Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence

George Tridimas

Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

16 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

As successful markets are founded on the rule of law and monetary stability, the paper investigates whether judicial independence (JI) and central bank independence (CBI) are positively correlated. After analysing and comparing the meaning, rationale and institutional arrangements for JI and CBI a more nuanced pattern of similarities and differences emerges. Estimation of the statistical significance of the coefficient of correlation between JI and CBI for an international sample shows that there is no significant correlation between indicators of legal independence but a significant correlation between indicators of actual independence.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE
Publisher	Springer
Pages	153-169
ISBN (Print)	978-1-4419-6783-1
Publication status	Published - 29 Jul 2011

Keywords

Central Bank Independence
Judicial Independence
Judicial Review of Policy
Delegation
Credibility
Rule of Law
Accountability
Political Insurance.

Access to Document

COMPARISON of CBI & JIAccepted author manuscript, 236 KB

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

@inbook{b62b3f3c5bf34458b212c7ec931ce5c0,

title = "Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence",

abstract = "As successful markets are founded on the rule of law and monetary stability, the paper investigates whether judicial independence (JI) and central bank independence (CBI) are positively correlated. After analysing and comparing the meaning, rationale and institutional arrangements for JI and CBI a more nuanced pattern of similarities and differences emerges. Estimation of the statistical significance of the coefficient of correlation between JI and CBI for an international sample shows that there is no significant correlation between indicators of legal independence but a significant correlation between indicators of actual independence.",

keywords = "Central Bank Independence, Judicial Independence, Judicial Review of Policy, Delegation, Credibility, Rule of Law, Accountability, Political Insurance.",

author = "George Tridimas",

year = "2011",

month = jul,

day = "29",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-1-4419-6783-1",

pages = "153--169",

booktitle = "CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE",

publisher = "Springer",

address = "Switzerland",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence

AU - Tridimas, George

PY - 2011/7/29

Y1 - 2011/7/29

N2 - As successful markets are founded on the rule of law and monetary stability, the paper investigates whether judicial independence (JI) and central bank independence (CBI) are positively correlated. After analysing and comparing the meaning, rationale and institutional arrangements for JI and CBI a more nuanced pattern of similarities and differences emerges. Estimation of the statistical significance of the coefficient of correlation between JI and CBI for an international sample shows that there is no significant correlation between indicators of legal independence but a significant correlation between indicators of actual independence.

AB - As successful markets are founded on the rule of law and monetary stability, the paper investigates whether judicial independence (JI) and central bank independence (CBI) are positively correlated. After analysing and comparing the meaning, rationale and institutional arrangements for JI and CBI a more nuanced pattern of similarities and differences emerges. Estimation of the statistical significance of the coefficient of correlation between JI and CBI for an international sample shows that there is no significant correlation between indicators of legal independence but a significant correlation between indicators of actual independence.

KW - Central Bank Independence

KW - Judicial Independence

KW - Judicial Review of Policy

KW - Delegation

KW - Credibility

KW - Rule of Law

KW - Accountability

KW - Political Insurance.

M3 - Chapter

SN - 978-1-4419-6783-1

SP - 153

EP - 169

BT - CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE

PB - Springer

ER -