Public Choice Perspectives of Institutional Reform: Inquiring politicians’ consent to institutional changes

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Focusing on the calculus of the political actors with the power to reform
institutions of policy making, the essay examines formally circumstances under
which such institutional framers choose to change the status quo. In an environment
of uncertain outcomes institutional reform will be enacted when all relevant agents
expect to derive a net gain in comparison to the existing institutions. The formal
model shows how such gains depend on the probabilities of beneficial outcomes
before and after the reform, and the benefits relative to costs under the existing and
the reformed institution
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMunich Social Sciences Review
EditorsManfred Holler
Place of PublicationMunich, Germany
PublisherACCEDO Verlagsgesellschaft
Pages33-49
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)978-3-88278-313-1
Publication statusPublished - 6 Dec 2021

Keywords

  • Institutional reform
  • Public Choice
  • status quo
  • distributional equity
  • unanimous consent
  • self-enforcing equilibrium
  • efficiency

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Public Choice Perspectives of Institutional Reform: Inquiring politicians’ consent to institutional changes'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this