A strategy-proof trust mechanism for pervasive computing environments

Zhiqiang Wei; Wei Zhou; Mijun Kang; M Collins; PA Nixon

doi:10.1109/MOBHOC.2009.5336929

A strategy-proof trust mechanism for pervasive computing environments

Zhiqiang Wei, Wei Zhou, Mijun Kang, M Collins, PA Nixon

Computer Science and Informatics Research

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

As pervasive applications become prevalent in our day-to-day lives, the interactions of service provision and consumption between unknown and strange users are commonplace. Trust and reputation systems play a vital role in such application scenarios. One of the problems is that selfish users are reluctant to render the truthful recommendation without incentive. Even if there are incentives, self-interested users may maximise their profit by falsely declaring their opinions strategically. In this paper, we propose a strategy-proof trust mechanism which is a VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism for honest recommendation elicitation. The characteristics of the mechanism, such as the characteristics of social choice function and the properties of the payments, are also discussed. Simulation results show that our mechanism is effective in preventing strategic manipulation and guarantee that selfish users will give honest recommendations.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Unknown Host Publication
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Pages	728-733
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Print)	978-1-4244-5113-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MOBHOC.2009.5336929
Publication status	Published (in print/issue) - 2009
Event	IEEE 6th International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems 2009. MASS '09 - Macau Duration: 1 Jan 2009 → …

Conference

Conference	IEEE 6th International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems 2009. MASS '09
Period	1/01/09 → …

Keywords

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10.1109/MOBHOC.2009.5336929

Cite this

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title = "A strategy-proof trust mechanism for pervasive computing environments",

abstract = "As pervasive applications become prevalent in our day-to-day lives, the interactions of service provision and consumption between unknown and strange users are commonplace. Trust and reputation systems play a vital role in such application scenarios. One of the problems is that selfish users are reluctant to render the truthful recommendation without incentive. Even if there are incentives, self-interested users may maximise their profit by falsely declaring their opinions strategically. In this paper, we propose a strategy-proof trust mechanism which is a VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism for honest recommendation elicitation. The characteristics of the mechanism, such as the characteristics of social choice function and the properties of the payments, are also discussed. Simulation results show that our mechanism is effective in preventing strategic manipulation and guarantee that selfish users will give honest recommendations.",

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T1 - A strategy-proof trust mechanism for pervasive computing environments

AU - Wei, Zhiqiang

AU - Zhou, Wei

AU - Kang, Mijun

AU - Collins, M

AU - Nixon, PA

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - As pervasive applications become prevalent in our day-to-day lives, the interactions of service provision and consumption between unknown and strange users are commonplace. Trust and reputation systems play a vital role in such application scenarios. One of the problems is that selfish users are reluctant to render the truthful recommendation without incentive. Even if there are incentives, self-interested users may maximise their profit by falsely declaring their opinions strategically. In this paper, we propose a strategy-proof trust mechanism which is a VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism for honest recommendation elicitation. The characteristics of the mechanism, such as the characteristics of social choice function and the properties of the payments, are also discussed. Simulation results show that our mechanism is effective in preventing strategic manipulation and guarantee that selfish users will give honest recommendations.

AB - As pervasive applications become prevalent in our day-to-day lives, the interactions of service provision and consumption between unknown and strange users are commonplace. Trust and reputation systems play a vital role in such application scenarios. One of the problems is that selfish users are reluctant to render the truthful recommendation without incentive. Even if there are incentives, self-interested users may maximise their profit by falsely declaring their opinions strategically. In this paper, we propose a strategy-proof trust mechanism which is a VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism for honest recommendation elicitation. The characteristics of the mechanism, such as the characteristics of social choice function and the properties of the payments, are also discussed. Simulation results show that our mechanism is effective in preventing strategic manipulation and guarantee that selfish users will give honest recommendations.

KW - n/a

U2 - 10.1109/MOBHOC.2009.5336929

DO - 10.1109/MOBHOC.2009.5336929

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-1-4244-5113-5

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BT - Unknown Host Publication

PB - IEEE Computer Society

T2 - IEEE 6th International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems 2009. MASS '09

Y2 - 1 January 2009

ER -

A strategy-proof trust mechanism for pervasive computing environments

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