Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence

George Tridimas

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

    Abstract

    As successful markets are founded on the rule of law and monetary stability, the paper investigates whether judicial independence (JI) and central bank independence (CBI) are positively correlated. After analysing and comparing the meaning, rationale and institutional arrangements for JI and CBI a more nuanced pattern of similarities and differences emerges. Estimation of the statistical significance of the coefficient of correlation between JI and CBI for an international sample shows that there is no significant correlation between indicators of legal independence but a significant correlation between indicators of actual independence.
    LanguageEnglish
    Title of host publicationCONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE
    Pages153-169
    Publication statusPublished - 29 Jul 2011

    Fingerprint

    central bank
    statistical significance
    constitutional state
    market

    Keywords

    • Central Bank Independence
    • Judicial Independence
    • Judicial Review of Policy
    • Delegation
    • Credibility
    • Rule of Law
    • Accountability
    • Political Insurance.

    Cite this

    Tridimas, G. (2011). Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence. In CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE (pp. 153-169)
    Tridimas, George. / Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence. CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE. 2011. pp. 153-169
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    Tridimas, G 2011, Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence. in CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE. pp. 153-169.

    Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence. / Tridimas, George.

    CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE. 2011. p. 153-169.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

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    Tridimas G. Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence. In CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE. 2011. p. 153-169

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