Conflict, democracy and voter choice: a public choice analysis of the Athenian ostracism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Ostracism, the removal of a political leader from ancient Athens for a period often years without any additional financial sanction or other punishment, was an importantand rather unique institutional aspect of the direct democracy. The present study explainsthe adoption of ostracism as the utility maximizing choice of a self–interested constitutionalwriter—cum—political actor to resolve violent political conflict and illustrates that itacted as a type of negative referendum on politicians. Using notions from game theory andspatial decision modeling, the paper goes on to attribute the infrequent use of ostracism toits two-stage decision making process wherein the decisive voter of the first stage differedfrom the decisive voter of the second stage.
LanguageEnglish
Pages137-159
JournalPublic Choice
Volume169
Issue number1-2
Early online date1 Oct 2016
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 1 Oct 2016

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public choice
voter
democracy
direct democracy
political conflict
decision making process
game theory
referendum
political actor
sanction
politician
penalty
leader
Democracy
Public choice
Vote

Keywords

  • Ancient Athens
  • ostracism
  • intra–elite conflict
  • constitutional choice
  • backward induction

Cite this

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Conflict, democracy and voter choice: a public choice analysis of the Athenian ostracism. / Tridimas, George.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 169, No. 1-2, 01.10.2016, p. 137-159.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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