the UN mission has heavy machine guns mounted on armored vehicles. The doctors we interviewed said that they received phone calls from people injured but they were unable to reach them for 24 hours because the UN would not allow anyone in or out.[[20]](#footnote-20)

Everyone that we interviewed said that no one from the UN or from the state had visited them after the raids to inquire as to whether there were any casualties. One woman, Evelyne, said ‘it makes you feel worthless.’[[21]](#footnote-21) Another person, Sorel, said ‘A massacre happens and no one comes to find out how many people were killed, how many people were lost, how many cases there are. It stays with you, you know what you know.’[[22]](#footnote-22)

The deaths and injuries described above and documented in the film *It Stays With You* are not new revelations. Allegations of excessive use of force were made at the time and reported in the press (albeit not on the front pages) and in depth on Democracy Now,[[23]](#footnote-23) and local human rights organizations such the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti.[[24]](#footnote-24) A local resident filmed much of the violence which was shared on social media - and subsequently used in the making of Kevin Pina’s 2009 film *Haiti: We Must Kill the Bandits.*[[25]](#footnote-25) Indeed the business communities that were putting on MINUSTAH to use intense force were well aware that there would be deaths and injuries to people that were not involved in gang activity. On January 9th 2006, Dr. Reginald Boulos, president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry berated MINUSTAH on Radio Metropole saying:

we really do not care about what certain international human-rights-defense groups may say… I do not want anybody to tell me that because there is pressure at the international level, the authorities here should not fulfil their duty, that they should not do what is required of them. If they are afraid of what these international human-rights groups may say, then they do not have a place in the political leadership of MINUSTAH in this country…

You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. We think that MINUSTAH’s generals need to make plans to limit collateral damage. But we in the private sector are ready to create a social assistance fund to help all those who would be innocent victims of a necessary and courageous action that should be carried out in Cité Soleil.[[26]](#footnote-26)

MINUSTAH dismissed the allegations as lies and said that most of those killed and injured were victims of revenge killings by gangs.[[27]](#footnote-27) However US Ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, stated that because of ‘the flimsy construction of homes in Cité Soleil and the large quantity of ammunition expended, it is likely that rounds penetrated many buildings, striking unintended targets’[[28]](#footnote-28) and Douglas Griffiths, then Deputy US Ambassador to Haiti, reported that allegations that MINUSTAH had killed twenty women and children were ‘credible.’[[29]](#footnote-29) The Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno admitted that:

A number of operations have been conducted by MINUSTAH and it is not easy for MINUSTAH to conduct these operations because, operating in an urban environment, ideally you need the kind of very specialized capabilities that the mission doesn’t really have …I have to be honest with you, there may have been some civilian casualties.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Despite these admissions, outside of the left-wing press and activist groups in Haiti there was very little criticism of the UN mission over these raids and surprisingly little questioning of its conduct from a legal perspective. Survivors claim that their voices were ignored as the press, the government and the UN collectively dismissed their stories as false, or if true no more than unfortunate and tragic ‘collateral damage’ that could not be avoided. Such denial compounds the suffering of survivors and exacerbates the trauma. Collateral damage is a term traditionally reserved for situations of armed conflict. This is because collateral damage is a routine consequence of hostilities in armed conflict - but outside of armed conflict use of force that will result in deaths to bystanders is lawful only in very exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, Edmond Mulet, the civilian head of MINUSTAH, routinely referred to deaths andinjuries caused to people that were not involved in crime as ‘collateral damage’.[[31]](#footnote-31)

**The Making of the Film *It Stays With You: Use of Force by UN Peacekeepers in* Haiti**

Our purpose in making the film was to use participatory film practices, in conjunction with socio-legal analysis, as a methodology in order to produce a documentary film that will enable the communities most affected by the use of intense force by MINUSTAH, to tell their story. The film was made in collaboration with the participants, who were shown the film before it was screened publicly so as to ensure that they were happy with their interviews and the way they were presented in the film. Their testimonies make up two-thirds of the film; the remainder consists of interviews with international legal experts - Philip Alston, who was Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings at the time of the UN raids, and his successor Christof Heyns - and interviews with Haitian and Brazilian[[32]](#footnote-32) academics and professionals.

Funded by an Innovation Award from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK), and taking our queue from the work and experience of Naomi Klein,[[33]](#footnote-33) we aimed to use the film to document testimonies and draw out stories that would be unlikely to emerge using standard social science interview techniques: people think about things and talk about things differently if they know that their story is going to be shared with the world particularly if the film is made using participatory practices. Our intention was, and continues to be, to use the film to raise awareness, start a debate, and galvanize human rights organizations and activists to push for an investigation into the alleged deaths and injuries during UN operations and for reform of UN peacekeeping rules on use of deadly force.

Klein, who grew up in the world of activist film-making – her mother Bonnie Sherr Klein was a member of the Canadian *Challenge for Change* group of documentary film-makers – is an activist academic, writer and filmmaker. Today she makes, or commissions, short films to accompany most of her written publications. She doesn’t ‘think films are capable of building an argument as carefully as a non-fiction book. But the film is much better at building emotion.’[[34]](#footnote-34) As Klein observes, one of the added values that film brings to research:

has to do with the collective experience of watching film and the idea of a screening being a community meeting in a way – the idea that it is the beginning of a community meeting. It is such a different experience than reading a book alone, watching the television alone or with a couple of people, because even if what you see or read is incredibly moving, enraging, you’re still alone. Your rage can be isolating. If you’re in a room with people, you can immediately turn and say “what do we do about it” and that’s the question.[[35]](#footnote-35)

# *It Stays With You* had its premiere in Port-au Prince on June 2nd 2017 to a full house of 120 people. MINUSTAH was invited and, although we received no reply to the invitation, afterwards people told us that ‘they were definitely there.’ On the post screening panel Professor Ilionor Louis and a participant in the film, Evelyne Myrtil, spoke of the gap of understanding between the UN peacekeepers and the residents of Cité Soleil and of the fact that despite all their efforts to bring complaints to MINUSTAH they were ignored; no one would listen to them. Haitian novelist Edwidge Danticat made a similar point about the value of the film in facilitating people to tell their stories and bring those stories to an audience outside of their own commmunities. ‘When I saw the people say that no one had come to speak to them before, it reminded me so much of my own family members experiences in Bel Air. Thank you so much for helping these folks tell their stories.’[[36]](#footnote-36)

# The film had its European premiere at the Royal Irish Academy on June 22nd 2017. The screening was on the same evening as the conference on *Human Rights: Culture and Critique* organized by Dr Claire Hamilton (NUIM) and I, with the support of the Royal Irish Academy. Points raised in the post-screening discussion include the value of participatory practices in traumatic situations; the usefulness of the film as an advocacy tool; the need for the UN to investigate the events shown in the film; and the need for the UN to address its policy guidelines on the use of deadly force when carrying out law enforcement operations.[[37]](#footnote-37) Nolan commented that ‘the participatory methodology used in making the film is absolutely crucial and it provides such a sharp contrast to what we heard about the denial of voice, the denial of agency and the denial of justice experienced by the victims of the violence’.[[38]](#footnote-38)

We then began an advocacy campaign combining screenings with panel discussions, social media, and emails to influential people and organizations. People who saw the film commented that they were moved and shocked by the stories; but using the film to move the campaign forward in concrete practical steps has been slow-going. Part of the reason for this is due simply to the fact that awareness raising is an incremental process and takes time. Also, we have learned lessons in terms of harnessing the visceral impact of the film to drive forward debate on the legal and political frameworks.

Klein, speaking on her use of film to support her written academic work, has said that:

I originally thought that I would just use the film at the start of my presentations and I found that went really badly because I couldn’t follow the emotional impact of the short [film] because people were stunned by it. And then just listening to someone talk was anticlimactic.[[39]](#footnote-39)

Klein’s response was to screen the film after her talks rather than before.

We found that the intensity of the emotions people felt after *Watching It Stays With You* had a similar effect: at the end of the screening people seemed stunned and in most cases the silence was then broken by the panel chair (usually an academic) slightly awkwardly trying to move on to familiar ground by opening a debate on the relevant legal issues. It was only afterwards in the social gatherings that people expressed anything about the effect of the film on them personally. This meant that in some of the earlier screenings the value of the collective experience of the event was limited to the shared experience of watching the film, which was strong, but not as strong as it might have been if the shared experience of watching the film had then moved into something akin to ‘the beginning of a community meeting’;[[40]](#footnote-40) before going on to address the legal issues from an academic and professional perspective.

The experience was noticeably different at the Harvard screening.[[41]](#footnote-41) The organizers, Harvard’s Equal Health, Center for Global Health, and Social Medicine Consortium, arranged for a ‘Moment of Reflection’ to immediately follow the film. This was led by Nadia Raymond from the Social Medicine Consortium (who is Haitian). Nadia’s harnessing of the intense emotions in the room - which were present at every screening but often left hanging as almost too personal to engage – worked superbly well in enabling everyone in the audience to share not only their views but their feelings and then drawing from the audience them suggestions as to ‘what can we do about it?’. The Moment of Reflection provided a very powerful transition from the film to the panel debate and generated something akin to the ‘community meeting’ spirit that Klein has spoken about. This meant that when we moved on to the panel debate that ‘community meeting’ spirit continued into the discussions and gave them a sense of shared engagement.

**Recommendations**

*It Stays With You* will be screened as a side event at the Human Rights Council session in Geneva in July 2018, sponsored by the Federation Internationaux de Droits Humains and Franciscans International. We plan to use this opportunity to push for a Human Rights Council resolution asking the United Nations to authorize an an independent and transparent investigation into MINUSTAH’s use of deadly force in Haiti and to promulgate a Bulletin requiring UN peacekeepers to comply with *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials*[[42]](#footnote-42) in all law enforcement operations, for example when they are responding to civil unrest, or arresting criminals, or providing security during elections or public protest marches. We ask that United Nations explicitly affirm its commitment to comply with international human rights law standards on the right to life in all circumstances in which troops use deadly force against persons that are not parties to an armed conflict or civilians participating in one. This would require troops to assess so-called ‘collateral damage’ with much greater care and ensure that any operations in which deadly force is likely to be used are planned so as to ensure that any use of deadly force is proportionate to the aim of protecting life.

1. Available for streaming at https://itstayswithyou.com/film/ [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. U.N. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Field Missions Mandate Table (1 Feb. 2016), *available at* http;//www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/mandate.xls. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. T.D. Gill, R. Heinsch, R. Geiss, ILA Study Group, ‘The Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare’-Interim Report (2014); ICRC, Violence and the Use of Force (2015); ICRC, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law: The Use of Force in Law Enforcement Operations (2015) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. U.N. Secretary-General’s Bulletin, *Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law*, § 1.1, U.N. Doc ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Daragh Murray et. al., Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict (2016), page 262 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law32 (2009), page 62 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Rights Up Front: A Plan of Action to strengthen the UN’s role in protecting people in crises (9 July 2013), *available at* http://www.innercitypress.com/sriban1rightsupfronticp.pdf, page 3, paragraph 4; [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June 2015, paragraph 81(d) (iii) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Special Rapporteur, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions*, Hum. Rts. Council, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at ¶¶ 58, 75, 145,U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36 (2014) (by Christof Heyns) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers, 323-333 (2012); Alexander Orakhelashvili, *The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions*, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 59, 59 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, *The U.N. is Bound by Human Rights: Understanding the Full Reach of Human Rights, Remedies, and Nonimmunity*, 51 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 1, 5 (2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials*; Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Cuba, 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. UN document MD/FGS/0220.0001, May 2002 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials* (note 12) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Special Rapporteur, *Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and Summary Executions,* U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (2006) page 326 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. A. Walter Dorn, *Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (MINUSTAH), 2006–07, 24 Intelligence & Nat’l Security 805, 814 (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. https://itstayswithyou.com/film/ [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Viewed by author, November 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. https://itstayswithyou.com/film/ [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. S Donnelly, Eyewitnesses Describe Massacre by UN Troops in Haitian Slum, Democracy Now, 11 July 2005, <http://www.democracynow.org/2005/7/11/eyewitnesses_describe_massacre_by_un_troops>; [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. UN Accused of Second Massacre, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, January 21 2007 http://www.ijdh.org/2007/01/archive/institute-for-justice-democracy-in-haiti-home-462/ [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. K Pina *Haiti: We Must Kill the Bandits* (documentary with footage taken by local journalists) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=25Mf7Lv5Qo8> [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Dr. Reginald Boulos, president of the chamber of commerce, on Radio Metropole, January 9 2006, ‘All Sectors Stay Home on January 9th’ calling for a strike to demand that MINUSTAH take stronger action against the gangs: http://haitipolicy.org/2006/01/all-sectors-stay-home-on-january-9-to-honor-the-memory-of-the-victims [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 27 March 2006, page 330 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. ["Human Rights Groups Dispute Civilian Casualty Numbers from July 6 MINUSTAH Raid."](http://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearman/cite_soleil/Port_au_Prince_001919_26July2005.pdf) Cable from US Embassy Port au Prince to State Department Headquarters. July 26, 2005, at K Yearman, The Cité Soleil Massacre Declassification Project <https://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearman/cite_soleil.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. ["Haiti Post-Dread Wilme: MINUSTAH Takes off the Pressure."](http://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearman/Cite_Soleil/Port_au_Prince_001829_12July2005.pdf) Cable Number: Port au Prince 001829 July 12, 2005 from US Embassy Port au Prince to State Department Headquarters available fromK Yearman, The Cité Soleil Massacre Declassification Project (n.28) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. UN HAITI/GUENNO 28 July 2005 <http://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/U050/U050729b/> [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. United Nations Juridical Yearbook 2009 (New York 2010) page 429; R Fatton Jr, ‘Haiti’s Crisis of Governance’ in J Heine, A Stewart Thompson, *Fixing Haiti and Beyond* (United Nations University 2011), page 41 at 61; C Lynch, U.N. Peacekeeping More Assertive, Creating Risk for Civilians, Washington Post, 15 August 2005 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. MINUSTAH was under the command of Brazilian generals (with the exception of one temporary appointment following the death of General Bacellar) and the largest troop contributing state was Brazil. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Ezra Winton and Naomi Klein, ‘A Conversation with Naomi Klein’ in *Challenge for Change: Activist Documentary at the National Film board of Canada* ed.s Thomas Waugh, Michael Brendan Baker, Ezra Winton (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Quebec, 2010), pages xv-xxiv [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid, page xxiii [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Ibid, page xviii [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Email to producers 31 October 2017; Also Edwidge Dannticat ‘A New Chapter for the Disastrous United Nations Mission in Haiti?’ *The New Yorker* 19 October 2017 https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-chapter-for-the-disastrous-united-nations-mission-in-haiti; [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. The panel discussions from both screenings are available at https://itstayswithyou.com/screenings/ [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid, Aoife Nolan [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Ezra Winton and Naomi Klein, ‘A Conversation with Naomi Klein’ (n.33), xxiii [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Ibid, xviii [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Armenise Amphitheatre, Harvard Medical School, April 3rd 2018, 5-7.30pm [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Cuba, 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)