Abstract
Focusing on the calculus of the political actors with the power to reform
institutions of policy making, the essay examines formally circumstances under
which such institutional framers choose to change the status quo. In an environment
of uncertain outcomes institutional reform will be enacted when all relevant agents
expect to derive a net gain in comparison to the existing institutions. The formal
model shows how such gains depend on the probabilities of beneficial outcomes
before and after the reform, and the benefits relative to costs under the existing and
the reformed institution
institutions of policy making, the essay examines formally circumstances under
which such institutional framers choose to change the status quo. In an environment
of uncertain outcomes institutional reform will be enacted when all relevant agents
expect to derive a net gain in comparison to the existing institutions. The formal
model shows how such gains depend on the probabilities of beneficial outcomes
before and after the reform, and the benefits relative to costs under the existing and
the reformed institution
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Munich Social Sciences Review |
| Editors | Manfred Holler |
| Place of Publication | Munich, Germany |
| Publisher | ACCEDO Verlagsgesellschaft |
| Pages | 33-49 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-3-88278-313-1 |
| Publication status | Published (in print/issue) - 6 Dec 2021 |
Keywords
- Institutional reform
- Public Choice
- status quo
- distributional equity
- unanimous consent
- self-enforcing equilibrium
- efficiency
