We introduce ideas about how coercion in public finance can be formally defined, building on recent work in the literature. Our discussion illustrates the connection between selected aspects of this research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and Tullock. We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of coercion in a public finance setting. We use a Lindahl solution as the counterfactual social state relative to which coercion inherent in any situation is to be judged in order to evaluate and compare the nature of coercion imposed by a social planner and in an electoral equilibrium.
|Title of host publication||James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy,|
|Publication status||E-pub ahead of print - 16 Feb 2019|
|Name||Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists, Robert A. Cord, managing editor|
Tridimas, G., & Winer, S. (2019). On the definition and nature of fiscal coercion. In R. Wagner (Ed.), James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, (pp. 487-509). (Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists, Robert A. Cord, managing editor; Vol. III). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-030-03080-3_23