Bargaining for Justice: The Domestic and International Politics of Croatian State Compliance with International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Article 29(d) and (e) Obligations

Christopher Lamont

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

State compliance with International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Article 29(d) and (e) obligations, arrest and surrender orders, remains under explored in international criminal tribunal (ICT) scholarship despite the fact state compliance with ICTY orders has often not proved forthcoming from the states of the former Yugoslavia. This Chapter attempts to identify determinants of state compliance with ICT arrest and surrender orders through an exploration Croatia's interaction with the ICTY from 1995 until 2005 and will include a discussion of both the domestic and international politics of state compliance. It will be argued that because domestic incentive structures established a foreign policy preference for non-compliance, only significant external coercion that threatened elite preferences for integration into western security or economic structures served to bring about state compliance.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGlobal Affairs in a Turbulent World: Perspectives and Controversies
Pages129-142
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Keywords

  • Croatia
  • International Law
  • International Criminal Justice

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