The Political Economy of Power–Sharing

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    7 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The paper analyses why office-motivated political rivals may agree to cease conflict to control the government and share power on the basis of an election outcome under proportional representation. As the outcomes of conflict and elections are uncertain, for each rational player the choice depends on which setting secures the highest expected net payoff. Adopting the methodology of the economics of conflict, I show that the factors of crucial importance are attitudes to risk, the comparative effectiveness of the adversaries in contesting election relative to a war, the size of the benefits from office, how the benefits are shared in a power-sharing agreement, and the proportion of the benefits destroyed by fighting.
    LanguageEnglish
    Pages328-342
    JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
    Volume27
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011

    Fingerprint

    political economy
    election
    proportional representation
    methodology
    economics
    Power sharing
    Political economy
    Elections
    Proportion
    Proportional representation
    Economics
    Factors
    Government
    Methodology

    Keywords

    • Power-sharing
    • consociational theory
    • post-civil-war democratisation
    • non-majoritarian institutions
    • proportional representation
    • risk aversion
    • split-the-surplus formula

    Cite this

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    title = "The Political Economy of Power–Sharing",
    abstract = "The paper analyses why office-motivated political rivals may agree to cease conflict to control the government and share power on the basis of an election outcome under proportional representation. As the outcomes of conflict and elections are uncertain, for each rational player the choice depends on which setting secures the highest expected net payoff. Adopting the methodology of the economics of conflict, I show that the factors of crucial importance are attitudes to risk, the comparative effectiveness of the adversaries in contesting election relative to a war, the size of the benefits from office, how the benefits are shared in a power-sharing agreement, and the proportion of the benefits destroyed by fighting.",
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    The Political Economy of Power–Sharing. / Tridimas, George.

    In: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2011, p. 328-342.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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