On the definition and nature of fiscal coercion

George Tridimas, Stanley Winer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

We introduce ideas about how coercion in public finance can be formally defined, building on recent work in the literature. Our discussion illustrates the connection between selected aspects of this research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and Tullock. We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of coercion in a public finance setting. We use a Lindahl solution as the counterfactual social state relative to which coercion inherent in any situation is to be judged in order to evaluate and compare the nature of coercion imposed by a social planner and in an electoral equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationJames M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy,
EditorsRichard Wagner
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Pages487-509
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 16 Feb 2019

Publication series

NameRemaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists, Robert A. Cord, managing editor
VolumeIII

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    Tridimas, G., & Winer, S. (2019). On the definition and nature of fiscal coercion. In R. Wagner (Ed.), James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, (pp. 487-509). (Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists, Robert A. Cord, managing editor; Vol. III). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-030-03080-3_23